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The Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) program began in El 
Salvador in early 1991, near the end of the twelve-year civil war. It not only 
represented an extreme form of decentralization in that it transferred the 
responsibility for hiring, firing and supervising teachers to rural communities, but it 
was also the first reform of its kind in Latin America. During the ensuing 20 years, 
the program has received tremendous attention. Indeed, within the country it became 
the central program through which the education sector was rebuilt and expanded in 
the post-war era of the 1990s and 2000s. Internationally, the program has been widely 
recognized as a successful and desirable example of community-level education 
management decentralization. In fact, the program has become a “global education 
policy” in that it has been and continues to be recognized, promoted and adapted 
around the world. 
  
To date, however, the majority of research on this program has been a-
historical in nature and has focused narrowly on whether the program “worked” – 
statistically speaking and with regard to such outcomes as student achievement. In 
contrast, in this dissertation, I analyze the dynamics of how the policy was developed. 
I shed new light on the trajectory of the EDUCO program by focusing, from an 
international political economy framework, on how the program was developed, 
scaled up, and internationally promoted.  In so doing, I am able to highlight relevant 
political economic structures that impinge on education reform, as well as the various 
mechanisms of transnational influence that contributed to its advancement within and 
beyond El Salvador.  In a number of different ways, international organizations are 
central to the policy development process.  
Methodologically, I focus not only on the process of development itself, but 
also on the ways in which actors and forces from multiple levels (local, national, 
international) interact and intersect in that process. Theoretically, by choosing to 
analyze EDUCO’s origins, I attempt to contribute to our understanding of how (i.e., 
through which mechanisms of transnational influence) and why certain policies come 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this introductory chapter, I begin by laying out the problem that the 
dissertation addresses.  This is followed by the presentation of the central research 
questions. Next, I briefly characterize the underlying concept which helps to bound 
this study.  Subsequently, I overview the research methodology on which I rely to 
investigate the phenomenon of interest.  In the final three sections, I comment on the 
significance, scope, and structure of the dissertation. 
1.1 Description of the Problem 
The Education with Community Participation (Educación con Participación 
de la Comunidad, EDUCO) program began in El Salvador in early 1991.  This was 
just as the twelve-year (1980-1992), U.S.-backed civil war was beginning to wind 
down between the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN), an organization of five rebel groups fighting for social and 
economic opportunities for the poor majorities, as well as political participation and 
access to the justice system.  In this context, the EDUCO program, which 
decentralized the management of education from the central to the community level, 
was pursued for a number of reasons.  The stated reasons range from addressing a 
lack of educational access after 11 years of civil war (particularly in rural areas), to 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the education system, to increasing the 
participation of parents in their schools.  This reform – the first of its kind in Latin 
America – represented an extreme form of decentralization in that it transferred to the 
community level the responsibility for hiring, firing and supervising teachers. 
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During the ensuing 20 years, the program has received a tremendous amount 
of attention, both within and outside of El Salvador.  Indeed, within the country it 
went on to become the central program through which the education sector was 
rebuilt and expanded in the post-war era of the 1990s and 2000s.  Internationally, the 
program has been widely recognized by international development agencies as a 
successful and desirable example of community-level education management 
decentralization.  In fact, the program has become a “global education policy” in that 
it has been, and continues to be, recognized, promoted and adapted around the world 
(Verger, 2012).  One of the most striking examples of EDUCO’s global character is 
the fact that it went on to be featured in the World Development Report (WDR) 2004 
– “Making Services Work for Poor People” – the flagship publication of the World 
Bank (at times, I will simply refer to this institution as the “Bank”) (World Bank, 
2003). 
However, before EDUCO became a recommendation for publications by 
international institutions on how to reform the provision of education, it received 
significant attention from researchers.  In their studies, researchers have been 
primarily concerned with various dimensions of the program’s impact (Cuéllar-
Marchelli, 2003; Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Jimenez & Sawada 2003; Sawada, 2000; 
Sawada & Ragatz, 2005; Umanzor et al., 1997), as well as its cost (Sastry, Melamid, 
& Ross 1995), and its operation generally (Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela 2004a,b). 
The majority of studies focused on the effect of specific variables and on specific 
outcomes, including student achievement, attendance, and retention; parental 
participation in schools; and teacher effort and pay.   
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Only Gillies (2010), Poppema (2012), and Reimers (1997b) have examined 
the EDUCO program from a perspective that explicitly incorporates a political 
dimension.  They discuss the emergence of the EDUCO program with regard, both, to 
the relationship between El Salvador and the United States and to the role of 
international organizations such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB).  Nevertheless, it is argued here that their research reveals only part of the 
story.  That is to say, although these authors help to draw our attention to macro-
political issues and to the influence of international organizations, there are important 
aspects of the development of the EDUCO program which should not only be more 
fully investigated within the context of El Salvador but which also should be 
understood within the international political economy of education policy reform 
(Verger, Novelli, & Kosar-Altinyelken, 2012).   
This dissertation thus represents research that attempts to address these issues.  
It seeks to explain in a detailed way the multi-level (i.e., local, national, and 
international) politics of how the EDUCO program was formed in El Salvador. Put 
differently, this dissertation sheds new light on the history of the EDUCO program by 
taking as its focus the process by which this program emerged, was scaled up, and 
was incorporated into national education policy. In deciding to focus on these issues, 
I necessarily place at the center of the analysis those dynamics which have heretofore 
tended to be neglected in research on the EDUCO program – e.g., the action and 
interaction of local, national, and international actors, as well as the mechanisms of 
influence which contributed to the program’s evolution. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
Given the above-mentioned focus, I ask the following overall question and 
sub-question in this dissertation: 
What was the process by which the EDUCO program developed into a 
national education policy in El Salvador? In what ways (i.e., through which 
mechanisms), and with what implications, was this process transnationally 
influenced?  
By asking these questions, this dissertation makes an inquiry not only into the process 
by which the EDUCO program emerged, but also into the ways in which key 
institutional actors impacted each other and altered the trajectory of education reform 
in El Salvador. 
1.3 Transnational vs. International 
 In this dissertation, I distinguish between the terms “international” and 
“transnational.” Following the work of Moutsios (2010), transnational is used in 
relation to the concept of influence.  For example, I use it to indicate that power (as 
manifested in individuals, institutions, events, language) does not manifest “out 
there,” beyond the nation state in some in between “international” space; rather, it, at 
times, manifests in and through actions, interactions, discourse, and structures that 
may span boundaries or may travel from one country to another – or may be 
perceived to do so.  In these cases, the exercise of influence is more appropriately 
characterized as “transnational.”  Put differently, while actors may be international in 
the sense that they come from elsewhere (i.e., beyond the nation state), the forms of 
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influence which they might exercise or to which they might be subject may be 
transnational. 
The term international, on the other hand, rather than being used to 
characterize influence, will be used to indicate that elements such as actors, 
institutions, or discourse can indeed originate from beyond a given country.  
“International,” thus, is used to say something about the nature of a particular entity 
or phenomenon as lying outside or beyond the geopolitical boundaries that demarcate 
countries.  To summarize, then, the use of the term international gives an indication 
of the origin of an entity while the use of the term transnational is associated with the 
exercise of particular forms of influence.  Additional discussion of these and related 
terms can be found in chapter four of this dissertation. 
1.4 Guiding Concept: International Processes of Education Policy Formation 
While I draw implications in this dissertation for the concept of global 
education policy, I do this by focusing on process.  That is so say, while I reflect on 
the contributions of my findings for the phenomenon of global education policy, I do 
so by investigating the process through which EDUCO developed.  As such, it is 
necessary that I define that processual space, in order to bound the unit of analysis.  
To that end, the guiding concept which undergirds this study is international process 
of education policy formation (IPEPF).   
In previous research (Edwards 2012a, 2013), I elaborated this concept by 
drawing on a number of scholars whose work relates to the tradition of international 
political economy (e.g., Dale, 1999a,b, 2005; Engel, 2008; Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, 
& Zegarra, 1990; Jakobi, 2009; Samoff, 2007, 2009; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Steiner-
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Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Robertson, 2011). Drawing on Edwards (2012a, 2013), 
IPEPF are those transnationally influenced processes in which national level political, 
governmental, and, specifically, ministry of education (MINED) representatives 
engage in order to formulate or authorize an official policy text, whether it be an 
education system development plan, a reform strategy paper, a legal decree, or other 
form of official policy statement. With regard to the manifestation of transnational 
influence at the national level in these processes, it can appear in variety of ways – 
each of which is discussed in chapter four of this dissertation. 
In researching the EDUCO program, the task at hand follows from this 
definition.  That is, I endeavor to understand the IPEPF through which EDUCO was 
generated. In so doing, I aim to explicate how and why various forms of transnational 
influence – but particularly influence from international actors – manifested during its 
initial development as a program and then during its inclusion in the reform policy of 
the MINED.  In the end, the concept of IPEPF is seen as useful because it clearly 
delineates the limits of the phenomenon under study, a phenomenon which can often 
be difficult to pin down for analytic purposes due to its dynamic, multi-level, and 
processual nature.   
Relatedly, it is necessary to briefly define two key terms which are integral to 
the concept of IPEPF.  The first is “policy,” which is defined as “positions taken by 
the state” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, p. 4).  The second is “policy process,” which is 
taken generally to refer to “the chronology of an issue coming onto the policy 
agenda” and specifically to “the construction of a policy text” which represents the 
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position assumed by the state (p. 14).1  Having these terms clearly circumscribed is 
important not only for conceptual reasons, but also because it enables one to describe 
more clearly and operationalize more precisely the research methods on which I will 
rely. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
Methodologically, I approach this research as a longitudinal case study 
(Jensen & Rogers, 2001). This methodology corresponds with the needs of the study 
because, as Jensen and Rogers (2001) explain,   
Longitudinal case studies ... focus on political entities or institutions …, on a 
particular agency (see Wood, 1988), or on policies, programs, or decisions. 
[They] may be quantitative or qualitative in character and may involve a 
formal report and analysis of critical events or processes. ... Time is the 
organizing device and the dynamics of change are the primary focus. (p. 38) 
Thus, for multiple reasons, the choice of a longitudinal case-study approach is 
appropriate. For example, this study is political in nature and is concerned with the 
development of a program (EDUCO) over time (from the late 1980s to mid 1990s). 
Furthermore, the research necessarily examines processes (in this case, processes of 
policy formation), and does so by focusing on both critical events and the “dynamics 
of change” of the policy formation processes across which the EDUCO program was 
initially created, subsequently scaled up, and eventually crystallized in the country’s 
education policy (Jensen & Rogers, 2001, p. 38).  
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, “state” refers to national governmental institutions (Krasner, 
1984). 
 8 
 In order to operationalize this methodology, I employed a number of specific 
practices rooted in the matrix-related strategies of Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
the case study tactics of Yin (2003).  I adopted and adapted these methods because 
they facilitate the explication of how processes of education policy formation evolve 
generally as well as the delineation of influence among multiple actors at multiple 
levels (i.e., the local, national, and international levels) specifically.  An extensive 
discussion of these methods can be found in chapter five.   
1.6 Significance of the Research 
 This research is significant for three reasons.  First and foremost, it is 
significant because it uncovers an aspect of EDUCO’s history which has received 
insufficient attention and which is, as a result, poorly understood.  The gravity of this 
gap in our knowledge becomes more apparent when one considers that the EDUCO 
program has indeed become a globally-renowned program which has been emulated 
by numerous countries around the world.  The implication is that development 
practitioners and scholars in the field of comparative and international education 
poorly understand the origins one of the most influential education reforms to emerge 
in recent decades.   
Secondly, the significance of this research stems from its ability to clearly 
unpack – and hence problematize – the dynamics of interaction among local, national, 
and international actors as they engage in the development of policies in a particular 
country (El Salvador).  Certainly, an understanding of such processes which goes 
beyond the official story regarding EDUCO’s development has much to offer, for it 
can suggest lessons to policymakers, education specialists, development workers, 
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scholars, and activists who either currently find themselves in similar situations or 
who wish to alter how IPEPF proceed in practice.   
Third, and finally, investigating the case of EDUCO is valuable because it 
allows us to take a thorough look at how transnational influence affects (or can affect) 
the way in which education policy is created – particularly, though not exclusively, in 
developing countries. That is, theoretically, this research contributes an in-depth case 
study that has implications for how we conceptualize education policymaking in an 
increasingly globalized world, where actors, institutions, and ideas from elsewhere 
are increasingly interconnected, not only among themselves but also with actors at the 
national and sub-national levels. 
1.7 A Note on Scope 
This dissertation is not an evaluation or case study of the EDUCO program 
and its effects at the community level, although through my future research I intend to 
make contributions at that level.  This dissertation is neither a case study of how the 
EDUCO program worked at the national level, though this aspect of the program’s 
experience will be addressed to the extent necessary in order to answer the research 
questions stated above.  Third, this dissertation does not primarily examine how the 
EDUCO program has gone on to become a global education policy which has been 
promoted to and copied by numerous countries around the world.  Finally, this 
dissertation does not place front and center the more recent developments through 
which the EDUCO program was modified (read: undone) beginning in 2011 by 
President Mauricio Funes – the first president to be elected in the post-war period 
from the FMLN.  These developments, too, will be the focus of my future research.    
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Rather, this study is about education policymaking in contexts and through 
processes in which actors and influence from within and beyond a country are central.  
In other words, this study focuses on processes of development of educational reform, 
policy, and practice – and the ways in which actors, ideas, and agendas from the 
international and national spheres interact.  The central point is to understand the 
institutions, interests, and interactions that gave way to the creation and formalization 
of EDUCO in El Salvador. 
1.8 Dissertation Structure 
The remaining chapters in this dissertation proceed as follows. In chapter two, 
I review both the trends in thinking behind decentralization in development as well as 
the approaches of international institutions that have accompanied those trends.  In 
chapter three, I review the existing literature on the EDUCO program. Following that, 
in chapter four, I specify the theoretical foundations, conceptual space, and analytic 
framework which guide the analysis in this dissertation.  I then use chapter five to 
detail the methods employed to answer the stated research questions. Next, in chapter 
six, I characterize the national and international context in the years prior to the 
beginning of EDUCO’s development.  After this point, in chapter seven, I present the 
findings related to how the EDUCO program developed.  In chapter eight, I discuss 
the findings presented in the previous chapter and begin to consider the theoretical 
implications.  In the penultimate chapter, I engage in a discussion of the significance 
of the EDUCO experience, in addition to reflecting on the implications of the 
dissertation for the concept of global education policy.  Finally, in chapter ten, I 
offers a few concluding remarks and makes suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Trends and Institutions in Development and 
Decentralization  
 
 The value of the EDUCO case is not only in what it tells about how 
international organizations and ideas interact with national actors and how they 
influence education policy at the national level, but also in what the case of EDUCO 
means historically.  That is, in addition to understanding the dynamics among 
national and international actors, we must place those dynamics into historical context 
in order to reveal the significance of the EDUCO program in relation to the larger 
trends of decentralization that we observe in the post-WWII context.  In order to 
accomplish this task, I periodize overarching trends in the thinking around 
decentralization and development since the 1950s.  In so doing, I not only overview 
the general approach to decentralization in each period but will also specify how 
educational decentralization was conceptualized. To begin, however, I provide a few 
preliminary comments to contextualize both my review of decentralization trends as 
well as the focus that I will place on the role of international institutions in relation to 
those trends.   
2.1 Trends of Decentralization in Development and Education 
In the years following WWII, many newly independent countries and former 
colonies engaged in efforts at nation-building and “development.”2  In ways that will 
be explained below, these efforts had implications for the organization of government 
generally and education systems specifically.  Over time, three more or less distinct 
                                                 
2 Despite my reservations about this term, I use if for lack of a suitable alternative.  
See Esteva (1995) for a critical discussion of its meanings.  
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periods of decentralization can be identified – the first being from the end of WWII to 
the mid 1970s, the second from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s, and the third from 
the mid 1980s to the present (Cohen & Peterson, 1999).   
Over the course of these three periods, multilateralism has gradually 
influenced to a greater degree education policy in developing countries.  In practice, 
what stands out is the rise of the World Bank, especially since the 1970s, at which 
point it became not only the “largest single source of development finance,” but also 
the “largest single provider of finance for educational development” (Mundy, 1998, p. 
466-7).  Indeed, by 1970, World Bank lending to education, at $409 million, already 
outstripped the total regular budgets of both the United Nations Education, Science, 
and Culture Organizations (UNESCO) ($355 million) and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) ($51 million) combined (Mundy, 1998, p. 459).  
Education sector lending from the World Bank reached just over $2 billion by 1995 
(Mundy, 1998, p. 467).  And by 2004, lending approximated $4 billion (World 
Bank/IEG, 2006).  Furthermore, in addition to financing development projects, the 
World Bank is also widely regarded as a leader in the research and thought that 
undergirds and promotes policy for development and education reform worldwide 
(Jones, 2004; Mundy, 1998).   
With regard to education decentralization specifically, Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, 
Patrinos, and Santibánez (2009) noted that a full 18 percent of all World Bank project 
lending between 2000-2006 was dedicated to it.  More recently, in 2010, in a World 
Bank review of all lending to primary and secondary education since 2001, it was 
found that the percentage of projects incorporating school-level decentralization has 
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continued to increase.  That is, while 48 percent of projects between 2001-2005 
included support for school-level governance, this number jumped to 64 percent 
between 2006-2009 (World Bank/IEG, 2010, p. 28).  Thus, not only is the World 
Bank a leader in both development financing and thought, but it also commits 
significant resources to its policy preferences, at least in the case of local-level 
decentralization. 
The implication, then, is that an attempt at unpacking general trends in 
approaches to decentralization in developing countries should also highlight the 
related thinking and policies of the World Bank.  Indeed, the World Bank has since 
the early 1980s acted as the primary barometer for reform trends pursued in 
developing countries (Mundy, 1998).  Thus, in what follows, after delineating the 
three overarching periods of thinking related to decentralization and development in 
the post-WWII period, I then focus on the World Bank’s approach to decentralization 
in the most recent period, the period in which the EDUCO program came into 
existence.   
Of course, in the development arena, the World Bank is not the only 
institution, though its research and financing are often the most influential.  To be 
sure, there is a range of other international organizations, each with interests that 
converge and diverge with those of the World Bank.  As such, after discussing the 
World Bank’s approach to decentralization, I then present that of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), German Technical Cooperation 
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(GTZ),3 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), and UNESCO.  Presenting the approach of these organizations to 
decentralization will serve as important background information for later chapters of 
this dissertation.  
2.1.1 Period 1: 1950s – 1970s: Nation-Building and Diverse 
Decentralization-Related Concerns 
 
In developing countries in the post-WWII period from the mid-1950s to the 
early 1960s, decentralization was, as Conyers (1984) notes, “characterized by the 
establishment or strengthening of local governments in a number of countries, many 
of which were then still under colonial jurisdiction” (p. 188).  Then, as Cohen and 
Peterson (1999) explain: “In the early 1960s proponents of decentralization focused 
on using the intervention [of decentralization] to assist colonies in beginning a 
transition to independence, achieving political equity, and responding to rising 
demand for public goods and services” (p. 1; see also Conyers, 1983, and Rondinelli, 
1980).4  National development and – relatedly – the establishment of national 
education systems were two of the main foci of developing countries.  Indeed, the 
creation of the latter was seen as a hallmark of a modern nation (Boli, Ramirez, & 
Meyer 1985; Hanson, 1970; Williams, 1997).  To some extent, even rural village 
schools were understood to play a role in the modernization process (Nash, 1965).  
                                                 
3 Note that in January 2011 GTZ was combined with two other German organizations 
to form the German Agency for International Cooperation, known as GIZ 
4 See Cohen and Peterson (1996), Conyers (1984) and McGinn and Street (1986) for 
references to an extensive literature related to decentralization in development 
generally in the 1960s. 
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In the international education literature of the time, few discussions of 
decentralization exist, particularly in relation to developing countries.  What literature 
does exist, however, was written within the context of nation building and, 
concomitantly, expanding school systems.  For example, scholars discuss 
decentralization in relation to the following: The desirability of local curriculum 
control in China (Lauwerys, 1957); the establishment of community schools in 
Ethiopia to increase access, to “counteract the overacademic nature of the country’s 
educational system,” and to protect the community from “the danger of being 
dominated by the central government” (Wodajo, 1959, p. 29); the inculcation of 
democratic and individualistic principles in Korea and Japan, along with 
decentralized control of the education system (Adams, 1960a,b); and the expansion of 
both government oversight and educational provision at the sub-national level in 
Malawi and Tanzania (Rimmington, 1966; Dodd, 1968).  The literature thus reflects 
many tensions which persist today as diverse countries wrestle with educational 
governance reforms: The protection of community schools from central government 
intervention, the promotion of locally-determined curricula, and the 
institutionalization of both centrally directed programs and monitoring at the local (or 
sub-national) level.   
Fundamentally, however, this period was about the expansion of educational 
provision and the “modernization” of school systems. Additionally, in the context of 
post-war intervention and Cold War ideological battles, it is not surprising that the 
literature reflects tensions around the incorporation of democratic and individualistic 
values in countries such as Japan, Korea and China.  Only towards the end of this 
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period do we begin to see the development of, and preoccupation with, administrative 
theories of decentralization (Chapman, 1973; Hanson, 1970, 1972) – a focus which 
would continue and intensify in the following period. 
2.1.2 Period 2: Mid 1970s – Early 1980s: Decentralization and 
Administrative Development 
During this time, aid agencies pressed decentralization reforms for a variety of 
related reasons.  As Cohen and Peterson (1999) explain, this was done “in order to 
promote … improved management and sustainability of funded programs and 
projects, equitable distribution of economic growth, and facilitation of grassroots 
participation in development processes” (p. 1; see also Murray, 1983).  The United 
Nations report, Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa, provides one 
concrete example of the thinking around decentralization in development generally at 
this time (Apthorpe, 1972; see Conyers, 1984, for more examples).  This document, 
and others like it, reveal that, in various parts of Africa (e.g., Kenya, Sudan, 
Tanzania5) and China, decentralization was conceived of as social and economic 
transformation through the centrally initiated projects of rural land reform, worker-
owned farm cooperatives, and local development committees (Apthorpe, 1972; 
Rondinelli, 1980; Rodinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983; Samoff, 1979).  Broadly 
speaking, there was attention, at least at the discursive level, to the ways in which the 
poor could be agents in their own development (Cornwall, 2006, p. 55).6  
                                                 
5 See Ishumi (1984) for more on the role that education played in community 
development in Tanzania during this time.  
6 For extensive literature in this regard, see the citations in Conyers (1984).  
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Mundy (1998) summarizes the thrust of the times: “The poverty-alleviation 
approaches to international development and education that emerged in the 1970s 
could be considered an attempt to construct ‘an international welfare program to be 
carried out as far as possible by the poor themselves’” (Mundy, 1998, p. 467).  For 
example, Robert McNamara, then-president of the World Bank, commented in 1975 
that, with regard to alleviating poverty and balancing development, “experience 
shows that there is a greater chance of success if institutions provide for popular 
participation, local leadership and decentralization of authority” (World Bank, 1975, 
p. 90-98, as cited in Rondinelli, 1980, p. 133). Though the approaches of this time 
were not without their own challenges and shortcomings, they demonstrate a very 
different approach to decentralization than that which has predominated since the 
beginning of the third phase, as will be shown in the following sections.  
Education systems around the world continued to modernize and expand 
during this second phase of decentralization.  Relatedly, the overarching concern was 
with “administrative development” (not decentralization specifically); planners 
approached education systems as complex organizations and created reform strategies 
for their improvement based on rational and technical logic (McGinn, Schiefelbein, & 
Warwick, 1979; Zadja, 2002).  At the same time, many educational systems 
experienced challenges, problems that one would expect to accompany a period of 
rapid expansion of education.  For example, many school systems were described as 
disorganized, in disarray, and unwieldy (Eliou, 1978; Hanson, 1983, 1984; Bray, 
1985).   
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In this context, decentralization to the sub-national level emerged in some 
countries as an attractive policy option to improve the quality of the education system 
(Hanson, 1983, 1984).  In a number of cases, where some form of administrative 
decentralization either already existed or was then being implemented, matters of 
both politics and organizational capacity altered or hampered the reform as designed.  
This was the case, for example, in parts of Africa and Latin America, as well as 
Papua New Guinea (Bray, 1985; Hanson, 1983, 1984, 1989; McGinn & Street, 1986).   
In contrast to later forms of decentralization, which would concentrate on the 
community or school level, these policies focused on provincial, regional, or state 
level administration (Bray, 1985; Hanson, 1983; 1984).  Moreover, the 
implementation of these policies highlighted the fact that decentralization to 
provincial, regional, or state levels was a process inescapably bound up in politics and 
complex organizational dynamics, despite the best efforts of central planners at 
rational planning.  Going forward, and as a reaction to the problems caused by such 
politics, proponents of decentralization would emphasize its implementation in 
accordance with the principle of efficiency, which implied the reduction of state 
bureaucracies, as will be discussed.  
2.1.3 Period 3: Mid 1980s – Present: Decentralization as Efficient and 
Effective Provision of Public Services 
This third phase began to pick up steam in the mid-1980s.  It has been 
characterized by the promotion of decentralization policies by international 
development organizations in order to, in the words of Cohen and Peterson (1999), 
“facilitate more efficient and effective production and provision of public goods and 
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services and to establish market-oriented economies in which public sector tasks can 
be privatized” (p. 2).  Before delving into what that meant in practice, it is useful to 
point out two features of the broad reform context that have facilitated the 
predomination of such a focus in the third period.   
First, the international economic and political landscape changed with the 
election of President Ronal Reagan in the United States in 1980 and Prime Minister 
Margaret in 1979 Thatcher in the Britain, both of whom privileged neoliberal policy 
prescriptions across all areas of government and society, including education (Clark 
& Astuto, 1986; Smith & Exley, 2006).  Moreover, the Reagan and Thatcher 
governments reflected and embodied a neoliberal perspective on education reform 
that had been gaining momentum in recent decades (Easton & Klees, 1992; Klein, 
2007; Whitty & Edwards, 1998).  Their elections, thus, had the effect of shifting the 
dominant global discourse around the role of the state and the provision of public 
services such that neoliberal policy prescriptions were elevated (Harvey, 2005).7  
Second, and at the same time, so too did the development lending landscape 
change.  That is, the World Bank established itself as financially and intellectually 
independent in the realm of education for development (Jones, 2007a,b; Mundy, 
1998).  Heretofore, the Bank had only a “small education projects division” which 
relied on UNESCO for technical assistance until the early 1980s (Chabbot, 1998, p. 
209).  With the emergence and growth of human capital theory since the 1960s and 
1970s, however, the World Bank had a rationale for supporting education that it 
could, within the new international political economy, easily promote because it 
                                                 
7 This trend affected not only developing but also developed countries, such as 
Australia (Abu-Duhou, 1999) and New Zealand (Dale, 2001; Peters, 1995). 
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theoretically aligned with the needs of a neoliberal economic framework (Mundy, 
1998).  In this context, the World Bank dramatically increased, both, loans for its 
education development projects as well as the size of its education research 
department (Mundy, 1998).  Consequently, beginning in the late 1970s and 
continuing into the 1980s and beyond, one sees the increasing influence of World 
Bank thinking in education development policy (Verger & Mundy, forthcoming).  To 
that end, the following section examines the development of Bank thinking with 
regard to decentralization – both generally and with regard to education.  
Conceptually, however, there is an important distinction to be made before 
moving on to the next period.  As noted above, this period has been about the ideas of 
efficiency8 and effectiveness in service provision and about the introduction of 
policies that are based on market principles and which lead to the privatization 
(Cohen & Peterson, 1999). This is separate from a focus on political decentralization.  
For example, while democratization and political decentralization were often the 
mantra of USAID during the 1980s, as will be discussed in a section below, the idea 
of decentralization in the development arena during this third period was increasingly 
associated with efforts at reducing the responsibilities of the state, minimizing its 
bureaucracy, shifting its functions to the private sector, and/or reforming the 
provision of public services so that they operated more like the private sector.  These 
tendencies are further highlighted and unpacked below by focusing on the discourse 
                                                 
8 Only since the 1960s has the term efficiency been imbued with a technical, 
economic definition.  For an interesting discussion of the development of its meaning 
over time, see Rutgers and van der Meer (2010).  
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of the World Bank from the 1980s onward, both generally and with respect to 
education.  
2.2 International Institutions and Decentralization 
 Having characterized the overall trends in thinking with regard to 
decentralization and development since the 1950s, this section turns to the approaches 
of individual international organizations.  In that international organizations played a 
role in the formation of the EDUCO program, it is necessary to have an idea of their 
approach to and interest in the issue of decentralization.  This is particularly true of 
the World Bank and USAID, the two institutions that would be most heavily involved 
in education reform in El Salvador in the 1980s and 1990s.  
2.2.1 The World Bank, Decentralization, and EDUCO 
Just as did the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, the World Bank began 
the 1980s by denouncing the inefficiency of the State.  In its World Development 
Report (WDR) 1980, the Bank first indicated that it considered the organization and 
operation of central governments to be fundamental obstacles to progress (World 
Bank, 1980). Three years later, this idea was taken further when the WDR 1983 
centered on theme of “Management for Development” (World Bank, 1983).  This 
report emphasized economic efficiency through privatization and the reorientation of 
government in order to make bureaucracies more responsive.  By the end of the 
1980s, the concept of “good governance” emerged as a way to achieve that 
responsiveness.  This is evident from the 1989 declaration by Barber Conable, then-
president of the World Bank:  
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A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of 
public institutions.  Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are 
important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public 
service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an 
administration that is accountable to its public. (World Bank, 1989, p. xii, 
emphasis added) 
Decentralizing the responsibility for the provision of government services was seen as 
a prime way to achieve good governance. In theory, a shift in control of public 
services from the central government to more local levels would increase the 
influence of the voice of local populations and thereby make those services more 
relevant, appropriate, responsive, and accountable to those who consumed those 
services.  To continue to encourage a redefinition of the state and the spread of the 
idea of good governance the World Bank issued a plethora of publications on these 
ideas in the 1990s (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 1999; Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998; 
Peterson, 1994; World Bank, 1991a, 1992, 1994c, 1997c).  
 Similarly, in the realm of education, the idea of decentralization first emerged 
in the mid 1980s.  For example, in their report on “Financing Education in 
Developing Countries,” Psacharopolous, Tan and Jimenez (1986) singled out the idea 
of “decentralizing management.”  For them, this meant permitting more private 
schools and relaxing restrictions on community-run schools.  They explain the 
rationale for the latter in the following terms:  
In some countries, restrictions apply not only to schools owned by individuals 
or religious institutions but also to those operated by community groups – 
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parents, neighborhood associations, occupational guilds or even entire local 
political subdivisions, such as villages or districts.  Such constraints often 
prevent private and local schools from responding adequately to their 
constituents’ changing needs. As a result, not enough school places are 
offered, and the type and quality of education may not be what parents and 
students want. To counteract this inefficiency, central authorities could loosen 
… their administrative and financial control over educational systems.  
Schools would then be accountable to both central authorities and local 
groups, including parents, villages, neighborhood associations, and other 
forms of local government. (Psacharopolous, Tan, & Jimenez, 1986, p. 33, 
emphasis added) 
Thus, Bank professionals working in the education sector made it clear that they, too, 
saw decentralization as desirable for its ability to engender more efficient and 
accountable management, not to mention for its ability to raise additional resources.  
Indeed, if parents and the community were responsible for the management of 
education, they could also pay fees to support the school’s budget (Psacharopolous, 
Tan, & Jimenez, 1986).  In addition to making schools more responsive, paying fees9 
would reduce their dependence on the national government – something that was seen 
as inherently positive due both to the perceived undesirability of government-
provided services and because the governments of developing countries were 
experiencing budget constraints from the debt crisis of the 1980s (Harvey, 2005; 
                                                 
9 The World Bank placed much emphasis on the paying of school fees in the 1980s 
and beyond. See, for example, Thobani (1984).  For a critique of Thobani and school 
fees, see Klees (1984).  
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Ward, 2004).  
 In the decade following 1986, when the above-comments were made by 
Psacharopolous, Tan and Jimenez (1986), one can see the World Bank’s continued 
interest in the concept of educational decentralization exemplified in a few 
publications.  Two that stand out are by Winkler (1989) and Prawda (1993).  The 
former discussed at length the principles and potential benefits of decentralization at 
regional and local levels, while the latter reviewed the experiences of four countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico) in Latin America, none of which had 
decentralized to the community level.  Noticeably, these two reports evince a 
continued interest in conceptually elaborating the benefits of decentralization and in 
evaluating mid-level forms of decentralization in terms of their efficiency, 
effectiveness, and ability to generate additional revenue.   
What they did not present, however, was empirical evidence that community-
level decentralization led in practice to the results that had been suggested by 
Psacharopolous, Tan, and Jimenez (1986). Nevertheless, in its 1995 publication, 
Priorities and Strategies for Education (World Bank, 1995a), the Bank chose to 
further highlight the ideas that had been advanced nearly a decade prior.  This 
document stated that, in addition to contributing directly or indirectly to the cost of 
education, “households … could participate in school management and oversight, 
along with their wider communities” (World Bank, 1995a, p. 120). The implication is 
that World Bank continued to prominently highlight the idea of community 
management of education, though studies had not yet shown the effectiveness of such 
a strategy in practice.  
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  It was not until the late 1990s that the World Bank had what it considered to 
be acceptable evidence of the benefits of community-level decentralization (Jimenez 
& Sawada, 1999; Jimenez & Sawada 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005; 
Umanzor et al., 1997).  By that time, the studies which garnered attention were 
evaluations of El Salvador’s EDUCO program, which had been in place and 
expanding since early 1991 with the financial and technical assistance of the World 
Bank.  While a later section of this chapter specifically discusses the EDUCO studies 
referenced above, suffice to say here that those studies generated a good deal of 
excitement within the Bank because they were believed to confirm some of the 
benefits of what Bank staff working in the education sector thought to be possible 
based on the theory of community level decentralization.  By the end of the 1990s, 
while El Salvador was not the only country to have begun a program for the 
community-level decentralization of education management (examples at the time 
included Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, among others around the world),10 it 
was the case that received the most attention at the time.   
To that end, a couple of events capture the magnitude of the attention that the 
program received, as well as the gravity of EDUCO’s example in the development 
arena more broadly.  With regard to the attention it received, what stands out is that in 
1997 EDUCO was labeled a “flagship program” by, and was awarded the Award for 
Excellence from, the World Bank, beating out hundreds of innovative development 
programs from other countries (Eriksson, Kreimer, & Arnold, 2000).  With regard to 
the gravity of the EDUCO program internationally, one must remember that the 
                                                 
10 See Nielsen (2007) for a discussion of 12 countries that implemented community-
level decentralization with assistance from the World Bank between 1990-2006.  
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EDUCO was centrally featured in the WDR 2004, titled “Making Services Work for 
Poor People” (World Bank, 2003).  While EDUCO’s appearance in this WDR 
occurred for a variety of reasons – ranging, for example, from the positive studies that 
emerged in the late 1990s to its internal promotion by Bank staff who worked on the 
program in El Salvador – what is most relevant for us here is that these events raised 
the profile of community-level education decentralization as a desirable reform which 
should be emulated in developing countries around the world.  Indeed, in that the 
WDR 2004 has since its publication been seen by development professionals as 
template for how to reform governmental service provision for increased 
accountability through decentralization, the EDUCO program has garnered 
significant attention. 
Of course, while the EDUCO program was perhaps the most well-known 
example of community-level decentralization, it should be noted that the World Bank 
did not restrict its attention to this case alone, and that it promoted the idea globally.  
For example, the World Bank, in its 1999 Education Sector Strategy, made 
decentralization one of the Bank’s official lending priorities (World Bank, 1999a).11  
With regard to the practice of reform, that same document declared: “Virtually all of 
the Bank’s client countries are tackling education reforms that often involve 
decentralizing management” (World Bank, 1999b, p. ix). In the 2000s, 
decentralization remained on the short list of preferred reforms of the World Bank, 
                                                 
11 Speaking to the content of the 1999 Education Sector Strategy, H. Dean Nielsen 
(2007), a Senior Evaluation Officer in the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group, notes: “The Bank’s Education Sector did not define what it meant by 
decentralization in the paper, nor did it offer any evidence that decentralization made 
a difference in valued education outcomes, but there was clearly a determination to 
support countries in their movements towards more local decision-making” (p. 84).  
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and, as such, featured in high-profile publications that continued to discuss its theory 
and implementation (World Bank, 2005).  
In more recent years, however, there have been shifts in the World Bank with 
regard to educational decentralization. First, beginning in the late 2000s, the World 
Bank began to de-emphasize community decentralization through/to parent councils 
in favor of decentralization through “school-based management” (SBM) (Barrera 
Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibáñez, 2009).  The difference is that the concept SBM 
does not restrict decision-making authority to parent councils alone (as in the case of 
EDUCO). SBM considers that responsibility for school-related decisions should be 
transferred away fro the central level and to “a combination of principals, teachers, 
parents, and other community members” (Barrera Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & 
Santibáñez, 2009, p. 3).  
The second shift has become evident with the publication of the Bank’s 
Education Strategy 2020: Learning for All (World Bank, 2011).  What this 
publication makes explicit is that the Bank now sees it as necessary to reform not 
only community-level provision of education in terms of accountability-based 
relationships but also entire national education systems and “all learning opportunities 
in a given society” along these same lines (World Bank, 2011, p. 29). Whereas 
accountability relationships were previously primarily conceptualized at the 
community level between parent councils and teachers, it is now suggested that such 
relationships should also exist between the central ministry of education and 
individual schools on the basis of student achievement.  
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2.2.2 USAID and Decentralization  
 Like the World Bank, the work of USAID has for decades related to the 
concept of decentralization. This work can be divided into three periods, the first 
being from the 1960s to the 1980s, the second being from the end of the 1980s to the 
2000s, and the third having begun in the late 2000s (Dinino, 2000). In what follows, I 
briefly detail each of these periods. 
With regard to the first period, a report by Dinino (2000) is instructive. As she 
writes:  
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Agency [(i.e., USAID)] has funded hundreds 
of projects in local communities. Through its community development 
programs, USAID supported rural development, principally by providing 
technical assistance to local governments on animal husbandry, sanitation, 
education, and health. The Agency also supported municipal development by 
providing credit for local housing and infrastructure, training in management 
techniques, and technical assistance on establishing new systems for taxation, 
personnel, and services and in developing regional development plans. (p. 3).  
When one considers that USAID is an arm of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising 
that the organization focused on community development and local government, 
particularly because, as Cornwall (2006) points out, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1966 explicitly stated that “‘emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum 
participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the 
developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local 
governmental institutions’” (p. 55).  A further observation of this period is that the 
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approach of USAID corresponded generally with the dominant trend of the time in 
that it focused on rural development and improving the administrative capacity of 
sub-national levels of government.  Of course, given the context of the Cold War 
during this period, the rhetoric and work of USAID should also be seen as a form of 
soft diplomacy through which the U.S. Government sought to spread democracy, to 
encourage market capitalism, and to win the hearts and minds of people in developing 
countries (Melissen, 2005). 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, USAID has, according to Dinino 
(2000), highlighted democratization while also incorporating the perspective that 
decentralization enhances effectiveness (see also USAID, 1998). In Dinino’s (2000) 
words:  
Based on lessons learned and given the proliferation of newly emerging 
democracies, the Agency revised its approach to local government assistance 
in the late 1980s. Most importantly, it began to emphasize the democratic 
aspects of local government programs. Decentralization became a means to 
empower citizens locally and to disperse power from the central government 
to localities, as well as a means to improve local administration. Indeed, the 
Agency has realized that the active participation of an informed citizenry 
significantly enhances the effectiveness and the sustainability of development 
efforts at the local level. (p. 4) 
Notably, however, and in contrast to the typically market-based mechanisms of the 
World Bank, USAID perceives that effectiveness of local development is secured 
through accountability mechanisms such as “town meetings, public hearings on major 
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issues, participatory planning and budgeting, and opinion surveys” (Dinino, 2000, p. 
4).  Thus, while USAID began to focus on the increasingly popular concept of 
effectiveness, it did so in ways that did not center on market principles.  Instead, more 
liberal ideas of participation were at the heart of their concept of decentralized 
planning (Edwards & Klees, 2012).  
 In the most recent period – i.e., since the early 2000s – the foreign policy of 
the United States has taken place in a post-9/11 context.  While democracy promotion 
now has been generally conflated with the Global War on Terror, and while it is seen 
as a means to stability in conflict-ridden, fragile and transitional states, what is most 
relevant here is that USAID itself continues to encourage democratization and 
decentralization through the Office of Democracy and Governance, which, as of 
2005, was funded to the tune of $1.3 billion annually (Melia, 2005).  Lastly, with 
regard to this most recent period, it should be noted that the economic rationale for 
decentralization has been elevated.  That is to say, in addition to decentralization’s 
potential to bring political stability, to create more transparent political institutions, 
and to improve democratic participation, an additional dimension highlighted is the 
ability of decentralization to allow sub-national governments to “promote the 
conditions for investment and economic development in a number of dimensions, 
including public infrastructure investments, pro-growth regulatory and tax 
environments, human resource development, and public-private partnerships” 
(USAID, 2009, p. 24).   
Though USAID can be seen as a form of soft diplomacy working on behalf of 
the U.S. government, it has not until recently tended to emphasize an explicitly 
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economic rationale for decentralization.  Put differently, while the U.S. government 
began to promote neoliberal economic rationales for the reform of government, it was 
not until the late 2000s that USAID underlined that decentralization of responsibility 
for economic policy to sub-national levels could be advantageous for reasons of 
investment and growth.  In contrast, from the 1960s to the 1980s its priorities were 
rural development and the strengthening of municipal governments; then, from the 
1980s to the early 2000s, the priority was democratic local governance and increased 
effectiveness through citizen involvement in participatory planning and feedback 
mechanisms.  As will be shown in this dissertation, USAID’s involvement in El 
Salvador during this period not only reflected overall trends of the time but also went 
beyond them in that it acted in other ways to advance the interests of the U.S. 
Government.  
 To conclude this section on USAID and decentralization, I briefly summarize 
its approach to decentralization with regard to education specifically.  Just as with the 
dominant trends described earlier, USAID focused on the extension and rational 
planning of education during the 1960s and 1970s (see, e.g., McGinn & Warwick, 
2006).  Then in the 1980s, USAID’s approach to education decentralization followed 
its more general approach to decentralization at the time, as described above.  In other 
words, USAID supported initiatives that would help move the administrative 
responsibility for education management to sub-national levels (Hanson, Garms, & 
Heymans, 1986).  In Latin America, this focus complemented a commitment made in 
1979 by education ministers to organize, within their countries, regional-level 
education management systems (McGinn & Street, 1986). 
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 In education, it was not until the 2000s that USAID began to focus on 
community-level decentralization, and even then it was not a central priority; rather, it 
was one of a list of priorities for the organization at the time (see, e.g., USAID, 
2003b). By the time that community-level decentralization entered the agenda of 
USAID, it was seen as one step to take towards ensuring that public services were 
efficient, effective, and available (USAID, 2003b).  Interestingly, in 2003, when 
USAID produced a document titled “Approaching Education from a Good 
Governance Perspective,” it advocated the decentralization of educational authority in 
tandem with the establishment of accountability mechanisms in the form of learning 
outcomes and educational standards, just as the World Bank had done in its 1999 
Education Sector Strategy Paper (USAID, 2003a; World Bank, 1999b). It should be 
emphasized, however, that USAID has not focused exclusively – or even primarily – 
on education decentralization to the community level, and that it has continued to 
fund decentralization initiatives at a range of sub-national levels.  In retrospect, then, 
it stands out that community-level education decentralization has been primarily a 
thrust of the World Bank, particularly during the decade of the 1990s.  
2.2.3 Decentralization and Other International Organizations 
Importantly, the World Bank and USAID are not the only two international 
organizations to support decentralization. To be sure, other notable international 
organizations have. Bergmann (2002), for example, noted that the German 
Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has promoted school-level 
decentralization because it believes that it helps to strengthen institutions and improve 
the management of education. Similarly, a 2005 UNESCO document indicates that 
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this organization has also been interested in decentralization, albeit in the context of 
system-wide analysis and to the extent that its implementation at various levels helps 
to achieve the Education For All goals (UNESCO, 2005).  Unlike the World Bank 
and other international organizations, UNESCO has not supported decentralization 
for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness; instead it has advocated a conception of 
decentralization known as “nuclearization” in order to expand access and to 
strengthen the connections among communities, civil society organizations, and the 
ministry of education (Picón, 1990).  
In addition, there is, for example, the Asian development Bank (ADB), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP).  To summarize, the first of these mirrors the 
thinking of the World Bank in that it focuses on market principles, the efficiency of 
resource allocation, community-financing of education, and the downsizing of central 
bureaucracies (Behrman, Deolalikar, & Soon, 2002).  Likewise, the second of these 
(i.e., the OECD) singles out allocative efficiency and the ability to hold government 
officials accountable as the primary reasons to decentralize government generally 
(Jutting, Kauffmann, McDonnell, Osterrieder, Pinaud, & Wegner, 2004). Finally, the 
UNDP takes a more sector-wide approach when it analyzes the question of 
decentralization.  For this organization, the question is how to increase institutional 
capacity such that decentralization can be supported and participatory planning 
practices can be implemented (Altmann, Cariño, Flaman, Kulessa, & Shulz, 2000; 
Scott, 2006) 
 Clearly, then, there are a number of organizations that engage with the idea of 
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decentralization in the international arena.  While this is the case, the decision to 
focus, primarily, on the World Bank and USAID stems from the fact that these two 
organizational actors are most relevant to decentralization in the Salvadoran context.  
Thus, although it is useful to have an idea of the range of global and regional actors 
that variously support and advance the notion of decentralization, the case of EDUCO 
necessitates a nuanced understanding of the World Bank and USAID in particular.  
2.3 EDUCO, Decentralization, and Trends in Development 
From a long-term perspective, four observations can be made at this point 
about the place of EDUCO in relation to larger trends around decentralization in 
development.  The first is that the EDUCO program came about during the most 
recent wave of reforms that have fallen under the label of decentralization.  In 
contrast to earlier waves that occurred in the post-WWII period, this final wave has 
focused on decentralization as a strategy to reduce the size of the central government, 
to transfer the primary responsibility for the management of public services closer to 
the local level, and to institute relationships of accountability that – in theory – result 
in increased efficiency and effectiveness.  While such reforms have been promoted in 
(though not necessarily implemented by) such developed countries as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, it has been the World Bank which has led the call for 
such reforms to be instituted in developing countries. 
Second, we see that EDUCO began at a particular point in time.  That is, in 
1991, though the World Bank had recently begun to theorize the benefits of regional 
and community decentralization (Psacharopolous, Tan, & Jimenez, 1986; Winkler, 
1989), it did not yet possess empirical evidence to confirm that the suggested benefits 
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would arise in practice.  Third, once studies started to emerge in the second half of the 
1990s about the EDUCO program, we see that it not only received accolades from the 
World Bank itself, but also became an example which was held up for other countries 
to follow. Fourth and finally, in that EDUCO was the first community-level education 
decentralization program for which the Bank had evidence that it considered rigorous 
and reliable, this program helped to solidify this type of reform on the shortlist for 
global lending priorities in the education sector. 
Notably, however, an overview of decentralization trends in the development 
arena in the post-WWII period does not give a sense of why the EDUCO program 
initially began.  That is to say, by its nature, the act of characterizing international 
trends necessarily glosses over the complex and multi-level politics that influenced 
the development of EDUCO.  What is more, for all the attention that this program has 
received, the details of its beginnings are virtually unknown.  To that end, I address in 
the next chapter that which previous research has revealed about EDUCO’s origins, 
operation, and outcomes.  
 36 
 
Chapter 3: Literature on EDUCO 
 
 A dissertation on the development of the EDUCO program begs the question 
of what we already know.  In this chapter, I not only review political analyses related 
to how EDUCO was formed, but also literature that is more evaluative in nature.  
Doing so will bring us up to date with what is already known about the EDUCO 
program.  As well, doing so will help to point to the necessity of revisiting how the 
EDUCO program began and developed – for, indeed, these latter two issues are those 
that have yet to be fully explored and explained.  In addition to political analyses, I 
also review four other groups of EDUCO-related literature. In total, then, five 
separate literatures will be assessed. 
In terms of sequence, the first group of literature to be explored contains the 
existing political analyses.  By reviewing this group, we get a sense of issues that 
have already been illuminated from a political perspective. Beyond a focus on their 
findings, however, the review will also be attentive to the limits of the data sources 
and frameworks employed in those studies. Not all political frameworks are 
equivalent, and the findings generated through their application may be constrained if 
relevant information is not incorporated. 
The second set of literature I review relates to EDUCO’s implementation over 
time.  A summary of this literature is valuable because it shows the increasing 
centrality of the EDUCO program to the Salvadoran education system over the course 
of the 1990s, as well as the way in which MINED policy towards EDUCO has shifted 
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in the 2000s.  In this section, the information I provide helps to contextualize the 
studies reviewed in the third group.  
The third section of this chapter is the longest.  Here, I critically review in 
detail the available evaluations of the EDUCO program.  I include those studies 
performed by researchers within and outside the World Bank.  Although these studies 
take as their object the outcomes of the EDUCO program in implementation – and not 
the process of policy formulation itself – a review of them here is still instructive 
because it goes beyond a recounting of findings. Put differently, I critically appraise 
their conclusions in relation to their evidentiary basis, their methods, and the larger 
political-economic context in which the studies were performed.  By doing this, I will 
provide some indication of the extent to which the World Bank sought to demonstrate 
that the EDUCO program would produce positive results.  In other words, by 
unpacking the context and limitations of these evaluations, we gain a sense of the 
extent to which key personnel at the World Bank desired to demonstrate significant 
impacts from the EDUCO program. In this dissertation, the knowledge contained in 
existing program evaluations is not viewed in isolation, but rather is understood as a 
tool in a political process.  
Next, I present the fourth group of literature.  This literature is characterized 
neither by program evaluations nor by in-depth political analyses.  Instead, this 
literature is promotive of the EDUCO program. As will be shown, it is also reflective 
of the extent to which international institutions during 1996-2006 elevated EDUCO 
around the world. This literature circulates globally, and it is salient to the case study 
at hand because it will facilitate, later in this dissertation, a discussion of the larger 
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implications that can stem from processes of policy formation in developing 
countries. 
The fifth and final group of literature brings us up to the present day with 
regard to the status of EDUCO globally.  At this point, I will review literature which 
suggests that EDUCO is in the burn-out phase of its career (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010).  
After 2005/6, while a few of the World Bank’s EDUCO studies continue to be 
relevant for global education policy, the EDUCO program no longer enjoys its status 
as a prominent policy on the global stage. In terms of this dissertation, arriving at a 
discussion of EDUCO’s progressive withdrawal from the limelight brings us back to 
the unanswered question of how EDUCO began – an issue which this dissertation 
unpacks in later chapters. 
3.1 Politically-Focused Analyses of EDUCO 
 Five studies are reviewed in this section, three of which are concerned directly 
with a political analysis of EDUCO’s development (Bejar, 1997; Gillies, 2010; 
Poppema, 2012), while two are only indirectly so (Moncada-Davidson, 1995; 
Reimers, 1997b).  Together, they show the extent of what previous research has 
revealed about the process that generated EDUCO. 
 The most comprehensive study of education reform in El Salvador in the post-
war period has been carried out by John Gillies (2010) and a group of researchers 
working with the Academy for Educational Development (now known as FHI360), an 
international NGO that has for many years worked with USAID to provide technical 
assistance in El Salvador.  For this study, the researchers conducted extensive reviews 
of academic literature and loan documents, conducted interviews with former senior 
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MINED officials, and drew on their own knowledge from their long-term 
engagement.  In so doing, they were able to explain educational change in El 
Salvador in political, institutional, and technical terms.   
 With regard to the origination of the EDUCO program, however, the findings 
are at once insightful and vague.  An example is when Gillies (2010) speaks to the 
national and international contexts that surrounded the initiation of EDUCO.  As he 
explains, EDUCO was “initially created out of necessity – and reinforced by the 
national emphasis on democratization, the global discourse on access and community 
participation, and the almost unflagging support from donors” (Gillies, 2010, p. 73).  
Unlike other pieces on EDUCO, the findings by Gillies (2010) directly indicate that it 
was not, as the MINED has at times claimed, a simple case where the then-Minister 
of Education decided one day in 1991 to create the EDUCO program after taking a 
field trip to the countryside to investigate the state of education there as the war was 
winding down (MINED, 2006).  To the contrary, and as Gillies (2010) finds, the 
creation of EDUCO was at the nexus of national educational needs (particularly, a 
lack of access to education in many regions of the country due to the war), global 
trends in thinking about education (e.g., as exemplified by the World Conference on 
Education For All in 1990), and the interests of international donor institutions (e.g., 
IDB, UNICEF, USAID, World Bank, etc).   
However, while this piece represents a significant contribution to our 
knowledge, it refrains from unpacking to a greater degree the dynamics of these 
factors – i.e., perceived needs at the national level, global trends, and international 
institutional interests.  It may be the case that the work by Gillies (2010) and 
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colleagues, sponsored and published by USAID, avoided more explicit statements 
about such sensitive dynamics due to the institutional context of their work.  In the 
findings section of this dissertation, I attempt a more revelatory account of how those 
factors interacted and played out in El Salvador, and with what implications for 
EDUCO.   
A more recent piece is by Margriet Poppema (2012), a researcher at the 
University of Amsterdam.  This piece is particularly valuable in that it brings 
attention to the regional and international contexts related to education reform in 
Central America in the early 1990s.  Specifically, it applies a critical lens to the 
analysis of political and economic factors that contributed to the development of 
community-level decentralization in Nicaragua and El Salvador.  In so doing, 
Poppema (2012) rightly points out that Central America was, in the 1980s, a hot spot 
of U.S. intervention due to the context of the Cold War and the fear that these small 
countries would turn into beachheads of socialism in the back yard of the United 
States.   
However, in her chapter, Poppema (2012) attributes the creation and initial 
funding of the EDUCO program to USAID.  As she writes, “USAID was directly 
involved in the conceptualisation of the EDUCO strategy.  Their subsequent funding 
was channeled through the 1990-1999 Strengthening Achievement in Basic 
Education (SABE) project, funded with US$33 million” (p. 171).  In addition, she 
goes on to say: “Thereafter the EDUCO programme became actively supported by the 
World Bank and the [IDB]” (p. 191). While it is true that USAID was heavily 
involved in education reform in El Salvador in the early 1990s, and while the SABE 
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program was certainly influential in terms of bringing attention to a range of issues 
(e.g., curriculum reform, textbooks, teacher training, etc.), it was the World Bank and 
other institutions that had a hand in the creation of the EDUCO program, as will be 
shown in the findings chapter (chapter seven) of this dissertation. It is suggested here 
that the difference in findings between this dissertation and the work of Poppema 
(2012) is due to the limited and difficult-to-acquire nature of information on how the 
EDUCO program began.  
A third piece of research – by Bejar (1997) – falls in the same vein as the two 
pieces discussed above in that it analyzes education reform dynamics in El Salvador 
during 1989-1996.  While Bejar (1997) does an excellent job of providing global 
context and describing many important aspects of education reform in the early 1990s 
(aspects that will be more fully discussed in the findings chapter of this dissertation), 
there is a noticeable lack of attention given to institutional agency. An example of 
Bejar’s (1997) account is bereft of a sense of agency is the following statement: “The 
pilot plan was prepared [in 1991] and the EDUCO program was prepared and 
negotiated with the World Bank” (Bejar, 1997, p. 55).  We are left wondering about 
how the pilot plan was prepared, by whom, and under what conditions, as well as 
about the nature of the negotiations and how the agreements reached between the 
MINED and the World Bank influenced the way in which EDUCO developed. These 
are gaps that I hope to fill through the present research.  
Beyond the studies by Bejar (1997), Gillies (2010), and Poppema (2012), 
there is other research on education reform in El Salvador which relates to the 
EDUCO program.  Notably, however, this research does not take as its objective 
 42 
either dynamics or policymaking process.  Nevertheless, they do provide information 
of which we should be aware and which should be kept in mind.  These pieces are by 
Moncada-Davidson (1995) and Reimers (1997b).  
The first of them – by Lilian Moncada-Davidson (1995), a professor at the 
City University of New York – appeared in Comparative Education Review in 1995 
and relied on interviews with MINED officials, teachers, and parents at various times 
from 1990 to 1993, in addition to extensive literature and document review.  This 
research focuses on the potential for education reforms enacted in the immediate post-
war period to contribute to the building of a peaceful society. While this article does 
discuss the EDUCO program, the majority of its attention is directed at critically 
appraising the economic and social policies (including education) passed by President 
Alfredo Cristiani, elected in 1989 from the right-wing party of the Nationalist 
Repulican Alliance (ARENA).  Thus, though not primarily an analysis of EDUCO, it 
does comment on two issues that are understood to have impacted the program’s 
generation.   
The first is international agreements and international conferences.  Namely, 
these were the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, developed in 
1989, and the World Conference on Education For All, which took place in 1990 and 
which was also referenced by Gillies (2010).  The second issue raised by Moncada-
Davidson (1995) is that the EDUCO program was not only based on the politically-
charged, popular-education practices12 begun during the war in rural areas of the 
country in the absence of government-provided educational services, but also that the 
                                                 
12 See Hammond (1998) for more on popular-education during the civil war in El 
Salvador.  
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government’s decision to institute the EDUCO program was a strategy to co-opt these 
popular-education practices, which were understood by the government to be part and 
parcel of left-wing strategies to educate and inculcate people in FMLN-controlled 
regions such that they, too, would join the movement for socialist reform of the 
country.  In going forward with my case study of EDUCO, I pay particular attention 
to the relevant and impact of these issues.   
 Lastly, a study is found in the literature by Reimers (1997b) that also touches 
on the first half of the 1990s.  It should be noted that Reimers’ (1997b) chapter was 
written after he had spent a few years intimately engaged in El Salvador, where he 
facilitated policy-related discussions and policy-related research which was funded by 
USAID (see, e.g., Reimers & McGinn, 1997).  As with Moncada-Davidson (1995), 
the chapter is not about policy formation and is focused instead on an assessment of 
EDUCO’s experience in practice and its implications for equity.  Yet, given Reimer’s 
depth of knowledge on how education policy was made – particularly during the 
years 1993-1995, when EDUCO was in the process of becoming official policy – it is 
suggested that his observations should be noted here and taken into account later in 
relation to the findings of this dissertation.  Reflecting on education reform, he writes:    
The education sector lacks a process of defining policies. At present the 
definition of policies is not forward looking, but instead is conditioned by the 
availability of resources, international cooperation, and available information. 
In this sense there is no vision guiding the sector’s development efforts and 
connecting them to larger objectives beyond those of the education system. 
The lack of information and of systems that permit the development of a 
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broad vision translates into a budget process unconnected to planning. Next 
year’s allocations are the same as last year’s, a mechanism that repeats the 
status quo more than it promotes change and educational innovation (Reimers, 
1997b, p. 154) 
Without mentioning EDUCO, he raises a number of issues directly related to policy-
making.  In reconstructing the series of events that led to EDUCO’s being made 
official, it will be interesting – and necessary – to investigate the claims made by 
Reimers (1997b), that formal processes did not exist and that the definition of policy 
was conditioned by resource availability, interests of international organizations, lack 
of information, and the absence of a broad vision of education’s role in society.  More 
than testing the general validity of these assertions, however, the question in this 
dissertation is the extent to which these factors existed and, if so, how they impacted 
the development of EDUCO as a policy.  
 To summarize, the studies reviewed above have tended to focus on the 
interests of different actors, as well as the dynamics of interaction of those actors 
during the early 1990s generally.  Noticeably, however, the reviewed studies did not 
sufficiently unpack EDUCO’s development. That is to say, while they speak to issues 
related to the EDUCO program, they did not adequately interrogate the multiple and 
competing interests in El Salvador at the time and, concomitantly, how those interests 
influenced EDUCO.  Looking ahead, the literature reviewed for the next section has 
allowed me characterize what is known about the experience of EDUCO in practice.  
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3.2 EDUCO in Practice 
There are a number of pieces that speak to EDUCO in implementation 
(Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003; Gillies, 2010; Meza, Guzmán & Varela, 2004a; Reimers, 
1997b; Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995). These pieces include information on (a) 
when EDUCO commenced in practice, (b) how EDUCO operated, (c) where EDUCO 
operated, (d) the program’s institutional structure, (e) the way in which it was scaled 
up, and (f) the relationship between the EDUCO program and official policy of the 
MINED.  To overview here the information contained in the literature on these 
aspects of the EDUCO experience is helpful because it provides valuable background 
information to keep in mind when discussing the process of EDUCO’s development.  
Additionally, fleshing out such information at this point allows one to identify 
additional gaps between what is already known and that which I aim to delineate with 
this dissertation. 
3.2.1 Commencement of EDUCO in Practice  
 I reviewed in the previous section the existing explanations in the literature 
about how EDUCO became official policy, and I showed that there is uncertainty 
regarding when and how – exactly – the EDUCO program began in practice.  Some 
of this uncertainty is addressed by the literature on EDUCO’s implementation.  On 
the one hand, for example, Reimers (1997b) notes that “EDUCO began in May 1991” 
(p . 155) and that the program was funded with “a loan from the World Bank” (p. 
157).  On the other hand, you have a description by Bejar (1997) that is less precise in 
terms of timing and which mentions two funding organizations:  
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In 1991, MINED began to implement a program funded by the World Bank 
and UNICEF and aimed at rehabilitating, through institutional reforms, the 
public sector’s capacity to efficiently administer and provide health and 
education services. In the education field, priority was given to preschool and 
primary level basic education in the rural sector and the program on 
Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) was created (p. 51, 
emphasis added). 
Thus, though there seems to be consensus that EDUCO began in practice in 1991, it 
would be useful to triangulate (a) the date, (b) the antecedents to the program’s 
beginning, and (c) the way in which UNICEF and the World Bank contributed to that 
beginning, especially since existing publications (with the exception of Poppema 
[2012]) almost exclusively mention only the World Bank as having supported 
EDUCO’s initiation.  This dissertation is primarily focused on tracing the process by 
which EDUCO became official policy, but it will also be able to clarify these issues 
because I ground the explanation of the policy process in a political economic 
analysis of the context of – and antecedents to – that process.  
3.2.2 How EDUCO Operated 
The EDUCO program was constituted by a particular set of arrangements that 
had the community level at the center (Reimers, 1997b).  To begin with, a group of 
five volunteer parents from each community was elected on two-year terms to form a 
Community Education Association (ACE), an entity which was given legal status and 
which was charged with contracting and paying (with funds transferred from the 
MINED to the ACE via bank account) the teacher(s) that would work in their schools. 
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These ACEs were thought to act as accountability levers that reduced teacher 
absenteeism and resulted in increased teacher effort in the classroom, especially since 
teachers were hired on one-year contracts and did not belong to teachers’ unions.13 
Communities either had to have a student population of at least 28 students per grade 
or be located in an area where no other educational services were available in order to 
be eligible to join the EDUCO program (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003). 
With the funds provided by the MINED, each ACE additionally had the 
responsibility of purchasing necessary didactic materials.  Moreover, given their 
autonomous legal status, ACEs were able – and, to some extent, expected – to carry 
out fund raising activities by contacting national and international governmental 
organizations and NGOs.  In practice, ACEs were initially formed by the MINED 
without the provision of school space or the funds necessary to construct a 
schoolroom.  Communities frequently donated time, materials, and labor to build 
schools (Lindo, 1998).  
The MINED, on the other hand, was responsible for a range of tasks.  These 
included the following: facilitating the creation of the ACEs; training the members of 
the ACEs in administrative and accounting procedures; setting the minimum criteria 
for teacher selection by the ACEs; designing and providing curricula; and overall 
coordination, supervision, and monitoring of the program as it was scaled up 
(Reimers, 1997b).14  Some of these tasks, such as the provision of curricula and books 
                                                 
13 This was done by requiring that ACEs hire teachers who were not members of the 
official MINED career system (World Bank, 1994).  If a teacher was not a member of 
that system, they were not eligible to join a teachers’ union.  
14 For additional details on the technical aspects of the EDUCO program, see Gilles, 
Crouch and Flórez (2010). 
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as well as regular supervision of the teachers, proved difficult, particularly in the first 
years of the program since funding was not provided, at that time, to finance them in 
practice (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995).   
On a system-wide basis, the implementation of the arrangements described 
above were, in theory, thought by EDUCO’s proponents to make more efficient what 
was perceived as a highly centralized and overly bureaucratic MINED.  On one side, 
accountability and enhanced quality were supposed to result from the community-
level management of teachers, as described above.  On the other side, in terms of 
cost, a number of features functioned to reduce costs traditionally incurred by the 
MINED.  These included costs for the construction of schools.  Because the MINED, 
in the beginning, did not provide for the construction of schools when it created 
ACEs, community members either made use of existing space in a community 
member’s house or worked together to build a classroom.  Initial budget assumptions 
for the EDUCO program also did not include costs of capital – i.e., textbooks and 
desks (World Bank, 1994a).  Lastly, cost savings were projected because the EDUCO 
teachers – while required to have a university teaching certificate in order to be 
contracted – were paid at a rate below that of teachers with equivalent credentials and 
who were members of the official MINED career system – a saving which worked 
out to $3 per student per year, on average (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995).15   
                                                 
15 Over time, the payment of EDUCO teachers was modified.  For example, starting 
in 1995, they began to receive bonuses ($40/month) for working in rural areas 
(Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010). With this bonus, EDUCO teachers made, on 
average, 7 percent more than teachers in traditional schools (Gillies, Crouch, & 
Flórez, 2010, p. 61). For more salary comparisons, see Rodríguez (2003).  Then, in 
2007, they began to be paid according to the official MINED pay scale, though they 
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In practice, despite the savings measures mentioned above, an early cost 
analysis done in 1995 shows that EDUCO is a less-costly option only if EDUCO 
teachers are not paid according to their credentials and if EDUCO schools are not 
provided with adequate school supplies (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995).  The 
possibility that EDUCO was less costly in practice than traditional public schools was 
further reduced when, in the mid-1990s, funding to the program increased through a 
series of loans from the World Bank and IDB.  That funding, as well as additional 
funds from the MINED, ensured that the EDUCO program was well-resourced.16  
3.2.3 Where EDUCO Operated 
 The EDUCO program has always operated in rural areas.  When the program 
began, the rural areas were most in need of education, the official provision of which 
had discontinued during the civil war.  When the MINED began to offer education 
again in the conflict-affected areas, it did so through the EDUCO program. This 
means that, in practice, EDUCO was initially targeted and implemented in areas that 
were not only rural, but also among the poorest in the country, not to mention 
previously-controlled by the FMLN.  As Reimers (1997b) stated, “EDUCO has been 
established disproportionately in the eastern part of the country in the areas that had 
been in conflict, in spite of the fact that there are higher percentages of children of 
school age out of school in the western part of the country” (p. 157).  This fact lends 
                                                                                                                                           
still did not have the job security afforded to teachers who were members of the 
MINED career system (Ramírez, 2007). 
16 The loans from the World Bank, for example, covered costs related to the 
following: Teachers’ guides, classroom libraries, school supplies, teacher training, 
ACE training, teacher trainers, management information systems, and the design and 
implementation of supervision system, among other things (World Bank, 1997).  
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credence to the notion that the MINED sought to neutralize the “loosely organized 
network of popular teachers who identified with the opposition during the war” 
(Reimers, 1997b, p. 157).  Over time, however, EDUCO was expanded to all rural 
areas of the country and some urban areas, as Gillies, Crouch and Flórez (2010) 
detail. 
3.2.4 EDUCO’s Institutional Structure 
 Initially, an EDUCO program coordination office was established in the 
MINED.  This office performed such tasks as supervision, teacher training, 
curriculum design, administration, finance, and communications (Bejar, 1997; World 
Bank, 1994a).  Three regional education offices were responsible – from 1993-1995 – 
for technical assistance at the community level (MINED, 1994a). In 1995, the 
functions of the EDUCO coordination office began to be integrated into the existing 
administrative units of the MINED, and in 1997, with assistance from USAID, the 
MINED created 14 departmental directorates which matched the political-
administrative structure of the country and which provided community-level technical 
assistance for EDUCO from that point onwards (Gillies, 2010).  
3.2.5 Amplification of EDUCO 
 As will be shown later in this dissertation, EDUCO received tremendous 
attention from the MINED and donor agencies alike because (among other reasons) it 
was the first instance of community-level education management decentralization.  
Between the popularity of the program and the desire of the MINED to once again 
provide education services in rural areas, the EDUCO program expanded rapidly and 
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was implemented extensively, and it came to serve as the driving force for reform 
within the MINED during the 1990s, as noted by Gillies (2010).  Numerically, while 
the EDUCO program started as a pilot in only six schools in 1991, at the end of 1994 
it already covered 2,316 teachers and 74,112 students (Cuellar-Marchelli, 2003).  Ten 
years later, in 2004, these figures had risen to 7,381 and 378,208, respectively.  
Approximately 55% of rural public schools (which make up two-thirds of all schools 
in El Salvador) would operate under the EDUCO program (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 
2010). 
 One can also examine the expansion of EDUCO in terms of grade-level 
coverage.  While the EDUCO program was initially only intended as a strategy to 
provide education at the preschool level and in grades 1-3, it was subsequently 
expanded in 1994 to cover through grade 6 and then again in 1997 to cover through 
grade 9 (Meza, Guzmán, & Varela, 2004a). After 2005, even some high schools 
became EDUCO schools (Gilles, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010).   
 Until 1999, the MINED allowed EDUCO and traditional schools to co-exist 
through what it called ‘mixed’ schools (Lindo, 1998).  Here, a traditional school 
would also receive funding from the EDUCO program and the community would 
establish an ACE. With the funding received, the community would hire a teacher for 
lower grades (grades 1-3).  The school would then use its non-EDUCO budget to pay 
a teacher to provide grades 4-6.  As mentioned, the EDUCO program was initially 
targeted to communities where educational services were not provided during the 
civil war. However, as the MINED began to scale up the program it did so by creating 
‘mixed’ schools, as well.  
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Over the course of EDUCO’s amplification, it is important to note that not all 
aspects were continued.  In particular, the ‘parents school’ did not last.  Initially, 
through this function of the EDUCO program, parents from the community would 
meet with EDUCO teachers once per month to learn basic literacy and numeracy and 
to strengthen relations between the community and school (Reimers, 1997b; World 
Bank, 1994).  As Reimers (1997a) notes, however, the percentage of EDUCO schools 
that fulfilled this function dropped from 50 to 25 between 1992 and 1993.  
 In conjunction with the expansion of EDUCO, the MINED also decided to 
expand the application of the principles on which the EDUCO program was founded.  
That is, in 1998, after receiving the President’s Award for Excellence from the World 
Bank for the EDUCO program in 1997, the MINED decided to move all schools in 
the country to school-based management.  Traditional public schools have since been 
governed by school boards (in Spanish known as a consejo directivo escolar, or CDE) 
(Gillies, 2010).  CDEs differ from ACEs in that they are comprised of three parents 
plus the school principal, two teachers, and two students (older than 12 years).  With 
the exception of the school principal, CDE members are elected, for a period of two 
years.  In addition, and in contrast to EDUCO, the teachers belong to the official 
MINED career system and are not contracted directly by the CDE (MINED, n.d.).  
Like ACEs, however, CDEs are responsible for managing the financial and human 
resources of the school, and for maintaining the school structure and environment 
(MINED, n.d.).  
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3.2.6 EDUCO and MINED Policy 
 Curiously, for all that has been written about EDUCO, very little literature has 
examined how EDUCO entered MINED policy.  This was shown in the review of 
politically-focused analyses of EDUCO presented earlier in this chapter.  Contrary to 
what one might expect, it is a piece by Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003), which is primarily 
concerned with assessing the outcomes of the EDUCO program, that clearly 
references EDUCO’s official entrance into MINED policy. As she writes, “the 
already initiated decentralization and privatization process within Salvadoran 
education is formalized through the education reform plan 1995-2005” (Cuéllar-
Marchelli, 2003, p. 152).  The education reform plan to which Cuéllar-Marchelli 
refers is known as the Ten Year Plan (TYP).  For this dissertation, then, the primary 
task is not only to understand how EDUCO began in practice, but, just as importantly, 
to explain the relationship between how EDUCO began and how it entered the TYP, 
with emphasis on the ways in which international influence affected each. 
Interestingly, once the MINED announced in the TYP its intention to dramatically 
scale up the EDUCO program, it received commitments totaling at least $78.2 million 
in loans from the World Bank and the IDB to support the progression of the EDUCO 
program (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995).  By offering loans, both the World Bank 
and the IDB signaled their interest in the program and their desire for it to succeed.  
 Yet it is important to emphasize that MINED policy toward EDUCO has 
changed over time.  For example, as the program grew, its administration was 
incorporated into the regular institutional structure of the MINED, as mentioned 
above.  However, after receiving immense attention from 1991-1998, the program 
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entered a period of time – under a new Minister of Education – in which it was 
relatively neglected and the quality of its management declined.  The perception was 
that the EDUCO program had done well, and was no longer a priority.   
Subsequently, a former champion of EDUCO within the MINED became the 
Minister of Education in 2004 and once again took up the cause of EDUCO.  In 
addressing the weaknesses of the EDUCO program that had emerged during the 
preceding five years, and in order to appease EDUCO teachers, the new Minister 
agreed, in 2007, to recognize the credentials and years of service of EDUCO teachers 
and to pay them according to the official MINED pay scale (Gillies, Crouch, & 
Florez, 2010).  ACEs remained the hiring authority, however. EDUCO teachers were 
still not eligible for job security.   
    Since 2009, more policy changes have occurred. Conspicuously, these 
changes come as part of a party shift in government.  The right-wing ARENA party 
held power in El Salvador for 20 years, from 1989 until 2009, during which time the 
MINED implemented the EDUCO program.  In 2009, Mauricio Funes became the 
first nominee of the FMLN to reach the presidency.  As part of his campaign, Funes 
made a promise to the teachers’ unions that he would revise the EDUCO program, a 
program the unions had long fought for many reasons, including the lack of job 
security for EDUCO teachers, inadequate support, inappropriate treatment of teachers 
by some ACE members, and the selling of teaching positions in some cases by ACEs 
(Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010, SIMEDUCO, 2011).   
Since being elected Funes has taken two actions.  The first, which went into 
effect at the beginning of 2011, transferred all EDUCO teachers to the official 
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MINED career system and, in effect, removed the hiring authority from the ACEs 
(Rivas, 2010a,b).  ACEs have since then continued to exist, but without performing 
the function which was seen by proponents as the heart of the EDUCO program – i.e., 
the ability to hire and fire teachers. Nevertheless, they continued to carry out other 
management duties, such as purchasing didactic materials.  The second action taken 
by Funes came in November 2012 and relates to the ACEs themselves.  They will 
now be converted to CDEs, beginning in 2013 (Rivas, 2012).  Thus, while parental 
participation will continue to be an element of school management, its role is being 
reduced and fused with input from teachers, students, and school principals.  
The preceding sections have, among other things, discussed how the EDUCO 
program operated in practice, its amplification over time, and how official policy 
toward EDUCO changed over time.  In the mid 1990s, once EDUCO had entered 
official policy and as the MINED was expanding it dramatically, a number of 
evaluations were performed.  In the next section, I review those evaluations.  
3.3 EDUCO Evaluations 
 The literature review includes nine evaluations of the EDUCO program, all of 
which were conducted between 1997 and 2005, the time during which the EDUCO 
program was not only being scaled up by the MINED but was also receiving 
significant attention internationally.  Seven of these nine evaluations were financed 
and conducted by the World Bank or its consultants.  Of these seven, five have 
continued to receive attention internationally (Umanzor et al., 1997; Jimenez & 
Sawada, 1999, 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005).  As I discuss in more 
detail below, there are two commonalities among these five: First, they reach 
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conclusions which are favorable to community-level education management 
decentralization, and, second, they are based on quantitative methods – methods 
which are seen within the World Bank and among development specialists to be 
rigorous and preferable when determining a program’s impact (Khandekar, Kookwal, 
& Samad, 2010).  On the other hand, and as I detail below, the two World Bank 
studies which have not received sustained attention were either based on qualitative 
methods (Lindo, 1998) or offered a less sanguine interpretation of the data on the 
EDUCO program (Parandekar, 2002). I discuss each of these two groups of World 
Bank studies.  
I also discuss the two studies which were not carried out by the World Bank 
(Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003; Reimers, 1997b).  Besides not being carried out by World 
Bank staff, these studies similarly did not employ methods which are seen as 
rigorous; nor did they offer particularly positive interpretations of the data. Unlike the 
World Bank’s evaluations, these studies have not been featured in the global 
education literature on decentralization. They did not resonate with the pro-
community-level decentralization message put forward by the World Bank and like-
minded institutions in the 1990s and 2000s; neither were they promoted in 
international institutional publications and international fora.  
 With these comments in mind, the present section proceeds in the following 
way. First, I review the studies performed by the World Bank.  For discussion 
purposes, I divide this group into those that have been well-received and promoted 
and those that have not.  Second, I discuss the non-World Bank studies.  Throughout, 
my review is critical.  That is to say, I do not recount only the findings suggested by 
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the authors; instead, I review the findings in light of the methods and offer critical 
commentary on issues that may have been under-emphasized or glossed over by the 
authors themselves. I also consider the political-economic context of the production 
of these studies. Table 3.1, below, summarizes key points in the following discussion 
of these studies. 
3.3.1 World Bank EDUCO Studies – Group 1 
 What I refer to here as “Group 1” are those five studies performed by the 
World Bank which were based on quantitative methods, which offered optimistic 
interpretations of the data, and which have subsequently been featured internationally 
in support of community-level education management decentralization (Umanzor et 
al., 1997; Jimenez & Sawada, 1999, 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005).  I 
review them in the order in which they were conducted.  Despite the positive 
reception of these studies internationally, I will argue that the conclusions warranted 
may not always be as strong or favorable as those offered by the authors.   
As I proceed with the review, it is important to keep in mind four 
characteristics of the international and national context.  First, and on a most general 
level, by the time these studies emerged development professionals generally, but the 
World Bank in particular, had been promoting the decentralization of public sector 
governance for at least 15 years.  Second, though literature had emerged which 
theorized benefits of education decentralization in developing countries, countries 
had, by and large, only experimented with administrative decentralization to regional 
or municipal offices. Third, and relatedly, because the EDUCO program was the first 
of its kind, and because it had existed since 1991, (continued after table)
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Table 3.1: Summary of Findings and Concerns related to EDUCO Studies 
No. Study Methods, 
Data* 
Finding Offered Concern/Comment re Methods, Data, Findings 
WORLD BANK STUDIES – GROUP 1 (FAVORABLE FINDINGS)** 
1 Umanzor et 
al. (1997) 
Ex post, two 
group 
comparison 
with 1996 data 
- ACE members feel that they have more 
influence in schools decisions (though they 
did not make more decisions in practice) 
 
- ACE members visit schools more often 
 
- EDUCO teachers meet/contact parents 
more often 
- Authors conclude that EDUCO schools are no worse 
than traditional public schools because student learning 
scores not statistically significantly worse 
- Effect of EDUCO on language scores is 





- The more fully specified models are not significant 
 
- Endogeneity: EDUCO students possess unobserved 
characteristics that correlate negatively with achievement 
outcomes; cannot parse out impact of intervention  










with 1996 data 
- EDUCO significantly reduces student 
absences 
- Reduction in absences could have been result of timing 
of new school construction/new educational services 
offered (shortly before data collection in 1996) 
- Community participation positively and 
significantly related to teacher wages 
- Not the case in more fully specified model 
 
-In model where EDUCO dummy and community 
participation variables are significant, the former is 
negatively related to teacher wages 
- Community participation (i.e., ACE 
member school visits) enhances teacher 
effort (i.e., meetings) with parents.  
- Simultaneity; not possible to separate effects or 
directionality of influence between variables 
- Community participation in EDUCO 
associated with lower student-teacher ratio 
- It could be correlation, not causation; i.e., EDUCO 









- EDUCO participation positively and - The participation variable with an effect is not specific 
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   significantly effects student achievement to EDUCO, but represents participation by parents in 
councils of traditional and/or EDUCO schools 







with 1998 data 
- Attending EDUCO increases probability 
of remaining in school during grades 4-6 
- Endogeneity: those unobserved characteristics that affect 
the likelihood of participating in EDUCO negatively 
effect decision to stay in school 
- EDUCO schools produce more frequent 
community participation (i.e., meetings with 
parents) and teacher effort (i.e., teaching 
hours), and fewer teacher absences.  








with 1998 data 
- EDUCO leads to increased language 
scores 
- Additional available background controls not utilized in 
models showing significance (student learning not 
significant when applied) 





- Communities have or can acquire capacity 
to implement EDUCO, though great 
variation in community participation 




Ex post, two 
group 
comparison 
based on 1996 
data 
- EDUCO school directors are younger, 
have less experience, also serve as teachers 
 
- Infrequent EDUCO teacher training 
 
- Internal inefficiency (i.e., student 
repetition) higher in EDUCO schools 
- Interestingly, the author argues that greater effort should 
be made to include the needs and aspirations of teachers 
 
- Author signals inability of communities to provide 
professional development to teachers 




and ex post 
two group 
comparison 
based on data 
- High EDUCO teacher turnover 
 
- Community participation only by ACE 
members 
 
- Author concludes that EDUCO has not “substantially 
increased school quality, internal efficiency, or even 
community participation” (p. 159). 
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from 1993 - ACEs work better where no school located 
previously 
 
- No significant differences for teacher 







- EDUCO parents pay higher (unofficial) 
school fees 
 
- EDUCO parents donate labor equivalent to 
28 percent of work done by all MINED 
administrative and support staff assisting all 
public schools 
 
- Community participation varies 
- The author relied on interviews, document review, 
available research studies 
Key: OLS = ordinary least squares; PSM = propensity score matching.  
 
Notes: *Data from 1993 is based on a stratified multistage method where departments and municipalities were sample for urban and rural strata 
and for EDUCO and traditional schools. The sample of 122 schools included 21 that were EDUCO.  Data from 1996 is based on random sample 
of 311 schools with a third grade section of at least 10 students. The surveys administered included language and math tests, in addition to a 
household survey and questionnaires for the director, third-grade teacher, parents, and two ACE members. Data from 1998 added new student 
learning tests and teacher and parent surveys to the information collected in 1996. The comparison group for all quantitative studies was 
traditional rural public schools.  
 
**The general characteristics of the three groups of studies can be summarized as follows: Group 1 studies exhibit favorable findings, have been 
based on quantitative methods, and have been featured in global literature on EDUCO. Group 2 studies, while performed or financed by the 
World Bank, have been less sanguine in their findings and conclusions. The non-World Bank studies have been both quantitative and qualitative, 
and have also been less positive in their assessment of the program.  
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much excitement and anticipation surrounded its effects in practice, particularly 
within the World Bank.  Finally, by the time these studies began to emerge in 1997, 
the MINED had already committed to the expansion of the EDUCO program in its 
Ten Year Plan, which had been created in 1995.  Moreover, the MINED had for years 
already been receiving international assistance from various organizations – IDB, 
UNICEF, World Bank – for this program, a program in which it had invested itself 
and on which the expansion of its education system depended. The MINED, too, 
wanted to demonstrate positive results.  Both nationally and internationally, the 
performance of the EDUCO program was under close observation and high 
expectations.  
 In this context, the first study was conducted by the World Bank and a few 
staff from the MINED.  It was an impact evaluation and it relied on data collected in 
1996 (most future studies would return to these data as well) through a random 
sample of 311 schools.  The population of schools from which the sample was drawn 
had to have a third grade section with at least 10 students.  At each school, in addition 
to administering language and math tests to third-grade pupils, the team interviewed 
and gave a questionnaire to the director (or person in charge), the third-grade teacher, 
five randomly selected 5th-grade students, their parents, and two members from the 
ACE.  The questionnaire collected background data. Although the sample initially 
included four types of schools – i.e., EDUCO, mixed, traditional public, and private – 
the 1997 impact study only looked at EDUCO schools and traditional public schools 
located in rural areas.   
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Underlying these data is an important feature to note before continuing with 
the study’s results.  Though the EDUCO sample was identified in a random way, this 
is negated by the fact that the MINED initially chose the communities which would 
participate in a non-random way.  That is, as discussed previously, the MINED 
purposefully selected the poorest and most disadvantaged communities (located 
where the government had not maintained control during the civil war) for the 
program (economists refer to this strategy as endogenous program selection), thus 
indicating that selection bias would be a problem inherent to the quasi-experimental 
studies conducted later. 
With these data, Umanzor et al. (1997) ran a series of ex-post matched 
comparisons17 between the EDUCO schools and the traditional public schools on a 
number of characteristics of interest.  They focused on associations between school 
and family characteristics and the outcomes observed in the school.  They found both 
similarities and differences in general characteristics across groups. For example, on 
average, and to a statistically significant degree, EDUCO teachers had a higher level 
of education, but less experience.18  EDUCO schools also had less access to 
electricity, but more of them had classroom libraries (most likely because a separate 
USAID program funded classroom supplies). Despite better libraries, EDUCO 
schools did not have more textbooks. Additionally, EDUCO students were found to 
live in much more rudimentary homes (as in, without electricity or piped water, but 
                                                 
17 Meaning that the EDUCO schools and the traditional schools were selected for 
comparison after the EDUCO intervention began. 
18 This is because, at the outset, ACEs were required to hire teachers who had at least 
a university level teaching certificate.  The excess supply of university-trained 
teachers in the early 1990s also contributed to this. 
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with dirt floors), yet parents were not found to help with homework any less than 
parents in the comparison group.  In terms of school-community interaction, ACE 
members felt that they had more influence in school decisions, though they did not 
actually make more decisions in the school’s management (Umanzor et al., 1997).19  
ACE members also visited their community’s school more often than did parents on 
the school councils of traditional rural schools.  Likewise, EDUCO teachers met with 
parents more often and contacted parents more frequently when students were absent.  
Lastly, with regard to the variables that have received the most attention, there were 
differences in neither student absenteeism, dropout, grade repetition nor student 
achievement on either the math or language tests (Umanzor et al., 1997).   
Some of these differences are cause for optimism – as with ACE parents being 
more involved in the school and EDUCO teachers meeting more with parents.  
Nevertheless, educational interventions are assessed primarily in terms of their ability 
to increase student achievement.  Moreover, in this case, the theory of the EDUCO 
program is in part based on the notion that community-level management would 
result in increased teacher effort, which would lead to better student learning.  
Although the comparison of the treatment and control group in this study did not 
show that EDUCO students had significantly better achievement than students in 
rural traditional public schools, these students also did not score significantly worse 
                                                 
19 According to the two group comparison by Umanzor et al (1997) between pure 
EDUCO and traditional rural schools, there was not a significant difference in the 
number of decisions made by “the school” – meaning the principal. This was 
according to the members of the parents’ committees for both types of schools, who 
were asked about whom makes decisions regarding pedagogy, school administration, 
personnel, and incentives. Nevertheless, the members of ACEs for EDUCO schools 
perceived that they exercised greater influence in school decision making.  
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than their counterparts in public schools.  Umanzor et al. (1997) took this as a 
positive sign, given the relatively worse economic conditions of EDUCO students, 
and thus conclude that EDUCO students thus exhibit “better than expected academic 
performance” (p. 26).  
The second study – by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) – emerged two years 
later.20  Here, Jimenez and Sawada (1999) employed more advanced econometric 
techniques to assess whether EDUCO had an effect on either student achievement or 
student absences.  In order to answer these questions, they used the same 1996 data as 
Umanzor et al. (1997) and applied regression analyses along with the Heckman two-
step correction (Heckman, 1979) in order to attempt to correct for the sample 
selection bias inherent in the EDUCO treatment group.21  In their study, they 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that Emmanuel Jimenez was at that time a member of the World 
Bank’s influential Development Economics Vice-Presidency, and was well respected 
among his peers. The fact that he took up the cause of EDUCO by doing research on 
it attracted the attention of others within the Bank.  
21 The Heckman two-step correction is employed where there are issues with sample 
selection bias.  Sample selection bias is normally a problem for regression analysis 
because, when the treatment and comparison groups systematically differ on a range 
of characteristics, we cannot be sure that the effect observed for the treatment (e.g., 
EDUCO) is unbiased.  That is, the effect (or lack of it) could be due to unobserved 
variables related to the treatment (labeled by economists as endogeneity).  Under 
endogeneity, we can also not be sure of the extent to which the estimates for the other 
variables in equation are biased as well (Berk, 1983).  The best way to address this 
issue is to first draw a representative random sample of participants from the 
population of interest.  In most cases this is not possible, especially in social science 
research. Such was the case with EDUCO, where participating communities were not 
chosen randomly and where participating communities differed systematically from a 
nationally representative sample.  
Thus, to deal with this common issue, James Heckman developed his now 
famous correction technique which treats sample selection bias as specification error 
(Heckman 1979).  Per this technique, a separate estimator term is added to the 
principal regression equation of interest (i.e., the “substantive equation”).  This term 
is arrived at by estimating through a (probit) selection equation the likelihood of a 
student being placed, for example, in an EDUCO school, given a set of selected 
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successively added controls for student, family, teacher, classroom, school, and 
community participation characteristics.  Throughout, the comparison group is 
traditional rural schools.  
In their discussion of student achievement, the authors state: “EDUCO’s … 
effect on language test scores is positive and significant, while its effect on math 
performance is positive and not significant” (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999, p. 428).  Yet, 
this statement is quickly followed by a concession: “Our measure of EDUCO’s 
advantage in language may be imprecise.  The estimate of the EDUCO coefficient is 
                                                                                                                                           
characteristics.  This probability, then, is fed back into the substantive equation as 
part of a ratio (the inverse Mills ratio) that represents the probability that a child with 
given characteristics will be excluded from the sample from which results are 
generalized, conditional on participation in EDUCO (Berk 1983). Ideally, then, the 
added estimator is a sample selection correction term that adjusts for the fact that 
certain characteristics are overrepresented in the sample being examined. From the 
regression output, one can then interpret a statistically significant result for this term’s 
coefficient as indicating that there is sample selection bias.  That is, a statistically 
significant coefficient signals that certain characteristics are over or under-
represented. 
Fundamental issues surface in practice, however.  For a thorough review of 
the many issues that can and do arise in practice through the use of the Heckman two-
step correction, see Bushway, Johnson and Slocum (2007).  For example, if the same 
variables appear in both the selection equation and the substantive equation, the issue 
of multicollinearity arises (Bushway, Johnson and Slocum 2007).  That is, in concrete 
terms, if the same variables used to predict a student’s participation in EDUCO are 
also used to predict a student’s test scores, then the correction term added to the 
equation for test scores may well co-vary with the other independent variables.  
What’s more is that this technique assumes that the error terms for both the selection 
and substantive equation are jointly normal, meaning that they are independent of 
each other (Heckman 1979).  However, the error terms will be correlated if there are 
unobserved characteristics (omitted variables) relevant to the dependent variables of 
both the selection and substantive equations.  It should be noted that, in the case of 
EDUCO, this is almost certainly the case.  The reason is as follows: Socioeconomic 
conditions determined who participated in EDUCO; these same poverty related 
characteristics always influence student achievement.  Ultimately, then, although this 
fix works well in theory, in practice it actually worsens issues of misspecification 
because there are now two linked regression equations to specify correctly, and which 




sensitive to the specification of the participation equation” (p. 428).  What they allude 
to is that their more completely specified models clearly show that the results for both 
language and math achievement are not significant.  Nevertheless, the authors make 
inferences in the concluding section to their paper from models missing controls for 
school inputs or community participation. They state: “[EDUCO] has improved 
language scores” (p. 440).   
In addition to the specification issue, there is the matter of endogeneity 
stemming from sample selection bias.  That is, the results provided by Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999) are confounded by the fact that the students who attended EDUCO 
schools also possessed unobserved characteristics that correlated with student 
achievement outcomes.   Jimenez and Sawada (1999) recognize this when they write, 
“The error terms of the participation and achievement equations are negatively 
correlated.  This means that EDUCO students have unobserved characteristics that are 
negatively correlated with achievement test scores” (p. 428).  Under conditions of 
endogeneity, one cannot truly parse out the impact of the intervention on student 
achievement because the participation of the student in the intervention is correlated 
with other factors which are also correlated with student achievement.  
Additionally, alternative conclusions can be drawn from the student 
achievement regression results, keeping in mind their limitations.  In math, for 
example, although the EDUCO variable is not significant, what does contribute to 
improved test scores is the availability of sanitary services.  With regard to language 
test scores, it is having a classroom library that contributes positively.  For both math 
and language, more frequent visits to the school by ACE parents is positively 
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associated with higher student achievement.  The data thus support the conclusions 
that schools in which parents are involved and which possess basic resources 
encourage better student performance.  Given that the focus of the evaluation was to 
determine EDUCO’s impact, these findings are not highlighted by the authors.  
The second question posed by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) is whether there is 
an EDUCO effect on student attendance.  They use the same data and controls as with 
their models for student achievement, changing only the dependent variable to 
indicate the number of days the student was absent in the month prior to the survey.  
Here, they find that EDUCO significantly reduces the number of days a student was 
absent.  They thus conclude that the accountability relationships instituted between 
parents and teachers which EDUCO are responsible for reducing student absences.  
However, if we decompose the effect of the EDUCO variable according to 
when the EDUCO schools were built, the picture changes (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999).  
If the EDUCO school was built between 1991-1995, there was no effect; however, if 
the school was built in 1996, it significantly decreased student absences.  As opposed 
to attributing the effect to relationships of accountability, the result could simply be 
due to the fact that students received a new school in the same year that the survey 
was administered.  The presence of a new school – where there had not been one 
previously – could significantly increase student attendance.   
Nevertheless, the authors chose to highlight a particular conclusion, one that 
resonated with the theory of community-level accountability relationships and their 
ability to lead students and teachers to perform better (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999).  
These conclusions are powerful, particularly given the fact that they are offered by 
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the World Bank and the fact that they were derived from methods that are widely 
seen as rigorous and objective.  To that end, the literature shows that other authors 
have repeated these conclusions, as did Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, and 
Santibañez (2009) in their review of the effectiveness of school-based management in 
developing countries. In this way, conjecture becomes consensus around the idea that 
community-level decentralization can lead to fewer student absences. 
 The third study was conducted by Sawada (2000) and attempted to determine 
if the EDUCO program had an effect on student achievement, teacher pay, teacher 
effort, or classroom inputs.  Numerous models were estimated using largely the same 
data and controls as were employed by Jimenez and Sawada (1999), the difference 
being that Sawada (2000) uses instrumental variables in an attempt to remedy the 
endogeneity which results from the nature of the sample.22   In the end, four 
conclusions were drawn, each of which is reviewed here. 
 The first conclusion stated that community participation was positively 
related to teacher wages.  However, although Sawada (2000) runs eight different 
models to test this, under the most complete specification neither is the community 
participation variable nor the EDUCO variable significant.  The author refers in his 
conclusion to an OLS regression which did not control for teacher characteristics.  
                                                 
22 Instrumental variables are employed in regression analysis under conditions of 
endogeneity.  The idea is that one seeks to “find a variable (or instrument) that is 
highly correlated with program placement or participation but that is not correlated 
with unobserved characteristics affecting outcomes” (Khandker et al., 2010, p. 87).  
Instrumental variables must be selected thoughtfully, as a weak instrumental variable 
– one that is correlated with unobserved characteristics or omitted variables – can 
worsen the bias of coefficient estimates. Ideally, the instrumental variable serves as a 
proxy for program participation while eliminating issues of endogeneity. See the 
previous footnote for more on endogeneity.  
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Moreover, in this particular model, while it is true that community participation 
(defined as the number of times parents on the ACE visit the school monthly) is 
positively associated with increased wages, what Sawada (2000) chooses not to 
mention is that EDUCO is significantly and negatively related to wages.  Thus, while 
Sawada (2000) finds a significant effect of community participation, this is not 
related to the EDUCO program.  In contrast, the EDUCO-related finding – that 
EDUCO teachers receive less compensation than their traditional school counterparts 
– is not highlighted. 
Second, Sawada (2000) highlights the relationship between teacher effort and 
community participation in EDUCO schools.  Here, the model does indeed show a 
statistically significant relationship between school visits by ACE members and the 
number of hours teachers spend each month meeting with parents. However, the 
latent constructs, as measured and specified here, experience simultaneity and, as 
such, it is not possible to separate the effect of community participation from teacher 
effort.  This is not to say that there is not a relationship between the two variables.  To 
be sure, parents spending more time at school would be intertwined with the number 
of hours teachers spend meeting with parents.  What remains unclear is the nature and 
directionality of the relationship.  Nevertheless, Sawada (2000) concludes: 
“Community participation seems to enhance the teacher effort level” (p. 26).  
For the third finding, Sawada (2000) reports that there is a connection 
between community participation and teacher-student ratio.  In particular, the finding 
is that the former causally decreases the latter.  This is a curious findings because the 
relationship between community participation and teacher-student ratio is not clear.  
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That is, one wonders why teacher-student ratio would be a function of community 
participation. While Sawada (2000) does not offer an explanation of why this would 
be, I suggest that this may be the result of the nature of the sample: EDUCO schools 
were located in particularly rural areas, where there tended to be fewer children per 
teacher.    
Fourth and finally, Sawada (2000) speaks to student achievement.  Although 
the EDUCO variable was not in any of the model specifications significantly related 
to test scores, the study is bookended by statements which, at first glance, indicate the 
contrary.  At the beginning and at the very end of the paper, Sawada (2000) writes, 
“We observe consistently positive and significant EDUCO participation effects on 
standardized test scores” (pgs. 1, 25, emphasis added).  What he refers to, however, is 
not a variable that represents parental participation in EDUCO, but rather a variable 
for parental participation generally. The problem with this wording is that the parental 
participation variable which was shown to be associated with student achievement is 
not specific to EDUCO.  Instead, it is a variable that represents participation in 
schools generally – by either parents of EDUCO students or parents of students in 
traditional rural public schools.23  Such statements can filter through to future reviews 
of empirical work on EDUCO and decentralization more generally.  
In the fourth study, Jimenez and Sawada (2003) attempt once more to 
uncover an EDUCO effect.  This time, they return to the question of whether 
participating in EDUCO is associated with staying in school over the two-year period 
1996-1998. To answer this question new data collected in 1998 – from student 
                                                 
23 The parents associations for traditional schools were known as Sociedades de 
Padres de Familia, or Family Parent Societies (Sawada, 2000, p. 3).  
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learning tests and teacher and parent surveys (Lindo, 1998, p. 21) – is added to the 
1996 data and then run through regression analyses (specifically, they use probit 
models) which utilize the Heckman two-step correction for sample selection bias and 
the same controls as their other studies (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Sawada, 2000).  In 
this case, however, they include in their sample the mixed EDUCO schools.24 
Once again, the authors acknowledge the inherent limitations they face due to 
sample selection bias and the effects of this on their results. Importantly, recall that, 
in practice, sample selection bias means that we cannot be sure of the extent to which 
coefficients are biased. To continue, in this study, Jimenez and Sawada (2003) reveal 
that, with regard to the Heckman two-step correction, the error terms for the selection 
and substantive equations are negatively correlated.  As a result, “unobserved 
characteristics regarding the children, households, and communities might positively 
affect the likelihood of selecting an EDUCO school and might negatively … affect a 
student’s decision to continue in school” (Jimenez & Sawada, 2000, p.21-22).  Yet 
the findings of Jimenez and Sawada (2003) can be found cited in the literature on 
education decentralization in developing countries (Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, 
& Santibañez, 2009). The cited results pertain to model 1 and indicate that attending 
an EDUCO school increases the probability of remaining in school for two years by 
64%.   
The fifth and final study came about in 2005, this time by Sawada and 
Ragatz (2005).  It builds on Jimenez and Sawada (1999).  In this version, the study 
                                                 
24 In their words, they had “878 students in 35 pure and mixed EDUCO schools and 
107 pure and mixed traditional schools” (Jimenez & Sawada, 2003, p. 18). They do 
not state how many students were in each type of school; nor do they define the 
difference between a mixed EDUCO school and a mixed traditional school.  
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asks how decentralization affects administrative processes, teacher behavior, and 
student achievement.  In addition to using the Heckman two-step correction 
procedure, it also makes use of propensity score matching – a strategy through which 
the compared treatment and control communities are matched along a series of 
characteristics to ensure that they are as identical as possible, given the communities 
in the sample.  In their analysis, Sawada and Ragatz (2005) eliminated the mixed 
schools included by Jimenez and Sawada (2003), thus reducing the sample to 37 
EDUCO schools and 96 traditional schools.  In some models, the same controls as 
before were used.  I discuss below those instances where the controls were different. 
The results are interesting in that they are not what the authors expected.  In 
terms of administrative processes, the only activity to occur more often at the school 
level in EDUCO schools concerns hiring and firing teachers (Sawada & Ragatz, 
2005).  Neither determining teacher salaries, giving teachers incentives, evaluating 
teachers, nor spending school money occurred more often at the school level in 
EDUCO than in traditional public schools.   Not surprisingly, the results show that 
teachers’ association relations occurred more often in traditional rural public schools.  
This was the case because teachers hired by ACEs are non-union, and thus there was 
no teachers’ association activity to observe.   
For teacher behavior, interpreting the results is like reading an Ouija board.  
There are models for 19 different dependent variables.  Each dependent variable tells 
us something different about teacher behavior – for example, how many hours per 
week the instructor teaches, how many hours s/he meets with parents, or how often 
s/he is absent.  Further complicating the picture is that each model is then run four 
 73 
 
different ways – using (a) standard (that is, Ordinary Least Squares) regression with 
42 independent variables, (b) the Heckman two-step procedure, (c) revised OLS 
regression with 32 independent variables, and (d) propensity score matching with 32 
independent variables.25  The problem across these 76 different combinations is that 
there is tremendous variability in terms of what is significant.  Those results that are 
significant under propensity score matching with 32 controls are then nonsignificant 
in the OLS regression with 42 controls, for example.  Elsewhere, the Heckman 
models return significant coefficients, but, in these cases, the other models do not.  In 
the end, none of the outcome variables are significant across all four forms of 
regression.  Sawada and Ragatz (2005) still report, however, that “many key 
measures survived the bias tests, including meeting with the parents, teacher absence, 
and hours dedicated to teaching” (p. 295). Through this statement, they are claiming 
that EDUCO leads to more frequent meetings with parents, less teacher absenteeism, 
and more hours dedicated to teaching.   
In addition to the above finding, the authors offer two additional conclusions 
based on their interpretation of the regression results.  The first is as follows: 
The results indicate that community participation seems to enhance the 
teacher effort level, possibly because of intensive monitoring of teacher 
behaviors and the implicit threat that exists because hiring and firing of 
teachers occurs at the community level (Sawada & Ragatz, 2005, p. 295). 
And, second: “Community participation not only uses relevant information that 
outside government agencies are not likely to have, but also imposes commitment on 
                                                 
25 Propensity score matching could not be run using all 42 variables because the 
communities were too dissimilar, according to Sawada and Ragatz (2005).  
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teachers, which leads them to exert greater effort” (p. 295).  I would suggest that 
these assertions are not borne out by the regression results, given the variability and 
inconsistency across models discussed above.  It seems that the authors were either 
confident in the regression results or had a predilection to explain the results in terms 
of accountability relationships that resonate with the World Bank’s theory of 
community-level education management decentralization, or both.   
 The final question of this study pertained to student achievement.  This time, 
the results look promising, for language scores.  We are presented with the output for 
a handful of coefficients across four specifications.  Three of the four models show 
significant effects of being in an EDUCO school compared with being in a traditional 
rural public school.  What the models do not show, however, are the authors’ 
controls, though the footnote to the table does note that child and household 
characteristics were taken into account.  What the authors choose not to mention, 
however, is that many of the available – and relevant – controls were not applied.  
That is, Sawada (2000) and Jimenez and Sawada (1999) ran the same models with 
additional controls for teacher quality, classroom quality, and school quality, and 
under those circumstances they did not find an EDUCO effect on student 
achievement.  One wonders if Sawada and Ragatz (2005) purposefully specified their 
models to generate significant effects.  There is no way to know for certain.  
Nevertheless, the fact that they chose not to use the available controls puts in question 
the conclusion they offer: That “EDUCO program governance leads to better effort of 
teachers, which improves educational outcome” (Sawada & Ragatz, 2005, p. 299).   
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 Many of the interpretations offered by Sawada and Ragatz (2005) raise 
concerns. Nevertheless, one conclusion suggested by the findings is that ACE parents, 
compared with parents on the school councils of traditional rural public schools, have 
and use the ability hire and fire teachers more26.  Given the provisions on which the 
EDUCO program has rested all along, this is to be expected.  Other findings from this 
study are more controversial and uncertain, and seem to be intended to positively 
skew the perception of EDUCO. 
In light of the critical review contained in this section, I suggest that we can interpret 
these five regression analysis studies as repeated attempts to find evidence that 
supports the beneficial effects of a particular version of decentralization.  It was 
shown throughout this section that World Bank researchers frequently offered 
interpretations which were questionable (based on the limitations of their methods 
and data and the possible alternative explanations).  In view of the reappraisal above, 
which is summarized in Table 3.2, below, vis-à-vis the program’s theorized benefits, I 
argue that not one of the studies reviewed definitively shows that the EDUCO 
program produced positive and significant results on the variables of most interest to 
the World Bank and the MINED.  Based on these studies, we can conclude that 
community-level decentralization does not lead to improved student achievement, 
student attendance, student retention, or teacher absenteeism when the available 
controls are applied.   
 
 
                                                 
26 That they use this ability is noteworthy, though the question that current research 
leaves unanswered is what criteria the parents use when hiring and firing teachers.  
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 Table 3.2: Re-appraisal of EDUCO’s Evidence Base  
vis-à-vis Theorized Program Benefits 
Benefit Logic Evidence shows … Comment* 
1. Access EDUCO is the best 
way to quickly increase 
access -- 
EDUCO shown to 
facilitate rapid 
expansion of access, 
















directors have less 








provided by Jimenez 
& Sawada (1999), 
Sawada (2000), 









No difference in 
instructional time 





evidence provided by 
Sawada (2000) and 
Sawada & Ragatz 
(2005) 














evidence provided by 










provided by Jimenez 






improved teacher and 
school quality 
EDUCO schools 




evidence provided by 







met through ACE 
***ACE members 
felt that they had 
more influence in 
school decisions 







More efficient mix of 
school inputs because 
ACEs purchase 
supplies to meet their 
needs 
-- 
No studies have 
attempted to examine 
this  
5. Cost Savings from reduction 
in central bureaucracy 
and more efficient 
management by ACEs 
EDUCO estimated to 
incur fewer costs (a) 
because teachers paid 
less (initially), (b) if 
schools are not 
provided with 
adequate materials, 
(c) if supervision is 
minimal, (d) if ACEs 
not compensated, and 




Melamid, & Ross, 
1995; World Bank, 
1994a) 
Political commitment 
to the program 
existed prior to, and 
independently of, 
cost studies  
6. Equity Increases system-wide 
as (a) education offered 
in rural areas and (b) as 
schools compete 










aspect abandoned in 
1994; enrolment 
growth only through 
EDUCO 
7. Social cohesion Increases through more 
frequent interaction 
among community and 
teachers  
***ACE members 
visit school more 







work on ACE, when 
community votes on 
members of the ACE 
Great variation in 
community 
participation, though 
communities have or 










evidence provided by 
Sawada & Ragatz 
(2005) 




 Notes: * For additional information on the questionable evidence referenced here, see Table 
3.1, in this chapter. **With regard to evidence on quality, Parandekar (2002) found, based on 
1996 data, that EDUCO teachers had not received any training in the previous year. *** This 
evidence is positive and credible for EDUCO. ****With regard to comment on equity, note 
that, initially, EDUCO schools were created near to traditional schools in order to create 
competition. 
 
Nevertheless, EDUCO did engender increased parental participation in 
schools through the ACEs.  Participation was not pursued for intrinsic reasons, 
however; rather, it was seen as instrumental.  For EDUCO proponents, to the extent 
that participation does not lead to the theorized outcomes, it is a less attractive policy 
option. By extension, alternative forms of participation are likewise not considered. 
Based on the above critique, it would appear, that the concepts on which 
community-level education decentralization has been promoted are not necessarily 
supported by the World Bank’s research.  Yet, the production of these studies during 
1997-2005 served to maintain attention on the EDUCO program within and beyond 
the World Bank (Desmond, 2009; Gillies, 2010; Gershberg, Meade, & Andersson, 
2009), and the sanguine interpretations served to reinforce and engender upbeat 
perceptions of the possibilities of community-level decentralization. Subsequently, 
the sanguine interpretations of the data offered by the authors of these studies have 
been repeated in academic and agency literature (an issue which is addressed in more 
detail later in this chapter) and have been used to suggest that community-level 
decentralization can produce a range of positive benefits.  Furthermore, beyond the 
development literature on decentralization, it should be noted that these studies have 
an effect in that they are used to justify loans to countries around the world in support 
of community-level decentralization. Governmental ministries become more 
receptive in light of such an evidence base. Thus, in addition to influencing the 
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perceptions of development specialists, these studies can be leveraged to influence 
education system governance in practice.  
3.3.2 World Bank EDUCO Studies – Group 2  
 In contrast to the studies discussed previously, two evaluations were 
performed by World Bank staff and consultants which have not received much 
attention (Lindo, 1998; Parandekar, 2002).  The absence of such attention is 
evidenced, for example, by the fact that Google Scholar does not show any citations 
of these evaluations, in contrast to the group 1 studies, which have been cited 
repeatedly.  As with before, I review these two studies in the order in which they were 
produced.   
 The first study in this group was performed by Lindo (1998) and it qualitative 
in nature.   In this case, Lindo (1998) visited 36 communities (drawn randomly from 
the World Bank’s original 1996 sample of EDUCO schools) and conducted 
interviews with 86 teachers and 50 parents.  The purpose of the investigation was to 
evaluate the relations of participation between the community and the schools. As 
such, the results present rich descriptions of this aspect of the EDUCO program.  
Lindo (1998) also derived a number of summary findings.  These include the 
following: (a) There is enormous energy and capacity at the community level that 
allow them to take advantage of the EDUCO program; (b) when the community 
participates, it contributes materials and also leads to “civic health”; (c) the success of 
one ACE helps other ACEs because they support each other; (d) there is great 
variation is the extent to which communities participate in the EDUCO schools; and 
(e) it is possible to foment participation habits in communities where they do not exist 
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(Lindo, 1998).  Thus, these findings are clearly positive with regard to community 
participation in EDUCO schools – an issue which has been secondary among 
researchers who have tended to focus on student achievement.   
Despite this, and despite the fact that it is the only piece to take an in-depth 
qualitative look at EDUCO, this piece does not seem to have had an enduring impact 
on the development literature, or on the promotion of the EDUCO program in 
particular.  It is not cited elsewhere and has not been presented at international 
conferences featuring EDUCO.  I suggest that this may be the result of a combination 
of a number of factors: first, its qualitative nature does not tend resonate as well in 
research and policy circles where researchers and policymakers prefer quantitative 
evaluations.  Second, the report was published exclusively in Spanish, thus restricting 
its accessibility to non-Spanish speakers. Third, despite being commissioned by the 
World Bank, representatives in this institution chose not to include the report in its 
well-known working paper series.  Fourth, timing matters.  That is, when the report 
was produced, other studies had already emerged which were econometric in nature 
and which were more accessible (i.e., English-language) (Umanzor et al., 1997; 
Jimenez & Sawada, 1999). 
The second study in group 2– and the final one discussed here that was 
produced by the World Bank – came out in 2002.  This study, by Parandekar (2002), 
compared 54 EDUCO schools and 127 traditional rural schools from the original 
1996 sample using means tests to discover differences related to select inputs and 
outcomes. Overall, the difference between this study and the others does not have to 
do with findings on dimensions such as school infrastructure, didactic materials and 
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student achievement outcomes, for the findings of Parankekar (2002) in that regard 
mirror those of previous studies. Rather, the difference is that this piece highlights a 
number of issues upon which other World Bank authors did not touch, and it offers 
critical commentary on them.  Namely, those issues relate to school director 
characteristics, teacher training, and internal efficiency.  
I begin with school director characteristics.  To summarize, Parandekar (2002) 
found that EDUCO school directors were younger (31.4 years vs. 40 years), have 
fewer years of experience (3.3 years vs. 8.2 years), and more frequently teach a class 
in addition to fulfilling director duties (100% vs. 71%).  This final characteristic is to 
be expected since the teacher who is designated as the director of an EDUCO school 
is always one of the teachers who has been tasked with additional administrative 
responsibilities. 
Parandekar (2002) also brings attention to the “generally low levels of 
[teacher] training” (p. 172). When asked to list the areas in which they had received 
professional training in the previous year, EDUCO teachers mentioned training in 
teaching values (20 percent), school-community relationship (6 perecnt), and school 
nutrition (33 percent).27 In light of these responses, Parandekar (2002) comments: 
“With clear deficiencies in the professional development programme, it is perhaps not 
surprising to observe that EDUCO teachers are not doing better when it comes to 
‘active’ teaching practices” (p. 173).  He continues, and speaks to the limitations that 
the community faces to address training shortcomings: 
                                                 
27 With regard to teachers in traditional rural schools, it was found that 23, 14, and 35 




EDUCO teachers know for a fact that they are accountable to the local 
community for their performance in the job and, at the same time, they are 
saddled with the realization that the same community is powerless to provide 
access to the training that they need in order to provide a good performance. 
(p. 173) 
Following this statement, he concludes his commentary on professional development 
by arguing for an increased sensitivity to the needs and desires of teachers: “If the 
decentralized model of service delivery is to lead to improvement in the quality of 
education, a greater effort should be made to include the needs and aspirations of 
teachers in the delivery of the educational programme” (p. 174).  Each of these 
comments is critical, and their sentiment is uncommon for a World Bank publication.  
Yet they underline issues to which we arguably should be more attentive when 
designing and implement community-level decentralization.  
 To continue, internal efficiency is an outcome examined by Parandekar 
(2002).  The other studies by the World Bank using the 1996 dataset did not single 
out this variable.  The results are not positive in favor of the EDUCO program.  
Indeed, compared with traditional rural public schools, EDUCO schools 
demonstrated higher rates of student repetition (10.91% vs. 4.91%).  Relatedly, and in 
contrast to the theory of community-level decentralization, teachers were absent more 
frequently (5.3 days/year vs. 3.2 days/year).   
To be certain, Parandekar (2002) put forth commentary which did not align 
with what had been the rhetoric of the World Bank and which was comparatively 
critical. He did this, for example, by calling for increased attention to teachers’ needs 
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and by elaborating on some of EDUCO’s shortcomings.  In addition, Parandekar’s 
(2002) study relied on simple means tests, whereas Jimenez and Sawada (1999) had 
already employed more advanced econometric techniques to evaluate EDUCO, and 
they offered more encouraging conclusions.  One’s findings will not be promoted 
within an institution if they are discordant with its mission or priorities, particularly 
one such as the World Bank, where discordant findings are often prevented from 
surfacing, let alone ignored once they are in print (Broad, 2006).  Institutional 
research is at a further disadvantage if it is seen as methodologically inferior in 
comparison with alternative research that the institution can put forward to advance 
its agenda.  The chance that research garners attention is slim if it does not have 
initial institutional support.  
3.3.3 Non-World Bank EDUCO Studies 
 The final two studies in the literature on the EDUCO program were not 
produced by the World Bank.  They bring different approaches to the assessment of 
this program’s effects and operation in practice, and, unlike the majority of World 
Bank evaluations, their findings are consistently less sanguine.  First I examine 
Reimers (1997b), followed by Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003).  
 As opposed to zeroing in on a particular outcome variable, the study by 
Reimers (1997b) is an exploration of how EDUCO functioned in practice. His 
findings are based both on personal observations28 and a survey in 1993 of 122 
                                                 
28 Reimers worked with both the Harvard Institute for International Development and 
USAID in 1993 on the reform of education policy in El Salvador. See Reimers and 
McGinn (1997) for more.  
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schools, 21 of which were EDUCO.29  The sample schools were selected from 
departments and municipalities through a multi-stage stratified random sample. The 
author does not mention the use of any statistical controls for background 
characteristics.  
 The results pertain to a number of practical aspects. For example, on the 
operation of the MINED, Reimers (1997b) finds that, “There have been institutional 
constraints to the implementation of the programme” (p. 157). More specifically, 
“Financial procedures and regulations of the Ministry of Education and other 
government agencies (Ministry of Finance) have slowed down transfers of funds to 
the communities. As a result there have been serious delays in disbursing salaries to 
teachers” (p. 157).   
At the community level, he observed not only that there was high teacher turnover 
(80 percent of teachers were hired the year before, and teachers were found to transfer 
to the traditional public school system as soon as a job was available), but also that 
community participation was limited to the members of the ACE.  Relatedly, ACEs 
have tended to do well when they were formed in areas that did not already have a 
school. That is to say, when ‘mixed’ EDUCO schools were created from previously 
existing schools, the schools tended to be run by the principals and not the ACEs (p. 
                                                 
29 The number of EDUCO schools was reduced in the course of research because the 
schools were closed on the day that the researchers arrived. They were replaced with 
traditional rural schools because the protocol directed the researchers to use the next 
closest school available to the EDUCO school selected for the sample. In the end, 21 
of sample schools were EDUCO (Reimers, 1997b).  
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158).30  High teacher turnover and limited community participation may contravene 
education quality and may jeopardize assumed accountability relationships.  
In addition to these general findings, the survey administered to the sample 
schools revealed a lack of significant differences along specific outcomes.  Between 
EDUCO schools and traditional schools, there were significant differences for neither 
teacher absences, school closings, instructional time, nor supervisor visits (Reimers, 
1997b). Interestingly, these findings run counter to the theory that improved teacher 
effort results from the theorized accountability relationships that accompany 
community-level education decentralization.  While we should be cognizant that 
Reimers’s (1997b) findings are based on data collected during the second year of the 
program’s implementation, we should also remember that later studies, upon critical 
review, did not necessarily produce more definitive or positive findings.  
 Ultimately, Reimers (1997b) arrives at a somber conclusion.  He writes, “In 
sum, while students in EDUCO schools perform at levels comparable to those of 
students in other schools, there is no indication that this innovation has substantially 
increased school quality, internal efficiency, or even community participation” (p. 
159).   Not surprisingly, these findings have not been well received either within El 
Salvador or by those who would promote EDUCO.  This is clear in various ways. 
First, as Reimers (1997a) shares, the MINED leadership in El Salvador was not 
receptive to his findings. In one of his pieces, he writes: 
                                                 
30 Beginning in 1996, schools had to choose one or the other modality, with the end 





The author’s experience in trying to share the results, which suggested that 
there were problems which needed attention with the EDUCO programme, 
with key decision-makers in the programme, is that it was very difficult to 
discuss these in a frank manner. Those committed to the program very quickly 
became defensive and found multiple reasons to deny the validity of the 
findings of our survey. (Reimers, 1997a, p. 167) 
Importantly, by this time, MINED leadership had committed to the program 
politically, as Reimers (1997a) notes.  Subsequently, they had an aversion to 
unflattering evidence in terms of the program’s operation and outcomes. 
World Bank staff have exhibited similar tendencies.  Reimer’s (1997b) work 
has primarily been used by the World Bank, and in ways that did not engage with the 
findings of his which I mention above.  The first example is Coudouel (2006).  In a 
book on the distributional impact of public sector reform, Reimers (1997b) is cited to 
support a statement that, I would argue, does not speak to the content of his research.  
Coudouel (2006) writes, “An evaluation of El Salvador’s experience with 
community-managed schools suggests that the poorest children can obtain education 
results equivalent to those obtained by their richer counterparts only if their parents 
are prepared to work hard (Reimers, 1997b)” (p. 271).  Reimers (1997b) did not make 
such claims, particularly not with regard to equivalent outcomes being dependent 
upon parents being prepared to work hard.  The second example is the WDR 2004 
(World Bank, 2003).  Reimers (1997b) is cited here, but his findings are not 
discussed.  World Bank (2003) instead draws on Reimer’s (1997b) comments on the 
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national context at the time of EDUCO’s implementation, avoiding the more critical 
conclusions he draws.   
 The final study I review is Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003).  This piece is the result 
of a dissertation completed at Teachers’ College, Columbia University.   The author 
assesses many different aspects of the EDUCO program in practice.  In order to do 
this, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) conducted interviews with MINED officials, reviewed 
MINED literature and documents on the EDUCO program, and appraised the 
evidence available through research articles and evaluation reports.  
The evidence on four dimensions was considered critically. These dimensions 
were: Access, equity, productive efficiency, and social cohesion.  In reviewing the 
evidence on access, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) carefully notes the rapid expansion of 
the EDUCO program.  However, unlike some proponents of EDUCO, she notes that 
increased access to education is not necessarily an outcome of the EDUCO program 
itself; rather, it is a by-product of the government’s decision to pursue an educational 
intervention that would necessarily increase coverage.  The real question is not 
whether the implementation of EDUCO was accompanied by an increase in student 
enrollment, but rather whether the same outcome would have been attained if the 
government had pursued an expansion of traditional public schools, or some other 
strategy, in the post-war context.  In the absence of a counterfactual, an assertion in 
favor of the EDUCO program over traditional public schools as regards access cannot 
be made. 
Equity is the next dimension. Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) not only finds that fees 
are charged to parents, but, on average EDUCO parents paid more than parents in 
 88 
 
traditional public schools.  She also draws attention to the fact that EDUCO parents 
on ACEs donated labor equivalent to 805 staff working full-time per year. In her 
words, this “represents about 28 percent of the work done by all MINED’s 
administrative and support staff assisting all public schools” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 
2003, p. 159). 
The third dimension is productive efficiency. This is defined as output per unit 
cost.  Per Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003), “in spite of its importance, this question [(of 
productive efficiency)] has no definite answer so far, for evaluations on the EDUCO 
program have mainly examined its effectiveness in improving education regardless of 
its actual costs” (p. 160).  Moreover, with regard to education quality, she concludes 
that, “it is still unclear to what extent EDUCO has a comparative advantage over 
traditional public schools” (p. 160). It should be noted that Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) 
arrives at this conclusion after reviewing the same studies that I have reviewed here 
(i.e., Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Sawada, 2000; Umanzor et al., 1997).  
Last is the social cohesion dimension.  Here, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) echoes 
Lindo (1998) when she finds that social cohesion is achieved through community 
participation, which “varies across communities” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003, p. 162).  
Likewise, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) reinforces Reimers (1997b) when she observes 
the following: “While EDUCO purports greater social cohesion, its success depends 
greatly on the existing social cohesion capacity” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003, p. 162).  
The implication is that the EDUCO program has tended to rely on the pre-existing 
capacity of and connections among community members, as opposed to facilitating 
the strengthening of these things. 
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In comparison with the ‘group 1’ studies, both the ‘group 2’ studies and the 
non-World Bank studies arrived at less than positive conclusions in terms of a wide 
range of programmatic aspects.  Not surprisingly, in the context of excitement that 
characterized development thinking the 1990s and into the 2000s with regard to 
decentralization, the findings of these latter two groups of studies were not elevated.  
To the contrary the international promotion of the EDUCO program echoed the tone 
and findings communicated in the ‘group 1’ studies.  The next section explains this in 
more detail.  
3.4 The Global Promotion of EDUCO 
 Alongside the numerous evaluations of the EDUCO program which emerged 
during 1996-2006, a parallel and, to be sure, not entirely unrelated process occurred 
wherein the EDUCO program was promoted, both directly and indirectly.  This 
process occurred on three levels.  First, within El Salvador, the numerous studies 
being carried out by the World Bank served to maintain the focus of the MINED on 
EDUCO, as Gillies (2010) noted.  Secondly, within the World Bank, those same 
research studies began to draw the attention of staff working outside of Central 
America.  Gershberg, Meade, and Andersson (2009) take note of this.  Based on 
personal observation, they write “Jimenez and Sawada (1999) was influential in 
convincing World Bank staff that EDUCO was a successful model” (p. 198).31  
Finally, internationally, Desmond (2009) observes that “information on EDUCO and 
                                                 
31 Alec Gershberg served as a senior education economist for the World Bank during 
the late 1990s.  
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its outcomes has been disseminated to nations throughout Latin America and Africa” 
(p. 18).   
 The international dissemination to which Desmond (2009) refers occurred in 
many ways.  That is, it resulted from the interest and promotion of a range of actors – 
actors operating on a global scale.  Consider the numerous examples below, in Box 
3.1, from 1996-2006, which provide some idea of the sustained attention which 
EDUCO was given. Keep in mind that these events are in addition to those 
publications of the World Bank which highlighted the desirability of community-level 
decentralization generally, such as the 1999 Education Sector Strategy (World Bank, 
1999b).  Recall that chapter two of this dissertation detailed the intense focus of the 
World Bank on decentralization beginning in the early 1980s. 
Based on the events in Box 3.1, one observation is that the World Bank and 
the IDB – both institutions which financed EDUCO in the 1990s – not only featured 
EDUCO frequently, but did so in ways that were promotional.  A second observation 
is that EDUCO has not only been globally promoted, but also has, from the 
perspective of international development institutions, it has become a policy worthy 
of global reproduction. In these processes, national-level actors can and do play vital 
roles. 
This is an important point, for national-level ministerial actors participated in 
seven of the twenty events listed above (see, e.g., Meza, 1997; Merino, Ycardo, & 
Jacir de Lovo, 1999; Meza, 2001; Jacir de Lovo, 2000; Najarro, 2003; Meza, 
Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004a, b).  In each of those seven events, national actors were 




Box 3.1: The Global Promotion of EDUCO, 1996-2006 
• 1996 – A UNESCO Bulletin on meeting the EFA goals in Latin America mentions 
the EDUCO program as an example of decision-making power being transferred to 
the local level (UNESCO, 1996).  
 
• 1997 – A regional seminar for Central America is financed by the World Bank to 
disseminate the lessons of EDUCO (Meza, 1997). 
 
• 1997 – EDUCO wins the President’s Award for Excellence from the World Bank 
(Eriksson, Kreimer, & Arnold, 2000). 
  
• 1997 – EDUCO is labeled a flagship program by the World Bank (Eriksson, Kreimer, 
& Arnold, 2000). 
 
• 1998 – The IDB features EDUCO at its 1998 meeting of the board of governors in 
Cartagena, Colombia (IDB, 1998). 
 
• 1998 – The Revista Latinoamericana de Innovaciones Educativas features the 
findings on EDUCO of the special mission of the IDB to El Salvador (Merino, 
Ycardo, & Jacir de Lovo, 1999).  
 
• 1999 – EDUCO is identified in a regional UNESCO Bulletin as a strategy for 
providing quality education to underprivileged and/or excluded youth (Rivero, 1999). 
 
• 1999 – A special issue of the World Bank Economic Review on decentralization and 
voucher experiments in education features the research of Jimenez and Sawada 
(1999) on the EDUCO program (World Bank, 1999a).  
 
• 2000 – The World Bank commissions the creation of teaching materials on the 
EDUCO program. Edge (2000) creates a “resource-kit” on EDUCO. 
 
• 2000 – In the IDB’s Primary and Secondary Education Strategy, EDUCO is 
mentioned as an exemplar of reform based in local management and accountability.  
It is claimed that “research has shown that school attendance and student 
achievement improved significantly as a result of these reforms” (IDB, 2000, p. 19).  
IDB (2000) additionally asserts that “community monitoring can also help to reduce 
absenteeism by putting community pressure on offending teachers” and that “El 
Salvador’s EDUCO program has been particularly effective in these approaches” (p. 
19).  
 
• 2000 – In a book published by IDB, a former Minister of Education from El Salvador 
contributes a chapter on the benefits of community participation (Jacir de Lovo, 
2000).32  
 
                                                 
32 The same minister of education would later also contribute a chapter on EDUCO in 
a book published by a Salvadoran think tank (Jacir de Lovo, 2003).  
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• 2001 – At an international workshop in Lima, Peru, co-financed by the World Bank 
and titled the “International Workshop on Participation and Empowerment for 
Inclusive Development,” the case of EDUCO is highlighted by the World Bank 
(Meza, 2001). 
 
• 2001 – Through a book chapter UNESCO reviews the gains made by El Salvador in 
the 1990s and exclaims its desirability for increasing community participation 
(UNESCO, 2001).  
 
• 2001 – A conservative education think tank – the Partnership for Education 
Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL) – led by the former Minister of Education 
from El Salvador focuses on the potential of EDUCO to address issues of educational 
coverage (PREAL, 2001).   
 
• 2003 – At an international workshop sponsored by the Organization of American 
States (OAS) to promote knowledge sharing among countries, a Salvadoran MINED 
representative presents on EDUCO (Najarro, 2003) 
 
• 2004 – The World Bank features the gains of the EDUCO program in its En Breve 
publication (Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004b).  
 
• 2004 – World Bank consultants from El Salvador present on the successes of the 
EDUCO program at a conference in Shanghai, China themed “Reducing Poverty on a 
Global Scale: Learning and Innovating for Development” (Meza, Guzmán, & de 
Varela, 2004a).  A book is produced by the World Bank based on this conference, in 
which EDUCO’s virtues are again noted (Moreno-Dodson, 2005).  
 
• 2004 – In its flagship publication, the World Development Report, the World Bank 
spotlights EDUCO as the prime example of public service decentralization in 
education along lines of accountability and for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness 
(World Bank, 2003). Per the Bank’s own admission (World Bank, 2011b), this report 
has been tremendously impactful, both within and beyond the Bank. Within the 
Bank, its regional strategies and programmatic activities at the country level were re-
aligned in terms of WDR 2004’s accountability framework. Externally, the World 
Bank has seen the influence of WDR 2004 on DFID’s work. 
 
• 2005 – In a book produced by the World Bank on revising service delivery, EDUCO 
is singled out as a reform that engendered access, efficiency, and equity (Fiszbein, 
2005).  
 
• 2006 – The publication En Breve of the World Bank again covers the EDUCO 
program, this time to speak to issues of access and quality (World Bank, 2006).  
 
• 2006 – The World Bank suggests to China at a conference in Peking on successful 
development interventions that it base its approach to rural education on the EDUCO 
model (Ramírez, 2006).  
 
but primarily the World Bank, to share the experience of EDUCO.  In concrete terms, 
the World Bank recruited Meza (1997) to present at a Central America regional 
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seminar; Meza (2001) to present at a conference in Peru; Meza, Guzmán and de 
Varela (2004a) to present in China; and Meza, Guzmán and de Varela (2004b) to 
publish their experiences in the Bank’s En Breve journal.  Of note is that these outlets 
(i.e., conferences and journals) are the Bank’s own, as well.  That is to say, with 
regard to the use of Salvadoran MINED actors, the World Bank either relied on 
existing outlets (i.e., En Breve) or created new ones (i.e., the conferences in Central 
America, Peru, and China) to promote its preferred policy options – such as EDUCO.  
As other studies have found (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & 
Johnson, 2006), the World Bank extended staff positions to these national level 
EDUCO proponents.  Indeed, in the late 1990s and beyond, the World Bank 
leveraged at the global level the experience of Salvadoran advocates of EDUCO by 
lending them its institutional clout.  
 The IDB acted similarly, though much less intensively, in its use of national-
level actors.  As noted above, it featured research by Salvadoran EDUCO experts in 
Colombia in 1998 at the meeting of the board of governors (IDB, 1998) and included 
a chapter by a former Minister of Education in a book it produced (Jacir de Lovo, 
2000).  The OAS, on the other hand, simply invited one Salvadoran representative to 
disseminate El Salvador’s experience with EDUCO at a knowledge sharing 
conference for MINED staff from Latin America and the Caribbean (Najarro, 2003).  
As an additional point, in interpreting the list elaborated above, it should be 
noted that the events included are restricted to those which appear in a review of the 
literature, and do not include, for example, the numerous study tours financed by the 
World Bank for MINED staff of various countries in Latin America and Africa to 
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learn from the EDUCO program first hand.  Neither does the list above include the 
many trips financed by the World Bank for Salvadoran MINED staff to travel to other 
countries to share insights into how the EDUCO program worked. Given the tidal 
wave of positive press about the EDUCO program during this time period, it is easy 
to see how less rosy studies by Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003), Parandekar (2002), and 
Reimers (1997b) were drowned out.  Additionally, given the trends of the 1980s-
1990s, the overall context of excitement and promotion, the highly-visible and 
positive studies by renowned World Bank researchers, the widespread involvement of 
the World Bank at the country level, and the desire of MINED officials to pursue 
reforms perceived as effective and potentially cost-saving, it should come as no 
surprise that the EDUCO model spread to other countries.  Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nepal, and Uganda are but a few examples (Desmond, 2009). Of course, even where 
not directly (or officially) emulated, the EDUCO program has helped to extend and 
reinforce the notion that community-level decentralization was desirable.  
 Interestingly, the events listed above not only demonstrate that the World 
Bank and IDB shed light on the EDUCO more frequently and intensively, but also 
that each organization tended to elevate the EDUCO program for reasons that aligned 
with its interests.  On the one hand, the World Bank and IDB consistently 
underscored EDUCO’s presumed ability to lead to enhanced efficiency, 
accountability and effectiveness, while UNESCO, on the other hand, repeatedly saw 
in EDUCO a way to extend education services to marginalized populations, to meet 
the EFA goals, and to promote community participation for reasons other than 
efficiency or effectiveness.  Thus, from its beginnings, EDUCO drew the attention of 
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a range of international institutional actors.  Over time, these same actors continued to 
highlight distinct aspects of the EDUCO experience.  Attention to EDUCO has 
persisted in the most recent period, albeit in a different way.  
3.5 EDUCO in Global Literature 
A review of the global development literature shows that the EDUCO 
program has continued to have an impact since 2006, even if it is no-longer actively 
held up as an exemplar of education reforms by international institutions. At this 
point, the review indicates that the impact of EDUCO persists because of the 
evidence base produced by the World Bank during 1997-2005.  That is, the 
quantitative studies reviewed above which were favorable to EDUCO (i.e., the “group 
1” studies) have become artifacts in the landscape where development professionals 
work.  These studies still serve to bolster arguments for education reforms related to 
notions of accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and participation.  As such, they 
continue to be cited and reviewed by scholars writing on community-level 
decentralization in developing countries (see, e.g., Di Gropello & Marshall, 2011).   
The same is true of international institutions.  Put differently, the group 1 
EDUCO studies have filtered into the global literature produced by international 
institutions – including, but not limited to, the World Bank. In Box 3.2, below, I 
provide examples of how the evidence base created by the World Bank has been used 





Box 3.2: Examples of EDUCO in Global Literature 
• 2005 – A United Nations Task Force on Education and Gender Equality 
identified EDUCO as “probably the most celebrated case of successful 
parental control,” as well as a key strategy for improving primary school 
effectiveness (Birdsall, Levine, & Ibrahim, 2005, p. 67) 
 
• 2006 – The evidence base for EDUCO is drawn upon in a World Bank report 
which elevates and compares educational decentralization in four Central 
American countries, suggesting them as good examples of teacher 
accountability (Di Gropello, 2006; see also Di Gropello 2005). 
 
• 2007 – A book chapter by a World Bank education specialist on forms of 
educational decentralization in Latin America includes EDUCO (Di Gropello, 
2007).  
 
• 2007 – A report prepared for UNICEF suggests that the EDUCO experience 
can provide lessons for decentralization in emergency/post-conflict settings in 
Africa  (Beleli et al., 2007) 
 
• 2007 – In a UNESCO (2007) report on how decentralization can help to 
ensure the provision of education as a human right, the EDUCO program is 
featured.  
 
• 2007 – An article on decentralization in three Central American countries by 
World Bank researchers reviews the group 1 studies and signals that such 
reforms lead to improvements in student learning and teacher acountability  
(Umansky & Vegas, 2007).  
 
• 2008 – A report by the Brookings Center on improving development 
effectiveness spotlights EDUCO as “an example of how a small innovation 
can be scaled up to a national level and have a significant impact on national 
education systems” (Hartman & Linn, 2008, p. 47) 
 
• 2009 – The Global Partnership for Education (2009) focused on EDUCO as a 
“way to ensure that the community contributes to improved educational 
outcomes” (p. 96).  
 
• 2009 – A World Bank review of experience with decentralization (or, in this 
case, “school-based management”) underscored the EDUCO program and 
rehearsed by the benefits claimed by group 1 studies  (Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, 
Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009).  
 
• 2011 – In a review of evidence on accountability mechanisms in education, 
the World Bank again focuses on the EDUCO program as one of the 




• 2011 – The Global Monitoring Report on armed conflict and education 
suggests that EDUCO provides a good example of a course of action when 
governments fail to provide educational services (UNESCO, 2011). 
 
• 2012 – A website for exemplary educational innovations in Latin American 
and the Caribbean features the EDUCO program (UNESCO, n.d.). 
 
 
Noticeably, the evidence in Box 3.2, is less promotive in nature than the 
events presented in the previous section. Not now the center of attention on its own, 
EDUCO comes into play through reviews of decentralization experiences as well as 
through the suggestions of a range global actors. 
Institutionally, a few observations stand out. First, the IDB has clearly reduced 
its focus on EDUCO.  This institution does not even register as promoting or making 
use of the EDUCO program.33 A similar finding is true of the World Bank. There are 
no-longer events that isolate and elevate the EDUCO program, though Bank staff still 
tend to make use of the evidence base produced by colleagues during the height of 
attention to EDUCO.  For example, as they review and write on the findings related 
to decentralization in practice they draw on EDUCO studies, despite their limitations, 
and in so doing signal what is, from their perspective, the enduringly positive and 
strong example of EDUCO (see, e.g., Di Gropello, 2006, 2007; Barrera-Osorio, 
Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009; Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011; Umansky & 
Vegas, 2007). 
 Yet, there is some evidence that the sentiment within the Bank toward 
EDUCO’s evidence base is shifting.  One example is a relatively more recent 
                                                 




publication on school-based management by the World Bank’s Human Development 
Network (World Bank, 2008). Here, the authors stated that “it is very likely”  (World 
Bank, 2008, p. 11) that the measure used by Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 2003) to 
correct for sample selection bias was invalid – the implication being that their 
coefficients are unreliable. Incidentally, this coincides with feelings among Bank staff 
that they have better studies now on which to draw to support community-level 
decentralization, school-based management and accountability-centered reforms 
(World Bank, 2008).  
As with the World Bank, so too do other institutions continue to draw on the 
“group 1” EDUCO studies reviewed in an earlier section.  This is evident from the 
above list, which demonstrates that institutions as diverse as the Brookings Center, 
the Global Partnership for Education, and UNESCO continue to find EDUCO 
relevant.  In assessing the reports by these institutions, it becomes clear that the 
legacy of the EDUCO program is the various benefits claimed by the group 1 studies 
reviewed in this chapter.  Given the wide range of claims made by these studies, the 
above mentioned institutions have pointed to EDUCO as a program with lessons 
relevant not only to instituting community involvement (Global Partnership for 
Education, 2009), but also to extending system coverage rapidly (UNESCO, n.d.), 
achieving educational and gender equality (Birdsall, Levine, & Ibrahim, 2005), 
providing education in post-conflict contexts (Beleli et al., 2007; UNESCO, 2011), 
and ensuring the provision of education as a human right (UNESCO, 2007).  In these 
ways, we see how evidence base created by the World Bank continues to echo 
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throughout the development landscape, albeit in a less intense form than it did 
previously. 
Of course, the reduced prominence of EDUCO has not come about in a 
vacuum.  Globally, the focus of development institutions and development 
practitioners has shifted to include other neo-liberal reform concepts as they become 
popular, such as public-private partnerships (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guáqueta, 
2009), merit-based pay for teachers (Woessman, 2011), and conditional cash transfers 
(Tarabini, 2008).  Vouchers remain a perennial policy priority as well (Berends, 
Springer, Ballou, & Wallberg, 2009).  In addition, as noted in chapter 2, the World 
Bank has in recent years begun to de-emphasize decentralization through/to parent 
councils in favor of decentralization through “school-based management” (Barrera 
Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibáñez, 2009). This term is broader in that school 
councils can include teachers and principals in addition to parents. Finally, at the 
national level, the EDUCO program fell out of favor politically once a president from 
the left-wing FMLN party was elected in 2009, after twenty years of rule by right-
wing, ARENA governments which were sympathetic to neoliberal reforms.  
Thus, while the list above demonstrates that the EDUCO experiment lives on 
via the studies produced by the World Bank during the program’s heyday, the 
longevity of this experiment is itself subject to development trends.  The World Bank 
has taken up the mantle of other reform concepts, while also shifting slightly the 
theory and practice of decentralization towards school-based management.  Likewise, 
the MINED in El Salvador now responds to the political climate there, one that does 
not favor EDUCO.  The international and national levels seem to align (or not) based 
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on constellations of political and institutional factors across each of these levels.  One 
might hypothesize that, in order for a given reform experiment to become global, the 
political dispositions at the national level must align (voluntarily or otherwise) with 
the institutional preferences of involved international organizations.  In addition, 
international institutions – or possibly transnational civil society networks – can 
facilitate the emergence of global education policies to the extent that they are able to 
generate and disseminate reputable knowledge, engage policy entrepreneurs, and 
activate inter-institutional networks (Verger, 2012).  
3.6 EDUCO – Looking Forward and Backward 
Looking forward, it seems likely that the EDUCO program will gradually fade 
from prominence. In other words, it seems that the EDUCO program, after being 
disseminated and promoted intensely from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s by 
international institutions, is now in the twilight of its career.  Steiner-Khamsi (2010) 
refers to this as the burnout phase of policy diffusion.   
This supposition is reinforced by the fact that the World Bank does not focus 
on community-level decentralization in its current Education 2020 strategy paper, 
though it is still preoccupied with the notion of accountability (World Bank, 2011a).  
The difference, as Edwards (2012b) has noted, is that the World Bank is now 
interested to scale up accountability mechanisms to the national level using 
standardized testing, as opposed to implementing accountability mechanisms at the 
community level using school councils.  The perception that EDUCO is moving out 
of the spotlight is bolstered by the observation that the studies by Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999, 2003) and Sawada and Ragatz (2005) were removed from the World 
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Bank 2020 Education Strategy. This occurred sometime between the elaboration of 
the draft strategy and the final production and approval of the World Bank’s new 
strategy document.34  
 In retrospect, one thing this review has not been able to fully unpack and 
clarify is the origin of the EDUCO program and its solidification as an official 
MINED policy in El Salvador.  In other words, while this chapter has reviewed the 
implementation of the EDUCO program, its evidence base in the literature, the way in 
which it has been promoted transnationally, and its recent status as a feature of the 
development landscape, what remains unclear is how the program began, not to 
mention the policy process through which it entered the Ten Year Plan for education 
reform in 1995.  Answering these questions requires a focus on the dynamics between 
international actors and national actors in the context of El Salvador.  That task also 
requires one first to explain the theoretical perspective in which such an analysis is 
grounded.  The next chapter thus turns in that direction.  
 
 
                                                 
34 As of November 28, 2012, the draft of the Education Strategy 2020 document was 






Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspective, Conceptual Space, Analytic 
Framework 
 
In recent decades, various perspectives on how education policymaking is 
transnationally influenced have gained currency.  In this dissertation, I draw on what 
might be called a critical international political economic theoretical perspective in 
my analysis of IPEPF (international processes of education policy formation).  In this 
chapter, in addition to explaining this theoretical perspective, I also wish to more 
fully clarify the specific conceptual space under investigation. As indicated in the 
introductory chapter, that conceptual space is labeled IPEPF.  To define the 
boundaries, contours, and dynamics of that space is essential because research 
methods must follow from the nature of the phenomena being investigated and the 
question one wishes to answer.  The clarification I offer here will facilitate both more 
accurate conceptual discussion and more precise operationalization of research 
methods in the remainder of this dissertation.  Additionally, specifying what is meant 
by IPEPF will reduce the conceptual ambiguity that can characterize investigations of 
how transnational forces influence education policymaking at the national level in 
developing countries. 
The final issue on which I elaborate in this chapter concerns the particular 
forms of influence to which I will be attentive in my analysis.  These forms of 
influence are derived from the work of Dale (1999b) and Samoff (2009) and relate to 
“external effects” of globalization and to “pathways of influence” of foreign aid. In 
that the central question of this dissertation is how transnational forces have impacted 
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education policy formation in El Salvador, the forms of influence distilled by Dale 
(1999b) and Samoff (2009) constitute a useful analytic framework when brought 
together, as will be shown.  This framework is particularly applicable to the present 
research not only because the authors on which it draws are grounded in an 
international political economic perspective but also because it is, as we will see, 
relevant to the conceptual space represented by IPEPF.  There is thus alignment 
among the theoretical perspective, conceptual space, and analytic framework 
employed in this dissertation. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I briefly set out two 
premises from which my theoretical orientation departs. Second, I characterize the 
literature on policy borrowing, in relation to which the present dissertation can and 
should be understood.  Third, I discuss in more detail the tenets of my particular 
theoretical framework. Fourth, I not only define IPEPF but also distinguish it from 
associated concepts.  Fifth and finally, I detail the analytic concepts I will 
operationalize in order to examine how transnational influence manifested in the 
formation of EDUCO as an official education policy in El Salvador. 
4.1 Theoretical Premises 
Theoretically, in this dissertation, I depart from two premises.  The first is that 
education policymaking occurs in the context of neoliberal capitalist globalization 
(Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002; Dale, 1999a; Daun, 2002; Stromquist, 2002; Stromquist & 
Monkman, 2000; Verger, Novelli, & Altinyelken, 2012).  The second, related premise 
is that global politics matter for how those policies are made (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004).  
These two premises are connected, for as Robertson, Bonal, and Dale (2002) have 
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written, “globalization is the outcome of processes that involve real actors – 
economic and political – with real interests” (p. 472). 
4.2 Policy Borrowing 
The issue of globalization and its implications for education are taken 
seriously in the field of comparative and international education (Dale, 1999a; 
Verger, Novelli, & Kosar-Altinyelken, 2012).  One particularly prominent strand of 
research to do so relates to the concept of policy borrowing (Phillips & Ochs, 2004; 
Schriewer, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012).  
Increasingly, despite the use of the term borrowing, much research in this area is 
concerned with political and economic factors that contribute to the ways in which 
educational policies travel from one country to another (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006, 2010; 
Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012).  This relatively recent focus is in contrast to the 
historical focus on trans-atlantic and trans-pacific flows of ideas, which tended to 
focus on political issues alone (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012). 
Along with this increasing focus on political as well as economic factors, 
scholars have issued challenges to those of us who would attempt pursue research in 
this vein. Rappleye (2010), for example, has suggested that the research on policy 
borrowing has tended to lack a temporal dimension.  He also suggested that more 
attention be paid to issues of policy transfer during periods of political transition 
(Rappleye, 2010).  Separately, Steiner-Khamsi (2012) continues the tradition in the 
field of comparative and international education of urging scholars to draw on 
concepts and frames from other disciplines, such as political science and sociology, in 
order to ensure that our theoretical and empirical focus goes beyond the education 
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sector alone. Lastly, Steiner-Khamsi (2012) recently encouraged policy transfer 
studies which endeavor to understand “local policy contexts against the backdrop of 
larger transnational or global developments” (p. 4). By engaging with these 
suggestions, we are likely to produce more nuanced, accurate, and comprehensive 
explanations of the nature and meaning of policy transfer.  
Broadly speaking, I attempt to respond to these challenges in this dissertation.  
This is evident in that I ground my study in the concept of IPEPF (which draws our 
attention to how the process of policymaking occurs over time). Moreover, and as 
will be demonstrated in chapter seven, I respond to Rappleye’s (2010) suggestions in 
that my findings focus squarely on the movement and development of policy ideas as 
El Salvador transitioned between presidential administrations in the late 1980s.  As 
will be shown in what follows, I also respond to both of Steiner-Khamsi’s (2012) 
points. I begin to do so by grounding my study not in an analysis of education politics 
narrowly but rather by grounding my study in a theoretical tradition that will facilitate 
an analysis of the politics and economics of education policy development more 
broadly (Dale, 2005). 
As a final point on policy borrowing, while I do not study policy transfer 
between countries directly, the present study can be seen as making a contribution to 
this research area. This is because I unpack the development of a policy that 
subsequently was the focus of much policy borrowing and lending. My research thus 
takes a step back and endeavors to investigate the stage prior to the point at which a 




4.3 A Critical International Political Economic Perspective on Education Reform 
The theoretical framework that I employ relates to work by authors who 
attempt to understand the making of education policy by situating their analysis in 
relation to the multi- (i.e., international, national, and/or local) and cross-level spaces 
and interactions where policy is made and through which education policy is 
impacted (e.g., Carney, 2008; Dale, 2005; Ginsburg, Cooper; Raghu, & Zegarra, 
1990; Roberston, 2011; Verger, Novelli, & Atltinyelken, 2012).  In departing from 
the work of such authors, the theoretical foundations of this dissertation are based on 
a broad yet related group of scholars whose work, collectively, could be labeled 
critical international political economy (CIPE)35 (Berman, 1992; Campbell, 1998; 
Cerny, 1997; Cox, 2002; Dale, 2000; Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990; 
Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2001; Jones, 2006, 2007a,b; Klein, 2007; King, 2007; 
Moutsios, 2009, 2010; Mundy, 1998; Mundy & Ghali, 2009; Robinson, 2006; 
Samoff, 1993, 2007; Thompson, 1977).36  
The CIPE perspective is particularly appropriate for my purposes because I 
am interested to analyze the various manifestations of power in explaining the 
interaction of a range of forces and actors on and across multiple levels (e.g., 
international, national, local) as they impact processes of education policymaking in 
El Salvador.  In addition, CIPE is appropriate because I understand those actors, their 
actions, and the processes, events, and contexts in which they engage to be 
simultaneously shaped and constituted by the following: Historical-structural 
                                                 
35 The term critical international political economy is drawn from Germain (2007).  
36 Alternatively, the theoretical perspective elaborated in this section could be 
understood as a critical perspective on global governance (Karns & Mingst, 2010).  
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conditions; multi-level politics and the involvement of a range of inter-related 
political-institutional (international, national, and local) actors; the institutional nature 
of international organizations; strategic-relational interaction; and ideational factors.  
I briefly comment below on what is meant by each of these five theoretical tenets.  
While each tenet can be distinguished from the others, they are, of course, not entirely 
separable.  In other words, these tenets are linked; changing an assumption about one 
would necessarily affect how we understand the others.  
4.3.1 Historical-Structural Conditions 
To begin, while Cox (2002) reminds us that historical structures are “those 
conditions not of their own choosing within which people make history” (p. 80), 
Torres (1989) gives more clarity with regard to what the application of the historical-
structural approach means in practice.  As he writes, the historical-structural approach 
is one in which individuals have choices, though “they are prescribed or constrained 
by historical circumstances, conjunctural processes, and the diverse expressions of 
power and authority (at the micro and macro level) through concrete rules of policy 
formation” (Torres, 1989, p. 83).  We can further distinguish among structural 
determinants and conjunctural ones.  According to Torres (1989), the former “have a 
historical-organic origin” (p. 94).  While he does not elaborate, I take this to mean 
that sub- and supra-national structural determinants evolve incrementally over time 
and are based on long-standing political-economic relations. One example of a 
structural determinant would be the Cold War context with all the associated 
geopolitical implications – e.g., the real and rhetorical global political and economic 
competition between capitalism and socialism (Klein, 2007).  Conjunctural 
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determinants, on the other hand, affect policy formation “at a particular point in time” 
through “the short-term crystallization of a peculiar constellation of forces” (Torres, 
1989, p. 94).  One example of such a short-term crystallization of forces may be the 
way that international organizations such as the United Nations agencies and the 
World Bank engulf and intersect with national ministries in reconstruction efforts in 
post-conflict settings.  Ultimately, the value of these politically-attuned, historical-
structural understandings lies in the fact that, without them, “it would be difficult to 
understand the particular rationale of resource assignment and the underlying motives 
for the creation (or elimination) of institutions, services, plans or policies” (Torres, 
1989, p. 95).  
4.3.2 Multi-Level Politics 
Numerous authors have expounded on the fact that the making of education 
policy around the world – and particularly in developing countries – is affected by 
actors at various levels, from the local to the international (see, e.g., Dale, 2005; 
Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990; Jones, 2007a,b; Moutsious, 2009, 2010; 
Mundy & Ghali, 2009; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004).  More than simple involvement, 
however, authors such as Moutsios (2009) have remarked how “important political 
decisions are taken … within transnational networks of power rather than by the 
weakened national institutions of representation” (p. 469).   
For Moutsios (2009), these transnational networks of power operate in and 
through a range of international organizations, but especially institutions such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
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While these institutions certainly constitute an important actor and an unavoidable 
layer of ideology and managerial bureaucracy in the international landscape of 
education reform, states – or, perhaps more appropriately, the national ministries that 
represent their interests – are still relevant and purposeful actors, even if their actions 
are constrained (see below section on strategic-relational interaction).  As Moutsios 
(2010) states, “power is located in the strategies and decisions of policy-making 
elites, which act in the transnational space constituted by global business, states, 
international organizations and interstate entities” (p. 127, emphasis added).   
Thus, while the ministries of the state may not entirely – or predominantly – 
retain the locus of control in processes of policymaking, state representatives are still 
vital actors (Dale, 1999b).  In the words of Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu and Zegarra 
(1990),  
Nation-states in the core and periphery may be seen as active in relation to the 
world economy in general and to multinational firms, corporate foundations, 
international organizations, bilateral agencies, and universities. They do not 
just respond to what is offered, nor do they merely accept what is given, but 
economic and state elites (among other less powerful actors) actively seek aid 
for their own purposes or attempt to redirect the uses of resources provided for 
other tasks (p. 489). 
Of course, state ministries are not the only actors at the national level, just as 
the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and WTO are not the only international-level actors.  
Other institutional actors that originate from the national level may include national 
NGOs, think tanks, businesses, philanthropic organizations, teachers’ unions, 
 110 
 
universities, and social movements.  Likewise, from the international level, you may 
have many similar actors, such as multinational corporations (van Fleet, 2011), 
international philanthropic organizations (Berman, 1979), international non-
governmental organizations, global civil society, trans-national social movements 
(Chabbott, 1998; Mundy with Ghali, 2009; Mundy & Murphy, 2001), global 
universities (Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990), regional organizations 
(Dale & Robertson, 2002), bi-lateral aid agencies (Berman, 1992; Mundy & Ghali, 
2009), and other multilateral agencies not mentioned above, such as the United 
Nations and its agencies (UNESCO, UNICEF) (Jones, 2005; Mundy, 1999).   
To be sure, the differences are not absolute between the actors classified 
above as national and international. That is, what is national and what is international 
may not always be clear: Individual actors from various countries (developing or not) 
may “move up” to work for the World Bank, while actors that have worked for 
international organizations may “move down” to occupy a position in a national 
ministry, for example.  Thus, while I suggest that it is conceptually useful to employ 
the designations international and national (not to mention local) when it comes to the 
level from which the institution in question operates, I also suggest, as have others, 
that it is necessary to consider the origins of individual institutional actors, whether 
they have moved across levels, and the implications of that for the policy role they 
play (Moutsios, 2009; Robertson, 2012; Steiner-Khamsi, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi, 
Silova, & Johnson, 2006).   
Considering such implications can be important because, for example, an 
actor who moves from the World Bank or UNESCO into a position with a Ministry of 
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Education may well possess and exercise specialist knowledge and clout that perhaps 
allows them to influence the content of reform agendas or the policy prescriptions 
taken up.  Conversely, depending on the context of origin and individual 
characteristics, we may not expect a researcher or policy actor from a developing 
country, for example, to have the same type of effect if they were to move up to work 
with an international organization.  It is perhaps more likely that such an actor may be 
strategically employed to further the agenda of the hiring institution, and not to make 
changes to it.  
Separately, the local level can also be relevant to a discussion of education 
reform, as Vavrus and Bartlett (2009) have shown.  In terms of actors specifically, it 
is recognized that there are various at this level which can be relevant to educational 
change.  These primarily include NGOs, such as community groups, activist groups, 
and interest groups, though social movements can also operate at – and often 
originate from – the local (or grassroots) level (Sutton & Arnove, 2004).  While these 
actors can be relevant, the present study does not take them to be a focal point, though 
I may in my future research on educational change in El Salvador related to EDUCO.  
That is not to say, however, that the local level is not considered in this dissertation.  
To the contrary, the politics of the local level – which are certainly important in the 
case of EDUCO – will be taken into account.  The difference is that local level 
politics will serve primarily as context, rather than as the central realm for analysis.   
Having gone from the international to the local level, it is necessary now to 
turn back to the national level in order to provide an additional comment on the 
nature of the state and its relationship to education. To that end, the theoretical stance 
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I adopt is drawn from McLennan (1984), who asserted the following: “The State in 
education is understood not as a single and unified entity but as a set of agencies, 
departments, tiers and levels, each with their own rules and resources and often 
varying purposes” (p. 3, as cited in Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990, p. 
490).  That said, actors within the state generally and within the Ministry of 
Education specifically are thought to engage in both symbolic and real education 
policy reform in order to respond to legitimacy crises, such that they “maximize the 
political gain to be derived from the design of educational reforms and … minimize 
the political cost of implementing them” (Weiler, 1988, p. 265).  Given the above 
theoretical tenets, the state is thus seen as a site of struggle wherein individuals not 
only maneuver for position within its ministries but also through which various 
groups from the local to the international level compete to influence the direction of 
education reform. 
4.3.3 The Institutional Nature of International Organizations 
In the previous section, in discussing the multi-level politics and political 
actors involved in the international political economy of education reform, the role of 
international organizations was underscored.  Here, it is necessary to further comment 
on the institutional nature of those organizations.  This is because their institutional 
nature combines with, and often enhances, the dominant position they can occupy vis-
à-vis national actors, particularly in the case of the World Bank.   
Moutsios (2010), drawing on the seminal work of Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004), explains this well.  As Moutsios (2010) writes, “IOs are bureaucracies. …. 
They are created by states and as such they appear rational, impartial and technical. 
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They are characterised by the attributes of bureaucratic authority” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 
125).  In the practice of policymaking, this bureaucratic authority has two key 
implications: First, they are seen as “in authority” because “they have the role that 
national societies recognise as legitimate for them to exercise power”; second, they 
are “an authority” because “they handle data and demonstrate expertise” (Moutsios, 
2010, p. 125).  The result is that these organizations are “valued as superior and 
neutral agencies of policy formulation” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 125). 
For their part, international organizations attempt to maintain their authority 
and reinforce the perception that they are neutral by engaging in ostensibly impartial 
and technocratic practices that will contribute to their being seen as contributing to a 
legitimate social purpose (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).  Concisely stated by Barnett 
and Finnemore (2004), “the authority of [international organizations] … lies in their 
ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral – as not exercising power but 
instead serving others” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 21).  Despite the projection of 
such characteristics, organizations of course advance or support certain objectives, 
goals, purposes, or principles over others.  While international organizations are 
frequently clear about their prerogatives, they often also have the ability to entrench 
their perspectives and policy preferences through rules and procedures.  Importantly, 
these rules and procedures can effectively lead to the “mystification of knowledge 
and power relations” and can “constrain and set priorities” in a way that is “barely 
discernible, and thus, generally inaccessible” since it happens through a seemingly 
apolitical and neutral institutional process (Samoff, 2007, p. 72). In conjunction with 
these procedures, international organizations often take care to “rely heavily on 
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specialist knowledge” because, in the words of Moutsios (2010), “it supports 
scientifically political pursuits and indicates ‘solutions’ to pre-defined ‘problems’” (p. 
125).  Specialist knowledge and formal, rationalized processes represent formidable 
and often taken-for-granted aspects of policy formation.  
Given that this dissertation is concerned with transnational influence in 
education policymaking, explaining how one understands the institutional nature of 
international organizations, as I have done, is seen to be important. This is 
particularly so given that the range of international institutions discussed in the 
previous section constitute an apparatus of specialist knowledge and international 
bureaucratic machinery through which national education polices are frequently 
affected, particularly in developing countries (Jones, 2007b; Moutsios, 2009). On the 
other hand, theorizing how national level agents interact with that apparatus is 
thought to be equally essential.  I address this issue next. 
4.3.4 Strategic-Relational Interaction 
 In the above sections, I have discussed historical-structural conditions, multi-
level politics, the range of actors that operate on and across those levels, and the 
institutional nature of those actors.  At this point, it is necessary to detail how 
institutional actors are understood to interact with each other and with those 
historical-structural conditions.  Fundamentally, this is necessary because the concept 
which guides this dissertation – i.e., IPEPF – is a dynamic one, characterized, both, 
by relations among unequal institutions and by the presence of constraints in the form 
of what Jones (2007a) calls the “global architecture of education” (p. 325).  
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 In conceptualizing these dynamics, I draw on the work of Jessop (2001) and 
his strategic-relational approach to explaining the interaction between structure and 
agency.  For him, agency relates to structure in that free-willed – yet still socialized 
and, I would add, ideologically malleable – agents make structurally oriented 
strategic calculations which they put into practice through recursively selected 
strategies and tactics (Jessop, 2001, p. 1224).  That is, actors “orient their strategies 
and tactics in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their ‘feel 
for the game’” (p. 1224).  At the same time, however, “the recursive selection of 
strategies and tactics depends on individual, collective, or organizational learning 
capacities and on the ‘experiences’ resulting from the pursuit of different strategies 
and tactics in different conjunctures” (p. 1224).  
Put plainly, actors initially scan and interpret the institutional and political 
context in which they are nested and then they take strategic action within the 
constraints they face. In determining the appropriate action, actors take account of (a) 
those actions which are possible, (b) the lessons they have learned (either personally 
or through the experience of others) regarding those actions which are likely to be 
rewarded, and (c) their own “feel for the game.”  The structural aspect of actor 
decision-making becomes clear when one considers “the tendency for specific 
structures and structural configurations to reinforce selectively specific forms of 
actions, tactics, or strategies and to discourage others” (Jessop, 2001, p. 1224).  
Institutional actors are often aware of which actions will be rewarded by the structural 
configurations in which they are embedded – and subsequently act accordingly.  
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4.3.5 Ideational Factors 
Drawing on the work of Béland (2005), Campbell (1998), Cox (2002), and 
Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu and Zegarra (1990), I recognize that ideational factors also 
influence policymaking.  That is to say, one cannot analyze the institutional, political, 
historical, and structural aspects of educational reform without also considering the 
role of ideas. Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu and Zegarra (1990) summarize well the fact 
that the ideational dimension must be considered in relation to the others.  As they 
write,  
The struggle at the ideological level, like at other levels, does not occur 
among individuals and groups with equal resources and power. Those with 
greater control over and access to the public and private modes of mass 
producing and mass distributing ideas tend to define the major issues in 
particular ways that shape the overall discourse. Voices expressing alternative 
frames for analyzing and addressing the problems may go unheard or be 
marginalized. The use of mass media and reports of government, corporate 
foundation, or international agency commissions must be understood as 
strategies for giving and denying voice (Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra 
1990, p. 493).  
In terms of analysis, the result is that, “When we examine educational reform efforts 
in any country or region, we need to investigate how the global structural and 
ideological contexts constrain and enable individual and group actors’ transactions 
concerning education” (Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990, p. 493-494).   
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Global structural and ideological contexts do not, however, create themselves.  
As various authors have discussed and shown, active agents, often based in or 
associated with international organizations play a role by advocating – directly or 
through research – for particular reform visions, principles, and programs (Campbell, 
1998; Haas, 1992; Jones, 2007b; Samoff, 1996, 1999; Verger, 2012). To the extent 
that those international institutions – either independently or in tandem with other 
institutional or powerful political actors – operate on and influence various levels, 
they are able to develop multiple levels of complementary ideas.  For example, while 
a multilateral institution may promote on a global level a neoliberal reform paradigm, 
at the country level the representatives of that institution will advocate particular 
programs that align with that paradigm (Campbell, 1998; Hall, 1993).  In doing so, 
these policy entrepreneurs rely on framing strategies that invoke symbols and 
concepts that will, on a normative level, help policymakers to legitimize chosen 
policy solutions to the public (Campbell, 1998; see also Mintrom, 1997; Verger, 
2012).37 Over time, continued promotion of a particular paradigm by international 
and national actors can lead to changes in public sentiment, such that, in addition to 
policymakers, societies and the “international public sector” (Forman, 2002) come to 
understand the world, policy problems, and solutions through a particular 
paradigmatic lens (Campbell, 1998; Carney, 2008; Cox, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 1998).  
By extension, the above discussion of ideas has implications for how 
institutional actors strategically engage in policy reform.  Put differently, there are 
                                                 
37 Note, however, that semiotics is not the only way that international forces can 
influence national-level policymakers. The range of forms of influence examined in 
this dissertation will be discussed in a later section of this chapter (Samoff, 2009).  
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linkages between the institutional promotion of certain ideas, on one hand, and the 
strategic-relational dynamics discussed in the previous section.  As was stated, 
policymakers scan and interpret the political, structural, and institutional contexts in 
which they are embedded.  The point here is that the circulation of ideas influences, at 
least in part, how those actors (a) understand their constrained situation, (b) identify 
the problems to be addressed, and (c) and perceive those policy solutions which are 
appropriate and which will yield the greatest benefit given the constellation of forces 
and interests in relation to which they must act.  To the extent that these ideational 
dynamics are driven by powerful international aid agencies, they are embedded in 
what Samoff (1996) labels a “financial-intellectual” complex.  
4.3.6 Summary of CIPE 
 There are thus a number of tenets that serve as the foundation for the 
theoretical perspective that I bring to the study of policy formation in this dissertation.  
To summarize, these tenets first suggest that one should take into account the 
historical and structural aspects of context understudy.  As indicated, this means 
considering both long standing political and economic divisions within and among 
countries as well as short-term conjunctural constellations of political and economic 
events, actors, and forces that serve as constraints on context and actor interaction.  
Second, the tenets hold that actors – but particularly institutional actors – from 
multiple levels are relevant in relation to education reform.  In this regard, significant 
attention is directed to the involvement of international institutions and the ways in 
which they interact with representatives of the state (e.g., ministerial actors), for the 
state itself is seen as a contested space in and through which a range of actors from 
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the local to the international level attempt to influence the direction of education 
reform.       
Per the third tenet, large international organizations are seen as occupying a 
central role.  This has to do with the effects of their institutional nature.  As 
bureaucracies that are organized to appear rational, impartial, and technical, they 
possess bureaucratic authority.  In practice that authority plays out in two ways – first 
in that they are seen as legitimate and second in that they perform analysis and deploy 
specialist knowledge in the service of decision-making.  The veneer of technical 
rationality and impartial knowledge often serves to entrench and conceal institutional 
interests.  Finally, for policymaking, the cumulative effect of international 
institutions’ knowledge production and required processes is that they constitute a 
somewhat diverse but mostly unavoidable layer of bureaucratic machinery and 
ideology on the world stage.  While the range of international institutions (but 
primarily bi- and multi-lateral institutions, international NGOs, global universities, 
and think tanks) and their representatives compete among themselves, this 
organizational web also often becomes something which national actors must 
navigate and with which they must contend. 
 To that end, the fourth and fifth tenets of CIPE speak to how national (but also 
international) actors react to that web.  On the one hand, the fourth tenet states that 
actors make structurally oriented strategic calculations which they continuously 
activate through selected strategies and tactics (Jessop, 2001).  While these 
calculations are based on those actions that will be rewarded – e.g., professionally, 
politically, financially – by the institutional and structural configurations in which 
 120 
 
they are nested, the calculations are also at least partially influenced by ideational 
factors.  Those factors are thus the basis of the fifth tenet, which asserts that 
historical, structural, political, and institutional aspects must be considered together 
with ideational ones.  Specifically, this tenet emphasizes that there are multiple levels 
of ideas and that, within the international political economic context, networked 
institutional actors advocate complementary paradigmatic visions and programmatic 
concepts by employing particular frames that help to legitimize policy solutions 
cognitively and normatively (Campbell, 1998).  Taken together, tenets four and five 
thus maintain that actors respond to their structural constraints, but also that the 
circulation and selling of ideas can influence how policymakers understand the nature 
of their situational constraints and, subsequently, which course of action will be most 
rewarded.  Structural constraints and ideational factors may often, though certainly 
not always, point in the same direction (Samoff, 1996).  
4.4 International Processes of Education Policy Formation and Related Concepts 
 Having laid out the general tenets that undergird my theoretical perspective, I 
wish in this section both to distinguish and to clarify the concept that I use to bound 
my study.  As stated previously, this concept is IPEPF – or international processes of 
education policy formation.  Beyond simply defining this concept, it is also necessary 
to distinguish it from – and to show its complementarity with – related concepts that 
have been elaborated in recent years by scholars working on the issue of education 
reform from an international political economic perspective.  To be specific, these 
related concepts are global architecture of education, global policy field, global 
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education policy, and transnational policymaking.  As will be shown, these concepts, 
while distinct, are closely related.  
4.4.1 Global Architecture of Education 
 To begin, “global architecture of education” has less to do with the processes 
by which education policies are made and more to do, not surprisingly, with the 
surrounding structures. As Jones (2007a) states, the global architecture of education is 
the “emerging, expanding and increasingly significant system of transnational 
influence” that complements national systems of education (p. 330).  For Jones 
(2007a), while part of this architecture can be “examined in organizational terms, 
through structured international bodies such as those of the United Nations system,” 
the global architecture of education also refers to “patterns of thought and behavior 
giving rise to pluralism and interdependence” as well as “the emergence of epistemic 
communities, being transnational networks of like-minded actors” (p. 330).  With this 
definition, it becomes clear that Jones (2007a) is focused on contextual elements that 
impinge upon processes of policy formation and not necessarily those processes in 
and of themselves.  Moreover, I would suggest that what Jones (2007a) terms the 
global architecture of education is subsumed by the tenets of CIPE, detailed above, in 
that the CIPE perspective takes care to account for the interdependence of actors 
(particularly national and international institutional ones) as well as the 
organizational, ideational, and agential dimensions of education reform.  
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4.4.2 Global Policy Field 
 The concept of global policy field has been offered by Jakobi (2009).  Figure 
4.1, below, is a visual representation.  According to Jakobi (2009), the global policy 
field is a characterized as a multidimensional space in which one finds “not only… 
national policymaking bodies and representatives of national society, but increasingly 
international organizations, international non-governmental actors, international 
exchange of goods and services, as well as a global public or findings from an 
internationalized scientific community” (p. 474).  To continue, the global policy field 
is thought to be a common international political space “in which policy agencies 
compete for influencing the shape of national and international education policy” 
(Jakobi, 2009, p. 477).   
Based on this definition, the concepts of global policy field and IPEPF are 
complementary.  That is to say, the global policy field is a larger conceptual space 
within which IPEPF can be located.  Put differently, while the global policy field 
encapsulates both the national and international levels of action, IPEPF explain those 
– vertical – processes through which actors and ideology from both levels interact in 










Figure 4.1: Global Policy Field 
Source: Jakobi (2009). 
4.4.3 Global Education Policy 
 Antoni Verger, Mario Novelli, and Hulya Kosar-Altiyelken (2012), in the 
introductory chapter to their book, Global Education Policy and International 
Development, state the following:  
Similar education reforms and a common set of education policy jargon are 
being applied in many parts of the world, in locations that are incredibly 
diverse both culturally and in terms of economic development. Education 
policies and programmes such as child-centered pedagogies, school-based 
management, teachers’ accountability, public-private partnerships or 











everywhere, to the point that they have acquired the status of ‘global 
education policies’ (p. 3).  
This description conveys well the sentiment of what is meant, in this dissertation, by 
global education policy, though the use of the term “everywhere” may best be 
understood as hyperbole.  The point is that global education policies are those policies 
which circulate around the world, which are on the short list of reforms that are seen 
as desirable and preferable, and which are put into practice in numerous countries.   
In Moutsious (2010) terms, they are the “common set of education policies 
worldwide” (Moutsious, 2010, p. 131).   
EDUCO can be said to have been an example of a global education policy.  
As was shown in Chapter three of this dissertation, the EDUCO program became 
widely discussed in the 1990s and 2000s and was implemented in a range of other 
countries.  While the above definition of global education policy does not include a 
temporal dimension, it will be interesting to see if research on global education 
policies tends to demonstrate a common lifecycle (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010).  
4.4.4 Transnational Policymaking 
 Transnational policymaking is a concept with two parts. On the one hand, the 
“transnational” component underscores the idea that education policymaking happens 
in a space that is “instituted and sustained by nation states, international 
organizations, inter-state entities and global corporations” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 122).  
As Moutsios (2010) notes, this space is “not international, in the traditional 
sense, as major policies are no longer made in the context of clearly distinguished 
relations between nation states; nor is it supra-national, as policies are not made 
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above or beyond nation states” (p. 122). Thus, just as Jakobi (2009) defines the 
overall global policy field as encompassing the national and international levels, 
Moutsios (2010) emphasizes that the act of policymaking itself does not occur on 
only one or the other, but at the nexus of the two. 
On the other hand, the “policymaking” component of “transnational 
policymaking” is understood to refer to the exercise of power in that transnational 
space.  As Moutsious (2010) writes, “power in contemporary education policy lies in 
the interaction between global capital, states and transnational institutions and the 
strategies, arrangements and decisions of their policymaking elites who are able to 
mobilize economic, institutional and discursive resources to realize their agendas” (p. 
129).  By mobilizing such resources, policymaking elites attempt to ensure that 
certain “policies and discourses cross borders and flow in and out of the nation states’ 
arenas of power” (p. 122).  These are exactly the issues which I try to unpack in this 
dissertation.  
4.4.5 International Processes of Education Policy Formation 
 The concept of IPEPF is central to this dissertation, and, in ways I will 
discuss, it fills a conceptual gap in literature on education policy development.  As I 
have discussed in both the introductory chapter and elsewhere (Edwards, 2012a, 
2013), IPEPF are those transnationally influenced processes in which national level 
political, governmental, and, specifically, MINED representatives engage in order to 
formulate or authorize an official policy text, whether it be an education system 
development plan, a reform strategy paper, a legal decree, or other form of official 
policy statement.  As I explained in Edwards (2012a), transnational influence at the 
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national level can manifest in these processes in variety of ways which differ in their 
intensity, duration, and effects, for example. I will not discuss at this point the range 
of specific ways through which transnational influence enters IPEPF since I present 
later in this chapter those numerous pathways – based on the work of Dale (1999b) 
and Samoff (2009) – which I am interested to analyze in the case of El Salvador.  
Suffice to say here that those pathways reflect and extend the theoretical tenets 
discussed earlier and the concept of power in transnational policymaking from 
Moutsios (2010).  The important point here is that the concept of IPEPF draws 
attention to the processual dimension of interaction with, engagement by, and 
influence from transnational forces (Robertson, 2012).  
 Practically, however, the concept of IPEPF requires two further definitions in 
order to be operationalized – one for “policy” and one for “policy process.”  First, 
“policy” is defined as “positions taken by the state” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, p. 4).  
Second,  “policy process” is taken – generally – to refer to “the chronology of an 
issue coming onto the policy agenda” and – specifically – to “the construction of a 
policy text” which represents the position assumed by the state (p. 14).38  In practice, 
then, research must be done in such a way that one can not only trace the chronology 
of an issue coming onto the policy agenda, but also the dynamics of the way that the 
policy in question becomes a position taken by the state and crystallizes in a policy 
text.   
On the whole, then, and by bringing each of the aspects of IPEPF together, we 
see that IPEPF are fundamentally about the constitutive interactions among 
                                                 




international, national, and local organizational actors (governmental, 
nongovernmental, bi/multilateral, and/or for-profit) during the evolution of education 
reform agendas and the production of those official texts that contain educated-related 
positions assumed by a government. A variety of elements (i.e., events and 
subprocesses) shape such processes and, along with the actors, form the basis for 
interaction. Elements may include, for example, the conduct, presentation, and 
diffusion of research and information; advocacy work; processes of national 
consultation; national commissions; international conferences and seminars; and 
international agreements, among others. Such a definition of IPEPF (and the terms 
that comprise it) brings to the fore the multilevel, complex, and contested nature of 
transnationally influenced policy production (Edwards, 2013).  
4.4.6 Conceptual Complementarity 
As a final point, I wish to point out the complementarity of the terms 
discussed in this section.  That is, the set of terms defined and discussed above can be 
used in conjunction, for they highlight distinct aspects of what could be termed the 
political economy of global education policy dynamics.  To begin, on a basic level, 
global education policies are those education policies which have become common 
worldwide.  Next, Jakobi’s (2009) notion of global policy field defines the overall 
space within which global education polices are conceived to operate.  In turn, Jones’ 
(2007a) terminology of the global architecture of education characterizes the 
topography of the terrain of the global policy field. To continue, Moutsios’ (2010) 
concept of transnational policymaking can be used as a term to describes the activity 
that occurs in the exercise of power transnationally in order to influence education 
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policy.  Finally, IPEPF constitute those processes through which transnational 
policymaking can be seen to occur in relation to a particular country.  All together, 
then, we have a vocabulary that allows us to distinguish among (a) an outcome of 
interest (global education policies), (b) the processes by which they may be born 
(IPEPF), (c) the types of action – though not the specific “external effects” or 
“pathways of influence” – that bring them about (transnational policymaking), (d) the 
conceptual space in which those cross-level and cross-country interactions occur 
(global policy field), and (e) the features of that space (global architecture of 
education). 
I would also like to point out that, to my knowledge, a discussion of this 
nature about the above terms has not been advanced previously.  It may thus be the 
case that the understanding I have here proposed regarding the distinctions among 
these terms could be useful more generally in the field of comparative and 
international education. The understandings suggested for these related terms could 
reduce confusion around the conceptual subtleties that they embody.  If not useful for 
scholars of comparative and international education generally, the above proffered 
distinctions may perhaps be practical for scholars who tend to work within political 
economic frameworks.    
In moving forward, and while keeping these definitions in mind, we can turn 
our attention to the specific mechanisms of transnational influence that affect how 
education policies develop. 
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4.5 Mechanisms of Transnational Influence: An Analytic Framework 
 The research question stated in Chapter 1 makes it clear that one issue which I 
seek to understand clearly is the operation of transnational influence in the 
development of the EDUCO program.  While I stated in both the preceding section 
and the introduction that I conceptualize this dissertation as an analysis of the process 
by which EDUCO was formed, I detail in the current section the analytic framework 
which will guide the analysis of that process.  This framework builds on both 
“external effects” and “pathways of influence.”  The former have been discussed by 
Dale (1999b) in relation to the ways in which globalization affects national 
policymaking, while the latter have been discussed by Samoff’s (2009) in relation to 
the ways that foreign aid – with an emphasis on the World Bank – impacts the 
creation of a country’s education policy.  On one hand, the focus of each author is 
rather distinct: Dale’s (1999b) external effects tend to speak to the “horizontal” 
dimension, to use Jakobi’s (2009) terminology, of global education policy diffusion 
while Samoff’s (2009) pathways tend to apply more to the “vertical” influence of 
foreign aid agencies in a given country, though these differences are not absolute.  On 
the other hand, both sets of mechanisms are similar in that they pertain to the 
transnational aspect of power in the construction of education policy.   
In any event, these mechanisms can be brought together under the label of 
“mechanisms of transnational influence” in that they both pertain to the nexus of the 
international and national levels, and in that they both address the operation of power 




Box 4.1: Mechanisms of Transnational Influence 
 
1. Dissemination: External agents highlight, spread knowledge about, and recommend 
certain policies or programs through information-sharing mediums (e.g., through 
annual reports, best practices data-bases and technical assistance). 
 
2. Harmonization: A set of countries mutually agrees on the implementation of 
common policies in a certain policy area (e.g., the configuration of the European 
Space for Higher Education). 
 
3. Standardization: The international community defines and promotes adhesion to a 
set of policy principles and standards that frame the countries’ behavior (e.g., 
international performance tests, such as PISA, contribute to the standardization of 
curricular content at the global level).” 
 
4. Installing Interdependence: Occurs when country governments and international 
organizations agree to achieve common objectives and to tackle problems that require 
international cooperation (e.g., climate change, ‘education for all’). 
 
5. Conditionalities: Foreign aid agencies attach conditions to the approval or 
disbursement of loans.  
 
6. Technical Assistance: Representatives of foreign aid instruct borrowers on what 
they should do, when, and how.  
 
7. Loan-Related (Documentary and Supervisory) Actions: Loans are enmeshed in a 
web of documents that include, for example, early studies, pre-appraisals, sector 
analyses, public expenditure review, implementation and management reports, and 
evaluations, etc. These reports specify what has been done, what has yet to be done, 
and what should be done. Ignoring the content of these reports can compromise loan 
eligibility.  
 
8. Certification: The approval of certain foreign aid agencies, but specifically the 
World Bank, indicates to other development partners that a country government is 
taking appropriate steps in a satisfactory fashion, and that it is therefore trustworthy.  
This is how aid providers often determine whether or not a country is, for example, 
making progress along an agreed-upon trajectory, implementing the activities for 
which it received foreign support, fulfilling its commitments to modify spending 
patterns or decentralize authority or democratize political competition.  
 
9. Aid Relationship Management: The administrative and managerial processes 
required as part of the aid relationship can be cumbersome and can drain ministerial 
capacity. Over the years, administrative requirements have related to discrete 
projects, sector-wide support, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and the 




10. Global Point of Reference: Certain aid agencies, but namely the World Bank, may 
possess more professional capacity than others and may wield more macroeconomic 
leverage than others, even when not the largest lender.  Such agencies may often 
oversee the provision and use of other agencies’ funds – and as such they become the 
primary point of reference for how to organize and manage development assistance. 
In policy coordination bodies, their voice often carries the most weight.  
 
11. Structuration of National Education Policy Processes: Foreign aid can influence 
who participates and with what impact in national education policy processes.  
Lenders often ensure that they are an insider for discussions of national education 
policy, though they formally defer decision-making to national governmental actors. 
Lenders may also ally themselves with the finance ministry (or the ministry of 
planning), which controls the national budget.  Shared epistemic perspectives 
facilitate this, and make it likely that the concerns, orientations, and priorities of aid 
agencies are internalized by these national actors.  
 
12. Research: The World Bank and other funding and technical agencies have 
become research entrepreneurs. (The first of these also attempts to serve as a 
knowledge bank for best practices in development.)  The numerous studies conducted 
by international institutions are influential when it comes to establishing reform 
priorities around the world.  There is also commissioned research, which can be for 
studies required for project approval or for sector-wide support, for example.  The 
technical, rational, and objective appearance of the research lends credibility to the 
findings. Commissioned studies can guide education policy in part by providing 
findings that justify certain policies.  
 
13. International Events: International actors use their resources to highlight, 
communicate, sell, and ingrain a particular message about education through events 
such as international conferences/summits, seminars, workshops, colloquia, and study 
tours.   
 
14. National Actor Recruitment and Socialization: Aid agencies selectively recruit 
professionals from developed and borrower countries who can help the agency 
advance its agenda.  Not surprisingly, those professionals often carry with them 
particular assumptions, frameworks, and expectations that align with those of their 
host organization.  At the same time, many of these agencies are powerful socializing 
institutions that are more resilient, more persistent, and more penetrating than its 
individual employees.  Employees tend to share certain analytic orientations and core 
ideas, not only about education, but also about how it should be studied and assessed.  
Note: I do not discuss Dale’s (1999b) notion of imposition because this idea is 
elaborated in a more nuanced fashion through the mechanisms defined by Samoff 
(2009). For the same reason, I do not include dissemination or cross-national 
achievement tests, as suggested by Samoff’s (2009).  




the mechanisms of transnational influence on which I will draw when discussing the 
findings of this dissertation. In all, 14 mechanisms are discussed.  
The analysis in this dissertation is helped by the inclusion of this set of 
mechanisms. First, this is because there is conceptual alignment between these 
mechanisms, the phenomena of IPEPF, and purpose of the present study.  Moreover, 
in that mechanisms of transnational influence permeate the process of EDUCO’s 
development, the application of the framework presented in Box 4.1, above, helps us 
to discuss in more conceptually specific ways the effect of influence from beyond the 
nation state.  Second, this framework is helpful because it focuses the analysis not 
only on the influence of foreign aid in El Salvador but also on the wider context of 
the global policy field (e.g., relations among countries) and the possibility that 
additional elements (e.g., international conferences) in the global architecture of 
education can influence the decision-making of national policy actors, for example.  
 It should be noted, however, that the application of this framework is not 
intended to be a one-way street.  That is, while the framework is valuable in that it 
serves as guide and ensures that the numerous ways in which the global education 
architecture can influence education policy are taken into consideration, it is also 
suggested that the present investigation of the EDUCO program can suggest 
modifications and/or additions to these mechanisms.  The point is that theory and 
research can – and should – inform one another.  
4.6 Transition 
 With this chapter, I have attempted to clarify a number of issues. I began by 
stating the premises which underlie my theoretical perspective on education 
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policymaking.  Next, I elaborated on that theoretical perspective – labeled critical 
international political economy.  In so doing, I presented five tenets. These tenets 
pertained to historical-structural conditions, multi-level politics, the institutional 
nature of international organizations, strategic-relational interaction, and ideational 
factors. Subsequently, I engaged in an explication of IPEPF and related terms. 
Through that explication, I demonstrated the distinct yet complementary nature of the 
terms global architecture of education, global education policy, global policy field, 
transnational policymaking, and IPEPF.  Finally, I derived and delineated an analytic 
framework from the scholarship of Dale (1999b) and Samoff (1999) – two authors 
who have for many years examined and theorized the nature of transnational 
influence on national education policymaking.   
Importantly, over the course of this chapter, I have attempted to scaffold, and 
clarify the concepts and frameworks on which I rely.  After discussing the relevance 
of the policy borrowing literature and then explaining the general theoretical tenets of 
critical international political economy, I defined those key concepts which are 
related to the phenomenon of interest in this dissertation and which have been 
elaborated by scholars who also operate within the international political economy 
paradigm.  To continue, in the final part of this chapter, I fleshed out an analytic 
framework that not only integrates with the concepts presented in the preceding 
section but which also meshes with the theoretical tenets of the critical international 
political economy perspective that grounds this dissertation.  Having tackled these 




Chapter 5: Methodological Considerations  
 When it comes to the generation of knowledge, six issues – many of which 
intertwine – must be addressed. First, on a general level, there is the link between 
ontology and research methodology: How one understands the nature of reality – and 
the extent to which it can be known – influences the choice of methodology.  Second, 
and at the same time, the researcher must select a research methodology which allows 
him/her to produce insights that respond to the research question being posed. Third, 
as Lincoln and Guba (2000) point out, while the methodological question asks, “How 
can the knower go about obtaining the desired knowledge and understandings?,” there 
is also an epistemological question which mediates the relationship between 
methodology and ontology.  This epistemological question asks, “What is the nature 
of knowledge and the relationship between the knower and the would-be known?” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The fourth issue concerns theory while the fifth pertains to 
those specific steps or methods in which one engages to facilitate data collection, 
analysis, and extrapolation.  The former (i.e., theory) relates back not only to 
methodology – for the research methodology implemented is fundamentally 
operationalized in order to respond to a question that speaks back to a theory of how 
the world works – but also to specific methods.  This is because while individual 
methods contain steps in which one engages to collect and manipulate data, the 
interpretation of that data and the production of insights are inseparable from both 
those (meta) theories which guide how one understands the world generally as well as 
those concepts which explain the specific phenomena under study. Sixth and finally, 
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there are assorted issues to which it is good practice to respond.  These issues are 
related to study origin, data integrity, ethical and political considerations, and study 
limitations.  
In this chapter, I attempt to respond to each of these issues.  In the first 
section, I speak to the origin of the study. In the second, I address the ontological, 
epistemological, theoretical, and methodological implications of my grounding in the 
philosophical tradition of critical realism.  In the third section, I present my particular 
research methodology (longitudinal case study).  Then, in the fourth section, I discuss 
at length the data collection, data management, and data analysis strategies of which I 
made use. Finally, in the fifth section, I tackle a wide range of issues related to the 
conduct of research.  These include the following: Researcher positionality, data 
integrity, ethical and political considerations, and study limitations.  
5.1 Study Origin 
 The study that I present in this dissertation is the result of the cumulation of 
many years of activity – both within and outside the university.  The explanation I 
offer below of the origin of my dissertation research is a purposeful attempt to be 
reflexive – that is, to be transparent about my own intellectual development and about 
those experiences which have shaded the lenses through which I tend to see the 
world.   
To begin, my first engagement in Central America came during the summer 
after my junior year of university, during 2004.  I worked in a neighborhood just 
outside Managua as an intern with a micro-finance NGO, the Association for the 
Economic and Social Development of Nicaragua.  During my two months living and 
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working in this municipality (known as Ciudad Sandino) I found myself preoccupied 
with questions of development – questions that pertained to why certain countries 
seemed to “develop” while others did not.  At that point in time – 2004 – Nicaragua 
was one of the poorest countries in Latin America; as such, it was a context of 
poverty and inequality to which I had not been exposed previously.   
I furthered explored these questions for the remainder of my time as an 
undergraduate at the University of Maryland, College Park, where I studied not only 
Spanish but also Latin American Studies and Finance.  In particular, the courses I 
took on “Issues in Latin American Studies” attracted my attention because of the 
critical lens that the professors brought to the study of history and politics.  The 
continual involvement and intervention of the U.S. military and other actors in the 
national politics of Latin American countries, particularly during the twentieth 
century, was something I had not learned about previously.  These courses provided 
the opportunity to begin to explore these issues, as well as issues of colonialism, 
indentured servitude, economic dependence, and the deleterious effects of free trade 
agreements for Latin American populations (but those in Central America 
specifically).  
Upon graduation from university, rather than pursue a job in finance, I 
followed my interests in matters of inequality and joined Teach For America.  For 
two years I was part of a corps of recent graduates who dedicated their time to 
working in under-resourced schools in the United States.  My placement was in 
Philadelphia.  As a Spanish teacher at a secondary school, my experiences showed me 
not only the importance of education but also of the effects that larger issues had, 
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such as community development and economic policy.  As my time in Philadelphia 
came to an end, I had more questions about these issues as well as the desire to study 
their inter-relations.  On the one hand, my questions were driven by my first-hand 
experiences as a teacher and my knowledge of the difficulties that my students faced; 
on the other hand, my intellectual curiosity was guided by the work of Paulo Freire. I 
had been exposed to his work through a course I completed as part of the Master’s of 
Education that I obtained from the University of Pennsylvania at the same time that I 
served as a teacher. 
Having completed the Master’s of Education at the University of 
Pennsylvania while teaching for two years, I returned to the University of Maryland, 
College Park, to pursue a PhD in International Education Policy.  This program 
provided an excellent opportunity to explore and analyze – from a critical perspective 
– issues at the nexus of history, politics, economics, development thought, 
community empowerment, and education policy.  It also exposed me to the 
importance of institutional involvement (e.g., bi- and multi-lateral institutions, among 
others) in educational reform in developing countries.  Since matriculating, I have 
consistently sought out courses, employment, and research opportunities that would 
allow me to further familiarize myself with these topics.  A few experiences stand 
out. These include: (a) an internship with the Organization of American States in the 
Education and Culture Department during the spring of 2008, (b) a study abroad trip 
to El Salvador during January of 2009, (c) a consultant position with the World Bank 
Institute during the spring of that same year, and, finally, (d) a visiting scholar 
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position at the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Social Science Research 
during the 2010-2011 academic year.   
After the study abroad trip piqued my interest in El Salvador, I used a few of 
my remaining courses to explore more recent education policy developments in that 
country (Edwards, 2013).  In addition, through these experiences, I learned of the 
EDUCO program and gained some appreciation for the fact that it had become a well-
known program among development professionals working on education.  Lastly, I 
used these courses as an opportunity, first, to explore literature on education policy 
formation in developing countries.  This literature attracted my attention because, 
often, it tended to focus on the dynamics of process.  Processual and dynamic 
perspectives on educational change resonated with me, particularly those perspectives 
which were grounded in more general political-economic theories of development.   
Thus, by the time that I joined to the University of Amsterdam as a visiting 
scholar in the fall of 2010, my research had a twin focus. First, it was grounded in 
understanding the EDUCO program, a program to which I was drawn because it 
seemed to be at the center of the various issues that drove my intellectual curiosity 
and personal politics (i.e., theories of international development, US intervention in 
Central American affairs, the impact of international institutions, community 
empowerment, and education policy). Second, my research at that point was directed 
at exploring theoretical perspectives not only on the political economic nature of 
educational change, but also, more specifically, on theoretical perspectives which 
could explain how and why certain education policies, such as EDUCO, became 
widely influential among in the development industry and around the world while 
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others did not.  While I continued to work independently on both issues, my time at 
the University of Amsterdam provided exposure to ideas related to the second.  To 
that end, I became aware of, or more familiar with, concepts related to “global 
education policy,” not to mention the work of Roger Dale, Susan Robertson, Mario 
Novelli, Thomas Muhr, Xavier Bonal, and Antoni Verger, among others – all of 
whom bring critical political economic and political sociological approaches to the 
study of educational reform around the world, but particularly in low-income 
countries.  As a final point, I should mention that it was also at this time that I became 
aware of the philosophical approach of critical realism – an approach which I have 
continued to explore subsequently.  
To summarize, the current study of the origins of the EDUCO program 
encapsulates and reflects the issues, pressures, and perspectives to which I have been 
drawn for nearly a decade.  Put differently, the present study of EDUCO allows an 
opportunity to conduct a case study which gets at how matters of power, history, 
politics, economics, and community empowerment intersect with education policy – 
primarily within El Salvador, though also, to a certain extent, beyond its borders.  
That said, it becomes essential to clarify the implications of the philosophical 
tradition within which that research has been conducted; namely, that tradition is 
critical realism.  
5.2 Critical Realism 
 The questions to which I respond in this dissertation ask that two separate, yet 
related, phenomena be explained.  First, I must explain the process by which the 
EDUCO program developed into a national education policy in El Salvador.  Second, 
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I must explain in what ways, and with what implications, this process was 
transnationally influenced. To answer these questions requires not only that one 
engage in a structural and processual analysis of policy formation, but also that one 
identify the mechanisms and effects of transnational influence in that process. To that 
end, critical realism is a particularly appropriate, for it lends itself to the study of 
structures, mechanisms, and events as regards the explanation social phenomena.  
5.2.1 Ontology, Epistemology, and Theory 
 Critical realism departs from a number of tenets, the key ontological and 
epistemological of which are presented in Box 5.1, below.  As can be seen, this 
tradition begins, first, from the (ontological) premise that the world exists 
independently of our knowledge of it and, second, from the (epistemological) premise 
that our ability to understand the world is fallible and mediated by the theories – 
implicit or explicit – that we bring to our observation and interpretation of that world.  
Two quotes help to emphasize and extend these points.  First, as Danermark, 
Ekstrom, Jakobsen, and Karlsson (2002), have written, “All knowledge is 
conceptually mediated and thus it is impossible to make neutral observations of 
‘facts’ about reality. The observations are always theory-laden.  This does not 
determine, however, what reality is like – it exists independently of our knowledge 
about it” (p. 41).  Second, Cox (2002) speaks to the problematic nature of facts and 
data, those basic informational elements upon which we rely as the basis for 





Box 5.1: Key Ontological and Epistemological Characteristics 
of the Critical Realist Philosophical Tradition 
 
1. The world exists independently of our knowledge of it. 
 
2. Our knowledge of that world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth and 
falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship between knowledge and its 
object. Nevertheless knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its 
effectiveness in informing and explaining successful material practice is not mere 
accident.  
 
3. There is necessity in the world; objects—whether natural or social—necessarily 
have particular causal powers or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities.  
 
4. The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, 
including structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating events. 
These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the 
natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events. 
 
5. Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent. 
We therefore have not only to explain their production and material effects but to 
understand, read or interpret what they mean. Although they have to be interpreted by 
starting from the researcher’s own frames of meaning, by and large they exist 
regardless of researchers’ interpretations of them. 
 
6. Knowledge is largely—though not exclusively—linguistic, and the nature of 
language and the  way we communicate are not incidental to what is known and 
communicated. Awareness of these relationships is vital in evaluating knowledge. 
 
7. Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able to explain and 
understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically.  
 
Note: This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather only summarizes some of the 
key ontological and epistemological characteristics of critical realism. 
 
Source: Adapted from Sayer (1992, p. 5-6).  
 
knowledge deals with facts, i.e., ‘mades’ not ‘givens’.  The Latin languages 
are clearer concerning this distinction. Factum derives from the Latin verb to 
make, just as datum does from the verb to give. The fact incorporates 
intention and action; it has a meaning to be discovered. The fact is not only 
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observed from without, but challenges you to understand it from within as the 
consequence of human activity (Collingwood, 1946). Data are just there; they 
have no meaning in themselves. (Cox, 2002, p. xxii) 
It is because facts and data do not explain themselves that being clear about one’s 
theoretical foundations is imperative. 
 However, apart from the important role that theory assumes as a result of 
critical realism’s stance on epistemology, there is an additional ontological point that 
needs to be made.  It is this: Critical realism assumes that fundamental elements of 
the nature of the world include mechanisms, structures, and events.  More 
specifically, it holds that structures are the sources of generative mechanisms which 
influence a range of events, only the latter of which we are able to directly observe.  
Structures, in turn, are defined as sets of “internally related objects,” where objects 
can be natural and/or social in nature (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 
2002, p. 41).  Put differently, structures are composed of objects39 which condition 
one another and which, through their relations, produce mechanisms (i.e., “causal 
powers”) which can effect and explain events, when forces external to the structure 
do not mitigate their operation (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002, p. 
55). These ontological elements are represented visually in Figure 5.1, below.  
Together, the vertical and horizontal dimensions reflect the supposition that, in 
reality, there are multiple, simultaneously existing structures, mechanisms, and 
events.  Moreover, as the figure indicates, structures, mechanisms, and events are 
                                                 
39 Examples of objects which make up structures include landlords/tenants, 




thought to be nested (Sayer, 1992).40  What the figure does not communicate, 
however, is that, in reality, there exist multiple levels of structures. Phenomena (i.e., 
events) are nested within, and are affected by, multiple mechanisms and multiple 
structures.  
Figure 5.1: Ontological elements per Critical Realism 
 
Source: Sayer (1992, p. 117).  
Theory then picks up where ontology leaves off.  That is, while critical 
realism assumes, on the one hand, that the world exists independently of our 
knowledge of it and, on the other, that reality is constituted and impacted by 
                                                 
40 Sayer (1992) makes an additional point with regard to the vertical dimension: “In 
the vertical dimension, some readers may want to add a fourth level above events to 
cover meanings, experiences, beliefs and so forth, but as these can form structures, 
function as causes, or be considered events, I would suggest that they be taken as 
already included” (p. 116).  
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structures, mechanisms, and events, what the philosophical tradition of critical 
realism does not stipulate is how (i.e., by what theory) that reality is thought to 
operate.  Stated differently, critical realism propounds that reality should be 
understood in terms of structures, mechanisms, and events, but it does not offer 
theories for explaining the natural and social phenomena that can be observed in 
terms of structures, mechanisms, and events.  As applied to research, this 
philosophical tradition thus requires that scholars bring their theories into the research 
process – and in a dialectical fashion.  
5.2.2 Methodological Implications 
 Per the tradition of critical realism, empirical research is informed by theory, 
while at the same time the results of that research help to modify the theory which has 
guided the investigation a social phenomenon.  In essence, then, when conducting 
research, we first define the phenomenon under study through the elaboration of 
abstract concepts (as in chapter 4 of this dissertation). Those concepts guide our 
attention and point to the issues or variables which are thought to be most relevant to 
understanding and explaining a particular phenomenon. Subsequently, our initial 
abstractions are refined through research in which they have been applied to the real 
world.  Of course, in practice, in order for this “double movement” of theory 
influencing research and vice-versa to be achieved, one must engage with a 
methodology and with specific methods which, in conjunction with theory, allow for 
the reconstruction, interpretation, and explanation of the phenomenon of interest 
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(Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002).41  Thus, in what follows, I 
present a brief discussion of methodology, followed by a lengthy discussion of 
specific research methods.  
5.3 Research Methodology: Longitudinal Case Study 
 Conceptually, in this dissertation, I focus on explaining a process of education 
policy formation and how it is transnationally influenced.  In accordance with this 
focus, methodologically, the approach I adopt is known as longitudinal case study 
(Jensen & Rogers, 2001).  Jensen and Rogers (2001) explain this methodology in the 
following way:   
Longitudinal case studies ... focus on political entities or institutions …, on a 
particular agency (see Wood, 1988), or on policies, programs, or decisions. 
[They] may be quantitative or qualitative in character and may involve a 
formal report and analysis of critical events or processes. ... Time is the 
organizing device and the dynamics of change are the primary focus. (p. 38) 
For multiple reasons, then, the choice of a longitudinal case study approach is 
appropriate . For example, my study is political in nature and is concerned with the 
development of a program (EDUCO) over time (from the late 1980s to the mid 
1990s). Furthermore, the research necessarily examines processes (in this case, the 
process of policy formation), and does so by focusing on both critical events and the 
“dynamics of change” of the policy formation processes across which the EDUCO 
                                                 
41 In the parlance of critical realism, the research acts of reconstruction, theoretical 
interpretation, and explanation – as regards social phenomena – are embodied in the 




program was initially created, subsequently scaled up, and eventually crystallized in 
the country’s education policy (Jensen & Rogers, 2001, p. 38).  
  On the whole, then, one can see that, in the present dissertation, the 
ontological, epistemological, theoretical, conceptual, and methodological dimensions 
fit together.  First, ontologically, there exists a “real world” in which social 
phenomena can be explained in terms of structures, mechanisms, and events. To 
continue, theoretically, I understand these ontological elements (i.e., structures, 
mechanisms, and events) to operate according to the tenets of CIPE (critical 
international political economy).  Epistemologically, the tenets of CIPE mediate how 
I interpret the data I have collected; at the same time, the tenets of CIPE guide the 
conduct of research because they point to the issues which are understood to be 
relevant to explaining educational reform. To continue, conceptually, as has been 
mentioned, the specific phenomena which I explain in this dissertation – and to which 
I generalize – are processes of policy formation and the mechanisms of transnational 
influence that impact them. Finally, methodologically, I have stated that my approach 
is a longitudinal case study.  In that this methodology encourages an analysis of 
processes and critical events over time in order to assess the dynamics of change as 
regards the evolution of policies and programs, it aligns well with the nature of that 
around which this dissertation centers – namely, IPEPF (international processes of 
education policy formation).  Despite the multi-level complementarity described here, 
the key to producing insights that facilitate the production of knowledge and the 
revision of our guiding concepts is methods – that is, those specific strategies and 
practices through which one performs data collection and data analysis. 
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5.4 Research Methods42  
 In this section, I begin by reflecting on the tasks that the methods employed 
must be able to accomplish.  These tasks necessarily follow from the questions asked, 
from the underlying theory I employ, and from the nature of the phenomena being 
researched.  I then discuss in detail the specific data collection, data management, and 
data analysis strategies that align with the needs of the study. 
As has been stated, the purpose of this research is, first, to explain the 
dynamic process (i.e., IPEPF) by which EDUCO was formed, and, second, to unpack 
transnational influence in that process.  By reflecting on these purposes, and while 
also considering the theoretical tenets of CIPE (i.e., critical international political 
economy), one can distill ten inter-related tasks for the methods that will be 
employed. In particular, with regard to the nature of IPEPF, the methods used must 
help one to accomplish the following tasks:  
i) Delineate the political-economic and ideational context of El Salvador prior 
to and during the development of the EDUCO program;  
ii) Specify the point at which the particular policy formation process of interest 
commences and concludes.  
iii) Detail the evolution of the EDUCO program from initial inception to its 
concretization as part of the MINED’s official education policy;  
iv) Determine the constitutive interactions and elements that comprise and 
delimit the process of policy formation;  
                                                 
42 Portions of this section draw on Edwards (2012a) 
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v) Document the creation and content of successive policy-related documents 
and reports;  
vi) Identify the relevant domestic and international actors immediately prior to 
and during the policy formation process;  
vii) Trace the emergence, trajectory and interaction of involved actors over time;  
viii) Isolate the actions and roles of the concerned international and domestic 
actors in relation to each other and among themselves;  
ix) Explain, based on tasks i-viii, EDUCO’s overall process of policy 
formation; and Interpret the general dynamics and specific forms of 
influence that characterize IPEPF in El Salvador; and  
x) Specify the mechanisms of influence through which international, national, 
and local actors impacted the development of the EDUCO program.  
To the extent that I have been able to carry out these tasks, I am able in the present 
dissertation to explain the IPEPF through which the EDUCO program entered official 
MINED policy.  I am also able to discern the mechanisms of influence through which 
its development was impacted. As will be shown, that influence has been primarily 
international in nature.  
It should be noted, however, that I will not walk the reader through each of the 
above-enumerated tasks in this dissertation.  Rather, they are tasks which must be 
accomplished as part of the research process.  What will be presented in the findings 
(chapter seven) of this dissertation is simply the resulting explanation of the policy 
formation process and how it was transnationally influenced.  These findings are 
contextualized in Chapter six.   
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Going forward, I will present the particular methods I utilize in order to 
accomplish these tasks.   As will be discussed, I rely on established case-study 
methods (Yin, 1994), as well as other specific matrix-related analytic strategies 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
5.4.1 Data Collection 
 Data collection occurred from approximately August 2011 to September 2012. 
Within this period, I was able to spend nine months in El Salvador due to financial 
assistance from a Fulbright Student Research Grant from the Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. Throughout this time, I relied on 
three sources of information: literature, documents, and interviews.  While the first of 
these typically includes academic publications – for example, books, journal articles, 
book chapters – the second are typically individual files, reports, evaluations, and 
other texts which are documentary in nature and which may or may not be publically 
available. 
I relied on these sources for a number of reasons.  To begin, the information 
obtained as one reads related literature, gathers documents, and conducts interviews 
helps one to understand the basic features of the context and process under study. 
That is, in the natural course of reading the literature, collecting documents, and 
performing interviews I began to understand El Salvador’s political-economic and 
ideational context, to comprehend the elements and events which comprised and 
delimited the process of policy formation through EDUCO developed, and to identify 
the domestic and international actors involved. 
With regard to literature specifically, historical analyses can provide 
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information on the political, economic and social contexts surrounding the policy-
formation process of interest. Separately, documents generated in relation to specific 
events in the policy-formation process themselves contain valuable facts and figures, 
provide data on the nature of those events and on the agendas being constructed and 
contested, as well as give an indication of where and by whom legitimate information 
was produced. Similarly, documents such as institutional reports, official legislation, 
education sector assessments, workshop proceedings, MINED statements, and 
newspaper articles, among others, can contribute to a more complete understanding of 
who participated and how, the context of that participation, and the structure of the 
overall process of policy formation. They also help to identify absences – that is, 
those voices, actors and perspectives which were not included in such processes 
(Jupp, 1996). 
Furthermore, interviews with local, national, and international actors provide 
information of a similar nature. In one respect, however, interviews have an 
advantage over documents: They help one better ‘to gain an understanding of the 
ways in which ... educational policy is [was] being interpreted, negotiated, and 
produced in relation to various pressures, and how policy is [was] interpreted by 
various system actors’ (Engel, 2007, p. 96). Interview data also help one to first 
identify and then interpret the roles of actors involved in such processes. Lastly, 
interviews can reveal alternative accounts to the official record that is reflected in 
government documents. For these reasons, they constitute a valuable source of data. 
With regard to the present case of EDUCO’s development, I cast a wide net in 
gathering documents. This was to ensure that data collection was as inclusive as 
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possible. In the summer of 2011, before departing for El Salvador, I began to search 
for documents and to conduct interviews within those institutions which I knew from 
my literature review had participated in the process of policy formation in El 
Salvador since the late 1980s.  Examples of these institutions include the Academy 
for Educational Development (AED), Harvard University, the IDB, USAID, and the 
World Bank.  With the exception of Harvard University, these institutions all make 
available a great deal of documentation through online repositories; in addition, the 
World Bank also has extensive physical archives.  Thus, via the online databases, I 
was able to access numerous documents related to the engagement of these 
institutions in EDUCO’s development. To be specific, the types of documents 
gathered from AED, IDB, USAID, and the World Bank included various reports, 
evaluations, country studies, workshop proceedings, grant- and loan-related 
documents, project-specific documents, USAID budgets, and statements of global, 
regional, and country-level institutional agendas.  In addition, before departing to El 
Salvador, I was able to conduct a number of interviews with key actors from the 
above-named institutions.  
It should be noted, however, that access to World Bank’s physical archives 
was not possible until my return from El Salvador, in July 2012, due to the 
considerable amount of time (ten months) the archivists at the World Bank required 
to retrieve and make available the requested documentation.  Moreover, some of the 
requested documents were subject to special approval processes since they were not 
yet at the time of request 20 years old.  Fortunately for this dissertation, upon my 
return from El Salvador I was in fact able to review hundreds of internal World Bank 
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documents related to this institution’s involvement in El Salvador – both generally 
and with regard to the education sector specifically. Valuable information which had 
not been publically released or had not been digitized and uploaded to the online 
repository was found in these archives, which contained additional project-related 
documents, loan-approval documents, and personal communication among World 
Bank staff and between World Bank staff and their Salvadoran counterparts.       
For both document collection and the conduct of interviews, my previous 
experiences and institutional associations were integral.  In my case, familiarity with 
the above-mentioned document sources, as well as the identification of key 
institutional informants, was made possible through prior research on education 
policy formation in El Salvador (Edwards, 2013), as well as through a previous 
consultancy with the World Bank’s Human Development Division. In addition, 
access to document collections and interviewees located in El Salvador was 
facilitated by visits to El Salvador twice during 2009 to participate in, and then to 
help lead, a study trip on education in rural areas. By following up with contacts 
made during those trips and through the conduct of research (Edwards, 2013) I was 
able to cultivate the institutional affiliations necessary in order to apply for and be 
selected to receive a Fulbright Research Grant. These Salvadoran affiliations – with a 
university (Central American University, UCA), a think tank (Business Foundation 
for Educational Development, FEPADE), and an educational consulting firm (Centro 
Alfa) – were vital because these institutions both house documents related to 
EDUCO’s develop and have themselves been involved in multiple rounds of 
educational reform in El Salvador.  These institutions thus contained valuable 
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documentation, provided me with access to key actors in Salvadoran educational 
politics, and lent me credibility as I went about collecting data.   
Using the documents obtained and interviews conducted before arriving in El 
Salvador as a guide, I was able to identify and explore additional archives while in 
country, often with the help of my institutional connections.  In particular, in El 
Salvador, I explored the archives of the Central American University (UCA) – which 
houses the largest library in the country and which has a special collection of 
government documents), Business Foundation for Educational Development  
(FEPADE), Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development 
(FUSADES), the MINED, and the two largest newspapers in the country (La Prensa 
Gráfica, El Diario de Hoy). To be sure, these archives contained documentation not 
available elsewhere.  That is to say, while the documentation I collected from the 
online databases of international institutions was certainly valuable, the documents I 
gathered from archives in El Salvador provided additional information and insights.  
Table 5.1, below, details the types of documents that I collected from each of 
the archives upon which I relied.  As this table indicates, I collected a wide range of 
documents.  Among these many documents, a few have proven to be particularly 
valuable for their revelatory nature.  I refer, in particular, to the personal collection of 
documents to which I was granted access by an education expert at FEPADE.  This 
personal collection was assembled by the education specialist from UNICEF who 
worked first as a consultant with the MINED in 1990 and then from 1991-1994 as the 
first director of the EDUCO office within the MINED.  Among other documents, this 
collection, which spanned 1990-1994, contained personal [continued after table]  
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Table 5.1: Summary of Documents Collected from Archives 








Internal government documents related to the implementation of 
World Bank education loans; a personal collection of documents 
from a former UNICEF education specialist working in El 












Year-end reports on education system, evaluations, progress 
reports, education statistics, curricula, training documents, 
documents related to World Bank projects, documents related to 
USAID-funded programs, UNESCO publications, education laws, 










MINED documents; masters’ theses; FEPADE publications; 
evaluations of – and literature related to – popular education; 





Documents related to USAID-funded projects and programs, 
education sector assessments, project evaluations, USAID strategy 




Documents related to World Bank education loans, related 
projects, and structural adjustment loans to El Salvador; 
evaluations; country studies; strategy documents; personal 
communication among World Bank staff and between World 
Bank staff and their Salvadoran counterparts 
 
Key: AED – Academy for Educational Development; FEPADE - Business 
Foundation for Educational Development; FUSADES - Salvadoran Foundation for 
Economic and Social Development; IDB – Inter-American Development Bank; 
MINED – Ministry of Education; UCA – Central American University; UNICEF – 





communications between the UNICEF education specialist and staff of the MINED 
as well as a variety of documents related to the establishment, operation, and 
evaluation of EDUCO during its early stages.  According to the education expert from 
FEPADE who granted me access to this collection of documents, it had not been 
previously shared with other individuals and had not yet been analyzed. 
One other set of documents proved to be especially informative.  I refer here 
to loan- and grant-related documents from IDB, USAID, and World Bank, such as 
loan- and grant-preparation, loan- and grant-approval, and the evaluation of loan- and 
grant-funded programs and projects.  These documents often contained candid 
assessments of El Salvador’s political, economic, and social context, as well as the 
risks and obstacles associated with implementing reforms.  They thus provided a 
window into the thinking of key actors within these influential institutions.  
Moving on, the strategy for accessing interviewees in El Salvador was very 
similar to that for locating documents. I began by approaching those key actors with 
whom I spoke during previous research. For that research, I began by collecting as 
many documents as I could directly related to events in the process of policy 
formation between 2003 and 2005 (such as event reports, sector assessments, etc.), 
and then proceeded to email or call each author and/or participant listed in the 
documents. In following this strategy for my dissertation, although many of my 
attempts to contact individuals were unsuccessful, a few were not, and the 
snowballing process accelerated the more that I obtained the endorsement of well-
known actors, particularly those actors who were currently holding – or who had 
previously held – high-level positions within the MINED.  In tandem with this 
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strategy, I relied on my new institutional affiliations for recommendations. Finally, it 
should also be noted that I relied on the contacts that I made in 2009 (when studying 
rural education in El Salvador) in order to gain access to local-level actors, such as 
community members and popular education teachers.  Overall, then, I followed 
purposive and snowball sampling techniques in order to locate interviewees  (Berg, 
2007).  
In total, I interviewed 82 actors for this dissertation.  This is above the average 
of 36 for case-study research (Mason, 2010). Table 5.2, below, lists the institutional 
actors with whom I spoke, as well as their level (i.e., international, national, local). In 
all, as can be seen, I spoke with representatives from government (MINED, National 
Assembly), multilateral institutions (UNICEF, World Bank), bilateral aid agencies 
(German Organization for Technical Cooperation, USAID), international NGOs 
(AED, Research Triangle International), Salvadoran think tanks (FEPADE, 
FUSADES), academia (Central American University), local NGOs (ADES, CIAZO), 
teachers unions (Union for EDUCO Teachers [SIMEDUCO], Bases Magisteriales), 
teachers from the popular education movement, and international consultants, among 
others. 
Conceptually, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, the distinction between the 
levels international, national, and local is not always clear.  Thus, while the institution 
for which one works tends to be associated with a particular level, what is more 
important than simply theorizing differences among levels is that we problematize 
how actors from these levels interact, use their power, and are shaped by the power of 




 Table 5.2: Interviewees by Level and Category  
Level/Category Institutional Entity/Actor Description # Ints. 
International Level Actors (44 total international interviewees) 
 
Multilateral    
Agencies 
 








German Organization for Technical Cooperation  








Academy for Educational Development 




      
Other 
 
Harvard Institute for International Development 




National Level Actors (31 total national interviewees) 




National Assembly  
MINED 
-­‐ Note: MINED interviewees included former ministers and vice-
ministers of education, EDUCO office personnel, education 
country directors, unit directors within the MINED, and other 









Teachers’ Union Representatives 
-­‐ SIMEDUCO (1)  
-­‐ Bases Magisteriales (2) 
 
3 
      
Think Tanks  
 
Salvadoran Found. for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES)  





Academia Central American University  1 
Local Level Actors (7 total local interviewees) 
     
Local NGOs 
 
Association for the Econ. and Social Dev. of Santa Marta (ADES) 








Popular Education Teachers 
 
4 
Total # Interviewees 82 
 
international, national, and local levels is to some extent useful as a classificatory 
system for involved actors, we must, during analysis, be sure to investigate how, for 
example, “international” actors from outside El Salvador enter into and impact those 
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“national” spaces where education policy is made and influenced (Robertson, 2011).  
Likewise, we must do the same for national actors: We must be attuned to how, for 
what purposes, and with what effects those actors enter into spaces beyond El 
Salvador’s borders, as well as those spaces within the country where transnational 
influence tends to circulate. To the extent that local level actors enter into either 
national or international level spaces, the same can be said of them.  The idea is 
simply that we must assess how actors primarily associated with one level affect the 
actors, actions, agendas, and mechanisms of the other levels. 
To continue, while the above table specifies the total number of interviewees, 
what is more important is confidence that I have interviewed as many relevant actors 
as possible from each level and type of actor. One gains this confidence by continuing 
to perform and seek new interviews until one has successfully spoken with all those 
actors whom documents and other interviewees suggest are important. Saturation is 
the other way in which one obtains confidence regarding the extent and accuracy of 
the data collected through interviews (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006; Mason, 2010). 
Evidence of saturation around a particular interview topic or from a particular 
subgroup begins to emerge when interviewees largely repeat the same stories, offer 
the same explanations, and give the same information. That said, even when one 
begins to experience saturation, one should continue to seek out under- and/or 
unrepresented voices and perspectives.  In my research, I erred on the side of caution 
by conducting as many interviews as possible and by continuing to seek out under-
represented voices and perspectives. 
Through these strategies, I was able to access many key actors who were 
 159 
 
integral to education reform during the early-to-mid 1990s and beyond in El 
Salvador.  Included in this group of key interviewees, there are the following:   
• Staff from the MINED in the early 1990s – including all Ministers of 
Education from 1990-2009, the advisor to minister at the time of 
EDUCO’s adoption, a number of the initial and subsequent staff of the 
EDUCO office, and staff from the office that handled international 
cooperation within the MINED; 
• Members of the initial teams from UNICEF and the World Bank that 
interacted with MINED officials in the early 1990s; 
• High-level personnel from the USAID office in El Salvador – including 
the director and sub-director of the Office of Education from the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and other programmatic staff; 
• Long-serving representatives of teachers unions, whose experiences date 
back to the 1970s; 
• Members of the popular education movement and individuals who have 
worked in local level NGOs that act on their behalf; 
• A key actor from Harvard’s Institute for International Development; and 
• Educational consultants from El Salvador, Chile, and the United States. 
As will be shown, through the data collected from these interviews, I was able to 
accomplish many of the necessary analytic tasks delineated above.  
 On a technical level, the interviews I conducted were semi-structured or, in 
Berg’s (2007) terms, “semi-standardized” (p. 95); they were conducted in either 
English or Spanish, as appropriate; they were performed at a location chosen by the 
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interviewee; and, lastly, they were recorded, provided the interviewee gave consent 
(Siedman, 2006; Berg, 2007). The duration of interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 
two hours, with the average length being just under an hour. Additionally, I did not 
perform member checks. In cases where member checks may have been useful, I was 
able to clarify issues through triangulation.  This was possible due to the large 
number of interviews that I conducted.  
The questions dealt with the interviewee’s experience with, knowledge of, and 
perspective on the development of the EDUCO program. Questions were both general 
and specific, and tailored to the level and prior experiences of each interviewee. I 
asked about the events that made up the process through which EDUCO was 
developed; about the involvement, actions and influence of international actors in 
them; about the dynamics of interaction among and between international, national 
and local actors; and about the ways in which these factors affected the emergence 
and path of EDUCO. As will be shown, by asking such questions, I collected data that 
serve to amplify and problematize those official and prevailing accounts of the 
development of the EDUCO program in El Salvador which were produced by and/or 
for the government and the World Bank (both of which have created a great deal of 
research and literature related to EDUCO). 
Although the discussion above has focused on data collection, in qualitative 
research it is not possible to completely separate data collection from data analysis. 
The former is an inherently iterative process, as analyzing the data one has collected 
facilitates identification of gaps in the data obtained and points to remaining data 
needs. Furthermore, with regard to document collection, one must have a way to 
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ensure that the texts retained for further future analysis are relevant. Thus, as with 
Engel (2007), during the process of document gathering, I evaluated “each document 
... for its usefulness for analysis” against the data analysis tasks driving the study (p. 
101). As Engel (2007) does, I relied on the set of specific questions developed by 
Guba and Lincoln (1981) in order to establish each document’s appropriateness for 
analysis. This set of questions includes, for example, the following: Who is the author 
and what is the author trying to accomplish? For whom was the document intended? 
What other documents may supplement this one? What is the subject of the 
document? How is the subject of the document articulated? What is the location 
where the document was generated? What is the context in which the document was 
written? What is the date/time of the document? Some documents provide more 
information than others, and it is important to distinguish which to retain for more in-
depth analysis. This was accomplished by evaluating each document in light of the 
questions listed above. However, once documents are collected and interviews have 
been conducted, the question of data management emerges.  
5.4.2 Data Management  
I developed systems to manage the dozens of interviews and hundreds of 
documents that I collected. First, I created an interviewee database using Excel. In 
this file, I kept a record of all the potentially relevant interviewees, as I became aware 
of them.  That is to say, as I read documents and conducted interviews related to 
EDUCO’s development and to education reform more generally, I recorded names 
wherever they were mentioned.  I would then search documents and the internet for 
additional information on the involvement of those actors within and outside El 
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Salvador in education reform.  At the same time, I would look for contact 
information.  Many times, I was able to acquire contact information for hard-to-locate 
actors through the relationships I developed with key institutional actors.  Other 
times, interviewees were able to provide such information, in addition to providing 
commentary on the careers, intentions, and current locations of those actors I had 
noted as being potentially relevant.  In the interviewee database itself, I stored each of 
these pieces of information (e.g., organizational experience, whether they were seen 
by other as being particularly relevant, contact information).  While the final number 
of actors interviewed for this dissertation was 81, the interviewee database ultimately 
contained over 250 individuals who were involved in education reform in El Salvador 
since the late 1980s.  
After conducting interviews, I noted them in an interview tracking table. 
This table contained the pseudonym I assigned for each interviewee (though not their 
names) along with other important information. I recorded, for example, the language 
(English vs. Spanish), date, and duration of the interview. I also noted whether or not 
I had an audio file (as opposed to only hand written notes) for each interview. In 
addition, since I transcribed some but not the majority of interviews, I specified who 
the transcriber was, whether the transcription had been completed, and whether the 
transcriber had been paid.  This tool was helpful for staying organized.   
The final tool that I created to facilitate data management was a document 
database. In the software program Excel, I created a spreadsheet in which I 
catalogued the titles of all the documents and literature I collected.  Along with the 
names, however, I also catalogued the following: author name, author institutional 
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affiliation, year and month of publication, and whether the document was relevant to 
the development of the EDUCO program.  To complement this information, I 
classified each document as either academic (i.e., journal articles, book chapters, 
books) or institutional (i.e., documents produced in relation to institutional 
operations) in nature and added to this a sub-classification that further indicated the 
type of information that could be found in each document. Table 5.3, below 
summarizes this classification scheme.  The sub-classifications are clearly not 
mutually exclusive; in applying these labels, I assigned that which, upon review of 
the document, stood out as most appropriate. The last two columns in the spreadsheet 
noted in which folder on my computer each document is stored (if I have a digital 
copy) and whether or not I have a printed copy of the [continued after table]  
Table 5.3: Classification Scheme for  





Academic   Doc in scholarly outlet 
Academic E.S Background 
History/Background on El Salvador, not 
specific to education 
Academic Education in E.S 
Related to education in El Salvador generally 
(but not EDUCO) 
Academic EDUCO EDUCO-specific 
Academic Other Relevant, but not specific to El Salvador 
News   Doc in newspaper 
Institutional   Published by an institution 
Institutional Strategic Contains Institutional Strategy 
Institutional Report Informative 
Institutional Evaluative Contains assessment 
Institutional Promotional Meant for public consumption 
Institutional Training Created to train institutional staff 
Institutional Internal Procedural or not for public consumption 
Institutional Legal Communicates laws/decrees 




document.  As a final comment on managing the documents I collected, I mention 
that I brought with me to El Salvador a scanner with which to digitize the majority of 
documents amassed. These have been stored on my computer, where I have a folder 
for each institution’s documents. 
5.4.3 Data Analysis  
A number of data analysis strategies were employed, for which I drew from 
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1994). The description of these methods – 
presented below – should not be interpreted as a strictly linear sequence, but rather as 
a set of inter-related analytic activities that inform each other and often occurred 
simultaneously, though some techniques were naturally more relevant at the 
beginning or end of the data analysis. I define each strategy (many of which I 
employed previously in Edwards, 2013) and discuss its application to the case of 
EDUCO’s development in El Salvador. Table 5.4, below, summarizes each of the 
eleven strategies employed. 
The first step involved reviewing the literature that I collected.  This 
included literature on El Salvador’s political and economic context during the 1980s 
and 1990s, as well as literature related to the landscape of education reform 
worldwide in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Reviewing such literature helped to 
understand the pressing issues within El Salvador that would have impacted 
government reform during this time, as well as the larger backdrop of geopolitical 





Table 5.4: Summary of Data Analysis Strategies 
No. Strategy Strategy Description 
1 Literature 
Review 
Review literature gathered and establish, for example, political-





Assess for IPEPF context, isolate facts about IPEPF and 
EDUCO (dates, events, actors involved, etc.), and, code data 
(e.g., interviewee statements re dynamics, influence, process 
mechanisms, etc.). 
3 Memoing  Consider data gathered and record emerging findings, 




Aggregate actors’ characterizations of events and processes by 
level and period, and then analyze cross-sections for themes. 
5 Events listing Create a chronological listing of all events during policy 
formation process. 
6 Critical events 
timeline 
Distill events timeline to only include those events, actions, and 
actors around which data converge; include commentary on 
significance and dynamics of each event, based on repeated 
analysis and evolving understanding of process dynamics. 
7 Policy content 
tracing 
Follow emergence of policy content across process-related 




Distill and summarize by time period actions and forms of 
influence of actors, as well as shifting structural characteristics; 
analyze for themes in conjunction with other analytic strategies. 
9 Context charts Visually represent the linkages among the essential events, 
actors, and context for each period of IPEPF. The focus is on 
mapping context, rather than attributing causation in the 
process of policy formation. 
10 Logic models Elaborate the interplay of context, events, and actors, and 
explain the ways in which each of them acted and interacted to 
influence, constrain, or enable IPEPF generally while 
facilitating, inhibiting or otherwise affecting the development 
of the EDUCO program specifically. 
11 Causal 
diagrams 
Departs from the logic model and “Display[s] … the most 
important independent and dependent variables in a field of 
study (shown in boxes) and of the relationships among them 
(shown by arrows). The plot of these relationships is 
directional, rather than solely correlational” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, 153). 
Note: The analytic strategies are iterative and cumulative; thus, while certain tasks are 
associated more with particular analytic strategies, they are not entirely separable from 
the adjacent steps in the analysis.  
Source: Adapted from Edwards (2012a) 




The second data analytic step in which I engaged consisted of repeatedly 
analyzing and coding the data.  However, although I began to repeatedly analyze the 
document and interview data during the data collection phase (e.g. in order to identify 
gaps in the information collected), moving to the stage of more formal analysis was 
different (a) in that the process was more structured, (b) in that it took into account all 
the data that I had collected, and (c) in that I began to code the data as well.  
Document and interview data were repeatedly analyzed in order to identify and 
extract factual information on who participated, when, how, through which events, 
and under what constricting or enabling structural conditions. During analysis of 
interview transcriptions, I also coded relevant sections of text that communicated the 
ways in which involved institutions participated in the process by which EDUCO was 
developed into an official policy. This first strategy was crucial, as repeated 
interrogation of the data allowed for incisiveness during subsequent analytic stages. 
Lastly, the initial analysis contributed to the identification of emergent themes which 
I was able to explore and refine as I moved through later steps.  
Memoing was the third strategy that I employed. Here, as I considered the 
data gathered, I recorded incipient insights, reflections and findings regarding the 
meaning of and interrelationships among data. These insights emerged through the 
analysis of individual and multiple sources of data and related both to minor and 
major issues - for example, the meaning of one interviewee’s statements, or a more 
nuanced understanding of how certain actors strategically engaged in a series of 
events to systematically influence agenda construction. This step was particularly 
important, since it was by reflecting on and drawing connections among the gathered 
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data that I was able, among other things, to more concretely discern the boundaries of 
EDUCO’s process of policy formation. That is to say, while the conclusion of the 
process by which EDUCO entered official policy was not particularly difficult to 
identify, the bounding the commencement of that process was more challenging since 
it required me to identify the point at which domestic and international actors begin to 
engage specifically for the purpose of policy formation. 
It should be noted that memoing was also important for developing an 
understanding of the structural issues that constrained certain actors and enabled 
others. This is because structural issues tended not to be readily evident. Thus, as I 
become familiar with the laws, regulations, aid relationships, loan conditionalities, 
and other forces which impinged upon the actions of involved actors and undergirded 
the entire context, it was essential that I recorded those insights in memo form so that 
I could revisit and revise them following subsequent data analysis.  Lastly, given that 
many of the strategies described below provided structured spaces in which to 
organize and analyze the data collected, memos provided, in contrast, a valuable, 
free-form space in which to pursue insights and engage in reflections on the relations 
among multi-level data and the complex contexts to which they pertain. Thus, though 
memoing is the third strategy described here, it is an important method with which I 
engaged throughout the data analysis process. 
The fourth strategy related to what can be called a perspectival flow chart.  
The purpose of this data analysis tool is to record and analyze how actors characterize 
periods of – or events and interactions within – IPEPF. These characterizations can be 
derived from interviewee recollections, institutional documents and previously 
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published reports. Given both the potentially numerous sources and levels from which 
characterizations flow, as well as the many events and processes to which they may 
pertain, the advantage of this flow chart was that it helped to group and array data in 
such a way that it facilitated analysis. More extended thoughts on the data contained 
in such a chart can be recorded in memos. Table 5.5, below, provides an example of a 
perspectival flow chart. 
Table 5.5: Example of a Perspectival Flow Chart 
 
Source: Edwards (2012a) 
 
The fifth and sixth strategies were closely related.  Respectively, these 
strategies were creating an events listing and then creating a critical events timeline. 
In the former, I created a chronological listing of all events during the process of 
EDUCO’s development until it became official policy, as understood on the basis of 
repeated interrogation of the data. It built directly on strategy number two. This 
listing was more extensive and inclusive than the critical events timeline, which only 
included those events around which data converged. Furthermore, the critical events 
timeline included space to record commentary on the significance of the actions 
which occurred during and around each event, process or sub-process. Over the 
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course of analysis, findings may begin to emerge by critically evaluating and 
reflecting on events. Importantly, the picture arrived at by constructing the events 
timeline and then reducing it to the critical events timeline was not assumed to be 
complete and total; however, on the basis of repeated analysis of the data and 
convergence of multiple data sources around a handful of events, actions and actors, I 
was able to interpret and gain insight into the way in which certain circumstances and 
variables shaped and influenced various stages of EDUCO’s development. Table 5.6, 
below, provides an example of how I constructed the critical events timeline. 
Table 5.6: Example of a Critical Events Timeline 
 
Source: Edwards (2012a) 
 Policy content tracing constituted the seventh strategy.  As the name 
implies, in this step I was attentive to the evolution of discussion around EDUCO in 
documents from the the IDB, MINED, USAID, and World Bank.  This step, in 
conjunction with analysis of the interviews, provided valuable information on how, 
when, and why the EDUCO program and the ideas behind it (before they were known 
as “EDUCO”) began to enter documents produced by the MINED.  
The eighth strategy I employed aggregates and summarizes the actions and 
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influence of multiple levels of actors during the process of policy formation. It is 
similar in design and purpose to the perspectival flow chart, and is labeled an actor-
influence matrix. Like the perspectival flow chart, it accommodates a summary of 
things over time. It is different, however, in that the perspectival flow chart contains 
characterizations provided by interviewees, while the actor-influence matrix is 
populated by the researcher on the basis of their (by now) revised, refined and in-
depth understanding both of the process in general as well as the specific actions, 
intentions, and forms of influence of the relevant actors. Beyond a representation of 
the actors’ own perspectives, then, it helps to clarify when actors became involved in 
EDUCO’s development, the ways in which they engaged with that development, 
what their intentions were, and how they influenced the program’s trajectory. 
Furthermore, unlike the perspectival flow chart, this matrix can include a row in 
which to record notes on developments in the political-economic (i.e. macro or 
structural) conditions in which each the process took place. Through this strategy, 
then, I was able to juxtapose in a single location the actions, intentions and influences 
of multiple levels of actors, along with macrostructural features (e.g. World Bank 
loan conditionalities) that affected how and when EDUCO entered official MINED 








Table 5.7: Example of Actor-Influence Matrix 
 
Source: Edwards (2012a) 
The ninth analytic strategy was to create a context chart. As Miles and 
Huberman (1994) explain, a context chart is “a network, mapping in graphic form the 
interrelationships among the roles and groups (and, if appropriate, organizations) that 
go to make up the context of [overall] behavior” (p. 102). The process of working 
with the data to produce such a graphic relies on the tactics of identifying patterns of 
interaction as well as “subsuming particulars into the general” (p. 104). As such, in 
large part, it is a distillation and visual representation of the information that the actor 
influence matrix contains. Importantly, the process of creating a context chart leads 
the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the linkages among the events, actors 
and context for each period of IPEPF. One is “not simply drawing a ... chart, but ... 
mapping salient properties of the context” (p. 104). Because two-dimensional context 
charts are inherently static, in my research on El Salvador I produced multiple context 
charts to reflect the changing dynamics and relations among actors between the late 
1980s and 1995.  Lastly, it should be mentioned here that context charts, as their 
 172 
 
name implies, are characterized not so much by the attribution of causation in 
producing policy as by their inclusion and mapping of a process’s overall constitutive 
events and contributing actors.  
Below, I present an example of a context chart in Figure 5.2.  This figure 
charts the interrelationships among the research methods employed for this 
dissertation. Note that the first strategy mentioned about – literature review – is not 
included in the chart.  Also note the bidirectional arrows among strategies, indicating 
the iterative and complementary nature of these proposed strategies. Lastly, reading 
this context chart from top to bottom indicates that general sequence in which I 
engaged in the strategies described in this section (though, as noted above, they 
process of analysis was inherently iterative). 
The tenth strategy was to elaborate a logic model. Crucially, the purpose of 
this strategy is to explain the overall process of policy formation and the ways in 
which various actors impacted EDUCO. In so doing, I condensed a large amount of 
data in order to zero in on the most salient features, as parsed out by previously 
engaging in the series of analytic strategies described above. In the end, as Miles and 
Huberman (1994) explain, “if you’ve done it [i.e created a logic model] right, you 
will have respected the complexity of local causality as it ... played out over time, and 
successfully combined ‘process’ and ‘variable’ analyses” (p. 160). Thus, it 
demonstrates causal relationships by explaining how certain conditions lead to other 
conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin, 2003). In the words of 
Yin (2003), it deliberately stipulates “a complex chain of events over time ... in 




Figure 5.2: Context Chart of Research Methods 
 
Source: Edwards (2012a) 
 
dependent variable (event) at an earlier stage becomes the independent variable 
(causal event) for the next stage” (p. 127). With regard to form, a logic model is a 
tightly wound narrative that succinctly conveys only those particularities and 
contextual features necessary to explain how the policy formation process proceeded, 
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and, within that, how various actors and forces impacted the development of 
EDUCO. 
The results of the logic model constitute the majority of what is presented in 
the findings chapter of this dissertation. To be sure, the writing of the logic model 
was difficult, due to the amount and complexity of the data. I relied on the insights 
gained by engaging in each of the strategies outlined above. By continually working 
with the data in each of these ways, I arrived at findings that fed into the development 
and improvement of the logic model. More specifically, in order to ensure construct 
validity (i.e. explanatory power) of the logic model, I (a) used triangulation strategies, 
(b) sought convergence among data, and (c) considered rival interpretations of key 
events and data (Yin, 2003). Additionally, I followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
suggestions for making causal assertions: They should be based on specificity, 
coherence, and plausibility. The recommendations of both Miles and Huberman 
(1994) and Yin (2003) were particularly useful strategies for dealing with the 
limitations inherent in the types of data upon which I relied. For example, there were 
missing (read: unattainable) documents and, potentially, aspects of the process about 
which I had little or no information with which to make inferences.  As a final note, 
in addition to the suggestions of Yin (2003) and Miles and Huberman (1994), recall 
that the theoretical tenets I set out in chapter 4 also served as a guide for interpretation 
where data was limited.  
Lastly, while a logic model is a verbal explanation, the eleventh and final 
strategy, a causal network, is a visual depiction. As Miles and Huberman (1994) 
write, “[a] causal network is a display of the most important independent and 
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dependent variables in a field of study (shown in boxes) and of the relationships 
among them (shown by arrows)” (p. 153). The plot of these relationships is 
directional, rather than solely correlational. It is assumed that some factors exert an 
influence on others’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 153, emphasis in original). Thus, 
“[i]n the causal network, the analyst traces the emergence and consequences of a 
particular theme and orchestrates it with others” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 160). 
In the present research, the particular case is the EDUCO program, and the causal 
network presented in the findings chapter portrays its development as impacted by 
various actors. It is on the basis of the causal network and the logic model combined 
that analytic generalizations are made. As a final word on this strategy, it should be 
noted that, although the visual diagram contains, in the words of Miles and Huberman 
(1994), only those “most important dependent and independent variables” (p. 153), 
the process of arriving at the final causal network was neither quick nor easy. Just as 
with the logic model (from which the causal network departs), I had to return time 
and again to the earlier tables and matrices to repeatedly refine it and ensure that the 
final depiction was as accurate as possible. 
 To provide an idea of how a causal networks might look, I present one in 
Figure 5.3, below.  This figure is drawn from my previous research on education 
policy in El Salvador. As has been mentioned, that research focused on the dynamics 
of policy development between 2003-2005, as a particular policy – “Plan 2021” – was 
being formed. The figure – which maps the actors, events, creation and flow of 
informational inputs, and presence of legitimating events – should be read from the 
bottom to the top.  Keep in mind, however, that without [continued after table]  
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Figure 5.3: Causal Network of Process Dynamics in Formation of Plan 2021 in 
El Salvador during 2003-2005 
 
Source: Edwards (2013) 
 
the accompanying logical model, which explains in detail the relationships among 
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these elements over time, the causal network is difficult to fully understand. 
In the preceding pages, I have elaborated upon eleven distinct yet connected 
strategies for data analysis. Importantly, these strategies respond to the needs of the 
study – that is, to the analytic tasks derived from the stated research questions.  I 
enumerated these analytic tasks at the beginning of this section. To the extent that the 
eleven inter-related and iterative analytic strategies delineated above respond to these 
tasks, my research on EDUCO’s development is able to explain, broadly, the process 
by which it occurred and, specifically, how multiple actors from multiple levels 
contributed to shaping that evolution.  In the final section of this chapter, before 
moving on to an analysis of country context in the late 1980s in the following chapter, 
I tackle a number if issues that arise in the conduct of research.   
5.5 Related Issues  
 In this final section, I briefly tackle a range of issues associated with the 
conduct of research.  I begin with the matter of researcher positionality, followed by 
discussions of data integrity, ethical and political consideration, and study limitations.  
5.5.1 Researcher Positionality 
 In addition to being reflexive about my intellectual development and those 
experiences which have influenced the theories that I personally bring to the conduct 
of research (see section 5.1), it is also possible that the perception others held of me 
influenced the process of performing this research.  That is to say, in relation to those 
with whom I interacted in the collection of data, my positionality – or the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with my position in the world – could have had 
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important effects (Hopkins, 2007). It is likely that – beyond being generally open, 
cordial, and accommodating – gatekeepers and interviewees were influenced to some 
degree by a number of characteristics.  These include, for example, the fact that I am 
male, Caucasian, from the United States, and a student in a PhD program.  In 
addition, the fact that I was a recipient of a Fulbright Research Grant was well 
received.  From my perspective, based on interactions with a range of actors over nine 
months in El Salvador, the above combination of characteristics at least somewhat 
influenced at least a portion of the individuals upon whom I depended for 
information, either directly or indirectly.  To put this in perspective, on a number of 
occasions, my Salvadoran colleagues remarked that, if they were to walk into a 
certain government office and ask for information or for an interview with a certain 
official, the process would not have been as simple or as hassle-free as it often was 
for me.  On the other hand, to the extent that interviewees held anti-American 
sentiment, my positionality also could have limited me.  
5.5.2 Data Integrity 
Another set of issues to discuss with regard to methods pertains to quality 
issues.  All methods have their strengths and weak points.  To that end, Mertens 
(2005) – drawing on various works by Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba – has 
elaborated a number of dimensions to take into account when performing qualitative 
research.  These include: Credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, 
and authenticity.  In this section, I attend to each of these in turn.  
 Considering credibility is equivalent to considering whether the findings of a 
study are valid.  More specifically, in the words of Mertens (2005), the issue of 
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credibility relates to the extent to which “there is a correspondence between the way 
the respondents actually perceive social constructs and the way the research portrays 
their viewpoints” (p. 254). A strategy I used to enhance credibility was triangulation.  
With this strategy, the researcher confirms facts and interpretations by looking across 
the data collected to see if multiple sources (e.g., documents, interviews) indicate a 
common finding. 
 Transferability relates to the degree to which findings can be generalized to 
other situations.  In the end, this is a decision that only the reader can make; however, 
the researcher must “provide sufficient detail to enable the reader to make such a 
judgment” (Mertens, 2005, p. 256).  As such, I have been sure to offer detailed 
descriptions of the context, events, actors, and processes that constitute the case 
education policy formation and educational change related to EDUCO in El Salvador.   
 It should be noted, however, that, for the present research, analytic 
generalization is just as important as generalizations regarding the transferability of 
findings to other settings.  As Small (2009) notes, in case study research, the central 
question is the extent to which the case helps to refine theory.  This approach to 
transferability and generalizability is consistent with the philosophical tradition of 
critical realism which undergirds this dissertation. 
 Associated with transferability is dependability.  This concept is concerned 
with the extent to which others can inspect and trace the protocol and steps taken by a 
researcher (Mertens, 2005).  At heart, the issue relates to whether others can trust 
one’s methods.  To address this concern, I have included earlier in this chapter 
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extensive details about how data I collected, managed, and analyzed the data for this 
disseration. 
 Confirmability is the next dimension of quality. Mertens (2005) writes that 
confirmability “means that the data and their interpretation are not figments of the 
researcher’s imagination” (p. 257).  To respond to this point, I cite, to the extent 
possible, the portion of the data from which my interpretations have emerged.  I also 
attempt to make clear the logic which led to my interpretations. Yin (1994) refers to 
this as constructing a “chain of evidence.” 
 The last dimension is authenticity.  Here, the concern is whether the 
researcher presents “a balanced view of all perspectives, values, and beliefs” 
(Mertens, 2005, p. 257).  When reading one’s findings, conclusions, and 
interpretations, others want to know if the researcher has systematically neglected 
certain perspectives present within the data.  My response to this dilemma has been to 
interview as many relevant actors as possible and to seek out during data collection 
those perspectives which might be under-represented.  Ultimately, however, the 
analysis presented in this dissertation is critical in nature.  When appropriate, I make 
clear where data may have been insufficient, where there were incongruous 
interpretations among actors, and where the interpretations offered have been 
suggested more by theory than evidence (Mertens, 2005).  That said, however, my 
underlying philosophical tradition – i.e., critical realism – assumes that my analysis 
and findings – while based on the systematic collection and analysis of data – are 
necessarily guided by partial evidence and are inherently mediated by my theoretical 
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tenets. The net result is that, while authenticity is an ideal, it can only be 
approximated in practice. 
5.5.3 Ethical and Political Considerations 
All researchers should consider whether there are ethical issues to take into 
account.  With regard to the present research, there were two issues: informed consent 
and confidentiality.  In order to address informed consent, I explained to each 
participant the purpose of the research – that is, to understand how the EDUCO 
program developed in El Salvador in the early 1990s – and for what their interview 
responses were to be used.  As well, I requested participants’ permission to digitally 
record the interviews.  Where this permission was not granted, I took notes by hand. I 
also stressed to the interviewees that confidentiality would be maintained.  
Due to the political and potentially sensitive nature of the interview topics, 
ensuring the confidentiality of each participant’s responses was essential.  After data 
collection, interviews were anonymized by separating identifying information from 
the transcriptions.  An identification key was created to which only I have had access. 
These strategies were intended both to protect the identity of the participant and to 
help build trust between myself and the participants.   
5.5.4 Study Limitations 
The limitations of this study relate primarily to its scope. Three limitations 
stand out and can be characterized in the following way:  
1. The focus of the dissertation only extends until 1995, when EDUCO 
enters official policy, and so does not focus primarily on the trajectory of 
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the program thereafter.  It should be noted, however, that I made a 
concerted attempt to address this limitation through the extensive literature 
review presented in chapter three.  Through that literature review, I detail 
insofar as possible the trajectory of they program in the years following 
1996.  
2. The focus of the dissertation does not examine how EDUCO operated at 
the local level, but rather largely at the dynamics of national and 
international actor interaction for the most part.  How EDUCO operated at 
the local level certainly deserves an in-depth and critical assessment.  I can 
do this in future research, as I collected data at the local level in two 
separate communities on how EDUCO worked.  
3. An additional, and inherent, limitation in this dissertation relates to the 
number of years that have passed since the phenomenon of interest 
occurred and the ability of my interviewees to accurately remember events 
15 or more years after they transpired. In response to this issue, I took care 
to triangulate interview data with the information contained in documents 
which were created more near to the moment at which relevant events 
occurred.   
Despite these limitations, it is hoped that the present dissertation makes a valuable 
contribution to the literature.  To that end, the next chapter presents the national and 





Chapter 6: National and International Context 
 
This chapter sets the stage such that the dynamics of education reform can be 
discussed in chapter seven.  That is to say, in this chapter, I characterize the national 
and international contexts relevant to El Salvador from the late 1970s to 1990. Where 
appropriate, I also discuss the nexus between these two contexts, for, as will be 
shown, both actors and structural relationships from beyond El Salvador impinged on 
Salvadoran politics during this time.  Throughout this chapter, the goal is to convey 
the political economic context at the end of the 1970s, show how the features of that 
context interacted and changed over time, and explain the genesis of the 
circumstances with which education reformers would be confronted in the early 
1990s.  In short, I attempt to explain the conditions which created the conditions 
within which EDUCO would eventually emerge. 
 To accomplish these tasks, I move through eight sections in this chapter. In 
the first section, I characterize the roots of the unequal and repressive situation found 
in El Salvador by the 1970s. Second, I discuss the emergence of armed resistance to 
that context in the 1980s. Third, I explore the origins and characteristics of the 
educational strategies that emerged during the war in conflictive areas. Fourth, I 
overview the rationale and nature of US government involvement in El Salvador 
during the 1980s in response to the conflict. In the fifth section, I then detail the 
contours of Salvadoran electoral politics.  This section shows how those in power at 
the national level moved from an alliance with the inward-looking, landed oligarchy 
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to being a new, outward-looking, export-oriented elite. In the sixth section, I then 
present and analyze the engagement and re-engagement of key national and 
international organizational actors.  These actors are the organizations that would 
later be relevant to education reform in the early 1990s.  In the penultimate section, I 
mention the World Conference on Education For All, which subsequently would be a 
referent for those involved in Salvadoran educational reform.  In the final section, I 
briefly conclude.  
 
6.1 The Roots of Conflict  
As Meade (2010) notes, the elite in El Salvador evolved in a manner distinct 
to that of the Somoza family in neighboring Nicaragua.  Not entirely dependent on 
the United States, they “evolved as a force in their own right” – though they accepted 
humanitarian and military aid and were “quick to call on the [United States] … if they 
proved unable to manage their affairs alone” (p. 291).  Since the mid-1800s, there has 
been “a small landed elite known popularly as the ‘Fourteen Families’” who “owned 
60 percent of the farmland,43 the entire banking system, and most of the nation’s 
industry” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 34).  Morevoer, as Acevedo (1996) notes, by the late 
1970s, “42 percent of urban workers were earning an income that placed them below 
the official poverty line” – a situation that was sure to be worse in rural areas (p. 27).  
In terms of inequality, Acevedo (1996) notes that, by 1974, while the poorest 20 
percent of the population received only 2.8 percent of total income, the richest 20 
percent were bringing in 66.4 percent.  
                                                 
43 From this farmland, they produced and exported coffee, sugar, beans, and corn, in 
addition to processed food and textiles (Meade, 2010). 
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Beyond control of the country’s political and economic systems, the elite also 
controlled the military and had their own loyal armies (or “death squads”).  With such 
power, they created a police state in the 1970s in reaction to government efforts at 
land redistribution, protests regarding the inequality that increasingly beset El 
Salvador since the 1960s (at which point 12 percent of the peasantry had no land), 
and the influence of liberation theology throughout the country, but particularly in 
rural areas.  This repression, combined with the ideology of liberation theology, 
played a key role in engendering the armed resistance that would emerge.  
Events came to a head in 1980 in El Salvador. During that year, a number of 
key figures were assassinated for speaking out, resisting repression, and working 
against social and economic injustice (Meade, 2010).  Among these key figures was 
archbishop Oscar Romero, the leading Catholic cleric in El Salvador and champion of 
the poor.  In addition to denouncing the murder of other priests in the country, whom 
he was convinced were killed by the military for trying to assist the poor, he also 
began to call for an end to US military aid to El Salvador because, he asserted, the 
state would continue to kill innocent civilians so long as it received assistance 
(Meade, 2010).  The final straw was his petitioning individual soldiers to disobey 
their superior officers as they ordered the execution of civilians.   
 His death on March 24, 1980, is seen as a turning point, and is often 
referenced in relation to the escalation of the domestic unrest into civil war 
(Montgomery, 1995).  Subsequent investigations have revealed that the assassination 
of Oscar Romero was ordered by Robert D’Aubuisson, a former army major who 
controlled death squads at the time and who, in 1980, founded the Nationalist 
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Republican Alliance (ARENA).  This is the same extreme-right political party that 
would later gain control of the presidency in 1989, and would retain it until 2009.  
The early 1980s were thus characterized by an oppressive and violent context 
in which death squads sought out subversives and murdered an estimated 30,000 
civilians during 1980-1981 (Meade, 2010).  By 1983, the total rose to as many as 
40,000 (Orr, 2001). This was accompanied and exacerbated by misery, malnutrition, 
and multiple failed attempts at land reform over the previous decade (Montgomery, 
1995). Groups of Salvadorans armed themselves to combat this dire situation.  
6.2 FMLN and Armed Resistance 
 In November 1980, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
was formed from five pre-existing political-military organizations operating in 
different areas of El Salvador (Montgomery, 1995).44  These five organizations 
either re-emerged or formed in the 1970s after a multi-decade period of intense 
repression of those suspected of being communist.  In the late 1970s, the combination 
of the conditions described above along with electoral fraud and the military 
prevention of progressive political and economic change through peaceable means 
engendered armed resistance (Montgomery, 1995).  
 The first offensive launched by the FMLN occurred on January 10, 1981.  By 
six months later, the country was locked in a military stalemate, despite the 
comparatively small, ill-equipped, and un-trained nature of the guerrilla groups, 
                                                 
44 These five political-military organizations were known as the Popular Forces of 
Liberation, National Resistance, Revolutionary Army of the People, Communist Party 




which have been estimated to contain (at the time) 4,000 soldiers, with another 5,000 
militia (Montgomery, 1995).45  Throughout the 1980s, the civil war would be a 
relatively low intensity conflict that unfolded primarily in the departments of 
Chalatenango, Cabañas, Morazán, and San Miguel, in the northwest of the country.  
See Figure 6.1, below, for a map of the departments of El Salvador.   





 The policy goals of the FMLN came into focus during the 1980s.  Upon 
victory, they sought to implement a number of structural reforms, including the 
nationalization of “banks, external commerce in major exports, the entire energy 
                                                 
45 By 1984, the FMLN counted between 9,000 and 12,000 combatants (Montgomery, 
1995, p. 169).  
 188 
 
system, and ‘monopolistic enterprises in industry, commerce, and services’” 
(Montgomery, 1995, p. 118).   This would be complemented by other urban, agrarian, 
tax, and banking reforms designed to redistribute land, increase government revenue, 
and ease credit for small and medium-sized businesses. Socially, they wished to 
reduce unemployment by creating jobs and to implement massive projects in housing, 
health, education, and culture, with the end goal being a “just distribution of the 
wealth, the enjoyment of culture and health, and the effective exercise of democratic 
rights of the great majorities” (Montgomery, 1995, p. 119). 
 The FMLN did not have a chance to institute these reforms because it did not 
win the war.  Nevertheless, in those portions of Chalatenango, Morazán, Cuscatlán, 
San Vincente and Usulután controlled by FMLN, there were, in the words of 
Montgomery (1995), “outlines of revolutionary local government” (p. 119). Though 
these local governments took different forms in different areas, “there was a universal 
effort … to organize collective or cooperative farms; to introduce literacy classes for 
civilians and guerrillas and compulsory education for children; and to institute 
medical care in areas where most people had never seen a doctor” (p. 122).  In 
contrast to liberal democracies, the FMLN placed emphasis on preparing people for 
“direct participation in daily decision-making and cooperation toward common goals” 
(p. 126).46 
                                                 
46 See Montgomery (1995, p. 119-122) for more on the participatory forms of local 
government attempted by the FMLN.  
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6.3 Popular Education 
 During the 1960s and 1970s the liberation theology of the Catholic Church 
was generally influential in Latin America, but particularly so in El Salvador. During 
this time, the Catholic Church turned its attention to poverty and injustice, rather than 
restricting its focus exclusively to the realm of the spiritual.  Catholic priests not only 
began to defend the rights of the oppressed and to criticize the ills of capitalism, but 
also to promote and engage in grassroots organization through which community 
groups were created with the purpose being to study the bible with an eye toward 
structural injustices which worked against the self determination of the poor 
(Montgomery, 1995).  By the late 1970s, these community groups were targets of 
repression by death squads in El Salvador and, as such, became recruits for the 
political-military organizations that would later form the FMLN (Hammond, 1998).  
Others who did not join became supporters of these organizations covertly.  
 As Hammond (1998) notes, once the war began, the FMLN recognized the 
need to organize and educate their base, and so turned to the strategy of popular 
education.  Those who implemented this educational strategy drew on the pedagogy 
of liberation theology and built on the methods of Paulo Freire (1970), with the idea 
being to “read the word and read the world” – that is, to identify, understand, and take 
action against various forms of social, cultural, political, and economic oppression 
(Freire & Macedo, 1987).  In El Salvador, once the war began, the role of the church 
declined; by the mid-1980s, popular education was supported by community councils 
with no relation to the church. 
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 Popular education was practiced during the 1980s in areas controlled by the 
FMLN, as well as in refugee camps in Honduras, and on the front lines during periods 
of non-conflict (ADES, 2005; Alvear, 2002; Hammond, 1998).  Popular education 
represented the only source of education in these spaces during the civil war, for 
government-provided educational services were either a non-option or had ceased due 
to the conflict.  Teachers assigned to teach in rural areas often refused to assume 
those positions (Gillies, 2010).  For the FMLN, in addition to a key source of literacy, 
popular education also represented a way to introduce participants to the political and 
ideological perspectives for which they were fighting. Ultimately, despite the make-
shift nature of this educational arrangement and the lack of resources experienced by 
popular educators, there were, by the early 1990s, approximately 1,000 teachers and 
13,500 students participating in this alternative educational system (Alvear, 2002, p. 
189, 200).  
6.4 U.S. Governmental Involvement 
 The first offensive by the FMLN – on January 10, 1981 – occurred just before 
the conclusion of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the United States.  Because he would 
leave office on January 20th of that same year, his administration “rushed in $10 
million in military assistance” along with military advisors to contain and counter the 
actions of the FMLN (Montgomery, 1995, p. 113).  Despite this reaction, it should be 
noted that the Carter administration had followed a course of foreign policy seen by 
many as being particularly tolerant.  Nevertheless, despite the easing – somewhat – of 
Cold War tensions during the 1970s, while Presidents Gerald Ford (1974-1977) and 
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) were in office, friction began to build once again in 
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Central America after the Somoza regime in Nicaragua fell in 1979 to a socialist 
revolutionary group – the Sandinista National Liberation Front. 
 Ronald Reagan, the incoming president of the United States in 1981, did not 
want another Nicaragua in its proverbial backyard (LeoGrande, 1998).   As 
LeoGrande (1998) writes, the “Reagan Doctrine” was a reaction to the policy of 
tolerance advanced by the previous administration under Jimmy Carter: “Where 
Carter promoted human rights as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, Reagan would 
renew U.S. alliances with anti-communist authoritarian regimes” (LeoGrande, 1998, 
p. 5).  He continues, speaking to the importance of the region at the time, “Central 
America was the last major battle of the Cold War. Reagan’s policy cannot be 
understood outside that context” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. x). 
 Indeed, as others have observed, Reagan exhibited “almost obsessive 
anticommunism” (Martín-Baró & Cardenal, 1995, p. 5).   This led to massive 
amounts of funding.  Whereas the United States provided approximately $150 million 
in aid to El Salvador from 1963 to 1979, it jumped to approximately $6 billion 
between 1980 and 1992 (Robinson, 2003, p. 89).  In 1985, military aid alone 
amounted to $533 million (Booth, Wade, & Walker, 2006, p. 105).  This aid went “to 
increase the size of the government forces by nearly 600 percent, to training and 
advice, [and] to the provision of modern weaponry, including land, air, and sea-based 
weapons systems of command, control, communications, and intelligence” 
(Robinson, 2003, p. 89).  In absolute terms, as a result of military aid, the Salvadoran 
army quintupled during 1980-1987, reaching 56,000 members (Montgomery, 1995, p. 
198-199).   
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Perhaps more importantly, the aid provided by the United States is understood 
to have tilted the advantage in favor of government forces.  As Booth, Wade and 
Walker (2006) write, funds from the United States supported a “failing Salvadoran 
military and thus profoundly altered the balance of forces between the regime and 
insurgents” (p. 105). Montgomery (1995) perceives that the FMLN would have won 
the war were it not for the support of the United States government and the provision 
of technology that permitted air-based attacks on guerrilla forces.  
Yet it should be noted that military assistance was only one prong of the 
strategy pursued in El Salvador by the US government.  Funds directed at political, 
economic, and social outcomes were also provided in order to influence national 
politics and induce its preferred policy orientations and measures.  Robinson (2003), 
for example, in writing on the issue of U.S. economic aid during the 1980s reveals 
that “funds were earmarked specifically for use by private sector groups” and these 
funds “played a key role in the development of new economic agents and the 
redistribution of economic and political influence” (p. 89).  The creation of “new 
economic agents” in El Salvador was seen as necessary because the dominant 
political actors at the time (i.e., the Duarte administration) whom the United States 
felt compelled to support, at the time, for the sake of the country’s stability did not 
share the same predilections for economic policy reform.   
Thus, while the United States was an actor that significantly affected the 
political-economic circumstances in which Salvadoran politics unfolded, the reality 
was that the United States still had to respond to national political dynamics.  The 
next section characterizes the important interaction of these two forces.  As will be 
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shown, by the late 1980s, these interactions as well as further steps taken by the 
United States created the conditions for a neoliberal reorientation of the Salvadoran 
elite.  
6.5 Dynamics of Salvadoran Electoral Politics 
Salvadoran politics at the national level moved through three distinct periods 
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.  As will be discussed, over the course of these 
periods those in power at the national level moved from being an alliance with the 
inward-looking, landed oligarchy to being a new, outward-looking, export-oriented 
elite. Multiple players are relevant to this transition, including not only the 
Salvadoran armed forces, national political parties, and distinct factions of the elite, 
but also political and organizational actors from the United States, as will be shown.  
6.5.1 Military Control: 1979 – 1983 
 
 The period 1979-1983 of Salvadoran politics has been described by historian 
Tommie Sue Montgomery (1995) as a “descent into anarchy”.  This period began 
with a coup against President Carlos Humberto Romero, who had been elected 
through fraudulent elections in 1977 and who governed until late 1979 as a military 
dictator.  In response to the increasing tensions and repression and a lack of action to 
address the socio-economic inequalities that frustrated Salvadorans, a coup against 
Humberto was executed in October 1979 by moderate military officers and a junta of 
progressive civilians, the latter of whom wanted to reign in military repression and 
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pursue socio-economic reform.47 By January of 1980, however, the civilians on the 
junta grew tired of the military’s recalcitrance with regard to the promised reforms, 
and so issued their resignation. While the alliance between the military and the 
progressive junta was short-lived, it still served to sever the historically strong ties 
between the former and the country’s oligarchy.   
From that point onward, three groups followed multi-track strategies.  The 
most right-wing and conservative sector of the oligarchy began to form its own death 
squads and created its own political party – ARENA.  The army retained control of 
the government while promising reform.  Finally, the United States, financed the 
Salvadoran military’s response to the FMLN while also attempting to ensure political 
stability by supporting a strengthening of democratic processes that would appease 
the citizenry through the possibility of reform by electoral means.  Covertly, the 
United States would also influence the outcomes of national-level economic and 
electoral politics in the name of economic growth and democratic reform 
(Montgomery, 1995).  
Although the military and Ministry of Defense retained their grasp on national 
politics during the early 1980s (despite the existence of an official junta government 
populated with civilians), they allowed new presidential elections to be carried out in 
early 1984.  This came about as a result of the counterinsurgency strategy advocated 
by the U.S. administration at the time, of which governmental reform was one part 
                                                 
47 In addition to two young, reform-minded military officers, there were three 
civilians on the junta. One was Mayorga Quiroz, the rector of the Central American 
Univerity, a Jesuit institution. The second was Mario Andino, a businessman chosen 
by the business community. The third civilian was Guillermo Manuel Ungo, a lawyer 
who was the secretary general of the National Revolutionary Movement and whose 
father had helped found the Christian Democratic Party (Montgomery, 1995).  
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(Montgomery, 1995).  The outcome of both the 1984 and 1989 presidential elections, 
as well as the intervening politics and circumstances which constrained them, would 
irreversibly alter the trajectory of Salvadoran political, economic, and educational 
reform that would be pursued in the early 1990s.   
6.5.2 Attempts at Moderate Presidential Politics: 1984-1989 
 
In the lead-up to the presidential elections of March 1984, the United States 
did not favor either of the main candidates.   Too far to the left was José Napoleón 
Duarte, a populist who represented the Christian Democrat Party.  He favored land 
redistribution and social welfare programs, called for a “social pact,” and pledged to 
end death squad violence.48 On the other side was Roberto D’Aubuission, who, as 
mentioned previously, had close ties with death squads and who was the founder of 
the extreme right wing party ARENA.49  Ultimately, the United States supported 
Duarte because he was acceptable to the U.S. Congress, many members of which 
wanted to avoid the exacerbation of conflict and preferred to seek a political middle-
ground that would lead to stability and to the institution of democratic processes.  To 
facilitate Duarte’s victory, the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States spent 
$2.1 million.  In addition, the U.S. State Department organized and paid ($10.5 
million) to conduct the 1984 elections (LeoGrande, 1998).  
                                                 
48 From the perspective of the business community, the Christian Democrats were 
“barely distinguishable from the Marxist guerrillas” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 127). In the 
words of one member of one of the wealthiest families in El Salvador, Duarte was 
“just a Communist who happens to believe in God” (LeoGrande, 1999, p. 128). 
49 The ARENA party was supported by the conservative elite and El Salvador’s 
business sector. The party exhibited antagonism to agrarian reform and social welfare 
programs (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 251). See section 6.5.3 of this dissertation for more 
on how this party changed during the 1980s. 
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After the election, Duarte was completely handicapped as president. The 
rightist majority in the National Assembly neutralized the agrarian reform that had 
been initiated by the civilian junta officially in power prior to 1984.50  The army 
tolerated Duarte because his retention of the presidency ensured that aid money 
would continue to be approved by the U.S. Congress, though Duarte knew that they 
“retained effective veto power over any initiative they disapproved” (LeoGrande, 
1998, p. 261).  Moreover, “Washington pressed Duarte to go slow on all fronts 
[regarding reform]” for fear of “a backlash in the private sector and the armed forces” 
(p. 261).  
Despite Duarte’s inability to accomplish his reformist policy objectives or to 
engage in real dialogue about ending the war, his message of peace resonated with the 
Salvadoran people, and the Christian Democrats subsequently won a majority of seats 
in the National Assembly in 1985.  This was a wake-up call for the right-wing 
ARENA party, which began to realize that their association with death squads was 
detrimental politically – both in the eyes of Salvadorans and from the perspective of 
the US Congress.  In response, ARENA shed D’Aubuisson as the head of the party 
and replaced him with Alfredo Cristiani – “scion of one of the nation’s wealthiest 
families and head of the coffee growers association” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 264). 
Cristiani fit the bill because he had been educated at Georgetown, spoke English 
perfectly, “knew how to talk to gringos … [and] had never been linked to the 
paramilitary violence of ARENA’s origins” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 264).  
                                                 
50 See Montgomery (1995, pgs. 137-138, 187) for more on the agrarian reform. In 
short, this reform, which had first begun in 1980, sought to nationalize large farms 
(over 100 hectares) and to transfer ownership of land to those who rented it. In early 
1985, the budget for this program was eliminated by the National Assembly.  
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Duarte was secure in office after 1985 because the United States passed a law 
that automatically cut off aid to El Salvador in the event of a coup.  Despite this, and 
despite the fact that his party controlled the National Assembly, he was still limited in 
his abilities as president – on the one hand by the military and on the other by 
insistence from the Reagan administration for economic reforms.  Washington 
perceived that the civil war was contained – due in no small part to military aid and 
air fire power it provided – and so turned its attention to economic reform 
(LeoGrande, 1998; Montgomery, 1995).  
To be sure, the economy and the social sectors of Salvadoran life were in dire 
circumstances by 1985. To summarize, the war was claiming 50 percent of the 
national budget (and would continue to do so until the end of the 1980s), the 
government ran an annual deficit of $100 million (which Washington financed), 
inflation was at 22 percent, real income for agricultural workers had fallen by 30 
percent since 1980, foreign debt reached $1.986 billion (double 1984 total revenues 
from exports of goods and services), and debt service reached $262.3 million.  In 
education, 4,500 teachers had fled the country, many others refused to assume posts 
outside either the capital or major cities, 1,200 primary schools were closed, and 
illiteracy rose to 65 percent (and over 90 percent in certain departments) (LeoGrande, 
1998, p. 278-279; Montgomery, 1995, p. 190). 
Duarte initially resisted prodding by the Reagan administration to implement 
an economic stabilization plan that would curb the government’s deficits. He 
nevertheless was compelled to comply when threatened with reductions in aid.  In 
early 1986, he enacted reforms that cut public sector spending, devalued the currency, 
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raised import taxes, limited imports of luxury goods, and proposed a “war tax” on the 
wealthy.  In an attempt to cushion the effect on the poor, Duarte raised public sector 
wages, froze the price of basic foods, and increased the minimum wage (which few 
employers paid).  In spite of this attempt, the effect of the package of reforms was 
immediate and spelled doom for Duarte. The prices of all goods with any imported 
component rose dramatically. Gasoline prices and bus fares increased by 50 percent 
and 25 percent, respectively. The poor opposed the package because it exacerbated 
inflation and degraded their standard of living. The rich, on the other hand, opposed 
the package because they were subject to higher taxes (LeoGrande, 1998).   
While Duarte was looked upon favorably by the U.S. Congress, he was 
enmeshed in a frustrated situation in El Salvador.  His economic reforms created 
pushback among national actors, and he was never able to address the two priorities 
he had set as president: Ending the war and improving the quality of life for the poor.  
The final years of his term were further marred, first, by an earthquake that devastated 
the capital in 1986, and, second, by a diagnosis of cancer in 1988 which left him 
unable to accomplish much in his final year as president (LeoGrande, 1998).  
6.5.3 Emergence of the New Right: 1989-1994 
In the mid-1980s, a group within the ARENA party led by its new leader, 
Alfredo Cristiani, began to favor economic reforms that aligned with the neoliberal 
platform being promoted globally by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations along 
with key multi-lateral organizations (Arnove, 1997; Harvey, 1995; Klees, 2008; 
Mundy, 1998; Peck & Tickell, 2002).  The new policy orientation of this group – 
which differed markedly from the traditional oligarchy, which was comprised 
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predominantly by landed elite who preferred to remain inward looking – was 
engendered not only by ARENA’s losses in the 1985 National Assembly elections but 
also by the actions of USAID within El Salvador.  Indeed, during the mid-1980s, 
USAID worked actively to support and strengthen a faction of the Salvadoran elite 
which was open to neoliberal economic reforms (Foley, 1996; Quán, 2005).  This 
coincided with the gradual weakening and transformation of that portion of the 
oligarchy which depended on traditional agricultural exports – a result of the war, the 
concomitant abandonment of coffee producing lands, and the limited agrarian reform 
from the early 1980s which appropriated some of the larger farms, in addition to 
efforts of USAID described above (Robinson, 2003).  
As the 1989 presidential elections neared, this “New Lucid Right” was 
“squeezed between the revolutionary forces and limited reform” of the Duarte 
government (Robinson, 2003, p. 87).  Without a doubt, while Duarte had in 1986 
instituted reforms geared to address the government’s deficits, he had not liberalized 
the country’s economy in the way either ARENA’s new business elite or the Reagan 
administration would have liked.  Cristiani thus ran on a platform of economic 
recovery and a quick end to the war: “He even pledged to negotiate peace with the 
guerrillas – an amazing policy reversal for ARENA that reflected how desperately the 
population wanted peace” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 566).  This reversal also reflected a 
further realization by Cristiani and the New Right: As long as the war was ongoing 
their business interests in banking and industry would continue to suffer and it would 
be difficult to attract international loans and investment (Foley, 1996; Quán, 2005).  
Finally, in contrast with the traditional oligarchy and the military, Cristiani accepted 
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the need for some social change – in order to engender social harmony and peace 
(Boudreax, 1992) – and tolerated moves toward the enhanced functioning of 
democratic processes, though, as Quán (2005) notes, Cristiani still held a “very 
circumscribed view of democracy (p. 281).  
Cristiani and the ARENA party won the presidential elections of March 29, 
1989, and assumed office in June of that same year.  Subsequently, a chain of events 
was initiated that set the country down the path to peace and economic restructuring.  
With regard to the former, Cristiani immediately called for peace talks to begin with 
the FMLN.  Peace Accords were finally signed in January 1992 with the help of the 
United Nations – and despite major set backs during late 1989 in the form of a final 
guerrilla offensive on San Salvador and the retaliatory killing by the military of six 
Jesuit priests, who were seen as the intellectual leaders of the left (LeoGrande, 1998).  
In actuality, the gruesome assassination of the priests by the military, combined with 
the realization that conflict could not be resolved by the use of force, worked in favor 
of ARENA. This is because while the White House was not fazed by these high-
profile civilian murders, the US Congress was “stunned” and immediately began to 
increase its pressure for a negotiated solution (LeoGrande, 199, p. 570).  For more 
detail on the key events between early 1989 and early 1991 that led to the signing of 







Table 6.1: Timeline of Events in Progress Towards Peace Accords 
No Date Event Description 
1 Jan. 1989 Bush assumes U.S. presidency. 
2 March 29 
1989 
Cristiani wins Salvadoran presidency and immediately calls for peace 
talks to begin with the FMLN. 
3 November 
11 1989 
FMLN final offensive in San Salvador. 
4 November 
16 1989 
Jesuit priests killed. 
5 Feb. 1990 Electoral defeat of Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 
6 April 1990 Government and guerrillas resume with seriousness negotiations 
facilitated by the United Nations. 
7 July 1990 The government and FMLN sign an agreement to end human rights 
abuses and to have UN observers monitor compliance once a cease-fire 
was in place. Talks deadlock, however, around reform of the military. 
8 October 
1990 
Senate in U.S. approves Dodd-Leahy language related to point #4 above. 
The House had already voted on this language in June 1990. This 
legislation in the U.S. Congress would cut military aid by 50 percent 
immediately and entirely unless the government made an effort to 
investigate the death of the 6 Jesuit priests. That same bill allowed the 
president to restore military aid fully if the FMLN refused to “negotiate in 
good faith or launched an offensive that threatened the government’s 
survival” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 573). 
9 March 
1991 
Legislative elections for National Assembly. The leftist Democratic 
Convergence wins 12% of the vote and 8 seats, showing that the electoral 
system offered real possibility for the guerrillas. 
10 April 1991 Negotiations produce a major agreement on constitutional changes that 
strengthened the independence of the judiciary, reorganized the security 
forces into a single civilian-controlled police force, and created a Truth 
Commission to investigate the human rights abuses of the 1980s.  
Changes would begin upon the signing of a cease-fire. 
11 September 
1991 
Marathon negotiations in New York between Cristiani and FMLN’s 
principal military commanders.  Under pressure from Washington, 
Cristiani made concessions to reduce the size of the military by half and 
to create an independent civilian commission to review the human rights 
records of individual officers. All fundamental political and military 
issues dividing the two sides had been resolved in principle. 
12 December 
1991 
More negotiations in New York. The U.S. pressured Cristiani to make 
concessions while a “group of friends” (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, 
and Spain) encouraged the FMLN to do the same. A peace agreement 
was reached, though it was not signed until January 16th in Mexico City. 
13 February 1 
1992 
Cease-fire goes into effect. A National Commission for the Consolidation 
of Peace is installed. The 6-8,000 FMLN combatants and 63,000 were to 







With regard to economic restructuring, the Cristiani administration quickly 
took steps.  As documents from the World Bank (1991b) indicate, in the month 
following the assumption of power, Cristiani “initiated a major stabilization and 
structural adjustment program” in order to “create a more liberalized, private-sector 
led economy” (p. 5).  The first structural adjustment loan from the World Bank would 
be approved in 1991, followed by a second one in 1993.51 While these structural 
adjustment loans had far reaching implications for the Salvadoran economy, a 
separate set of loans from the World Bank and the IDB would be approved in the 
early 1990s that were specifically directed at financing and reforming social sectors 
such as education and health.  The process by which these loans were produced will 
be the focus, in part, of chapter seven of this dissertation.   
The following section addresses the ways in which key national and 
international organizations engaged and emerged in 1980s.  Having already discussed 
in this chapter the structural constraints that characterized the 1980s, it is now 
imperative that we understand the genesis and activity of these organizations in the 
period leading up to and following the election of President Cristiani, for they set the 
stage and created the conditions under which the EDUCO program was born in the 
early 1990s.  As will be discussed, these organizations were created prior to the 
election of Cristiani’s administration and then strategically channeled both personnel 
and informational inputs to it. 
                                                 
51 These were followed with a “public sector modernization” loan from the World 
Bank in 1996. For more on the significance of these loans in the context of total aid 
during the 1990s, see Rosa and Foley (2000).  
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6.6 Engagement and Reengagement of Key Organizations 
The development, involvement, and interaction of various organizations must 
be clarified in order to adequately understand the policy formation dynamics present 
in El Salvador following the election of Alfredo Cristiani. I focus on the dynamics 
around FUSADES (the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social 
Development) first, followed by FEPADE (the Business Fund for Educational 
Development), and, lastly, United Nations organizations and the IDB.  Throughout, 
where appropriate, I address the influence of USAID and the World Bank.  
6.6.1 FUSADES 
 During the 1980s, USAID supported the creation of two influential NGOs. 
The first was FUSADES in 1983.  As Foley (1996) notes, FUSADES became “the 
most influential think-tank in El Salvador” precisely because it had the backing of 
USAID, which was “driven by the Reagan administration’s enthusiasm for private 
enterprise and committed to creating a string of business organizations throughout 
Central America to support export-oriented policies” (p. 71-72).  In specific terms, 
while wealthy Salvadoran funders put up about $1,600 each to start FUSADES, this 
amount was quickly dwarfed in 1984 by a contract that would eventually be worth 
$50.46 million as part of USAID’s Industrial Stabilization Recovery Program (Foley, 
1996).  Ultimately, between 1983-1993, USAID would award FUSADES no less than 
$150 million in contracts (Robinson, 2003).  
 During 1985-1988, the clout of FUSADES increased exponentially. On the 
one hand, this was because the think-tank served as an “incubator for … intellectuals 
… and for private sector leaders who began to provide political and financial support 
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for [ARENA]” (Robinson, 2003, p. 95).  On the other hand, in addition to serving as a 
“who’s who” of the local technocratic elite (Robinson, 2003, p. 95), FUSADES 
became the primary conduit through which dominant international actors would work 
to ensure that neoliberal economic and social reforms would be pursued.  Robinson’s 
(2003) research, for example, reveals the following: “In 1988, in anticipation of 
ARENA’s electoral victory, the FUSADES drafted an Economic and Social Program. 
For this purpose, [USAID] and … FUSADES contracted twenty-five international 
advisors, among them Arnold Harberger of the University of Chicago, one of the 
original ‘Chicago Boys’” (p. 96).52  In the research conducted for the present 
dissertation, multiple interviewees also mentioned the presence and importance of the 
“Chicago Boys” at the time.  Indeed, when I asked one interviewee if the so-called 
Chicago Boys came “directly” from the University of Chicago, the reply was: “Yes, 
of course, to work with us in FUSADES – and from there all the priority lines for 
what would be the government’s plan took shape” (MINEDNL18).   
In addition, according to the work of Peter Sollis (1993), at least one 
economist from the World Bank – José Marques – was on leave in order to work on 
the economic team at FUSADES (Sollis, 1993).  The close ties among such 
international agencies as the World Bank, FUSADES, and the Salvadoran 
government are further evident when one considers that the wife of Marques became 
the Minister of Planning once Cristiani assumed the presidency.  Such connections 
engendered a “significant … positive informal dialogue … between [World] Bank 
staff and the staff of FUSADES” (Eriksson, Kremer, & Margaret, 2000, p. 29).  
                                                 
52 See Klein (2007) for more on the history and impact of the “Chicago Boys”.  
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Formally, though, the involvement of the World Bank was minimal until the late 
1980s, having not issued any new loans to El Salvador since 1979, with the exception 
of a loan for reconstruction after the earthquake of 1986 (World Bank, 1991c).  
 Close personal and intellectual ties between FUSADES the Cristiani 
administration were common, however.  Eriksson, Kremer, and Margaret (2000) note 
that the significance of the relationship between FUSADES and the government 
“became obvious when in mid-1989 the newly elected president, Alfredo Cristiani, 
who had himself come from FUSADES, selected his reform-minded economic team, 
including the ministers of planning and finance, as well as the head of the Central 
Reserve Bank, from key FUSADES staff” (p. 29).  In all, not only would “at least 17 
business leaders and persons linked with … [FUSADES] became part of the new 
government” (Segovia, 1996, p. 55). Additionaly, just as importantly, “the 
organization’s Department of Economic and Social Studies drafted the structural 
adjustment plan which became the basis for the economic program of the new 
ARENA government in 1989” (Foley, 1996, p. 72).  What followed subsequently 
“was sweeping neo-liberal reform, including trade liberalization, devaluation of the 
currency, privatizations, the lifting of subsidies, the promotion of non-traditional 
exports, and the expansion of free trade zones and maquiladora activities” (Robinson, 
2003, p. 96).   
The implication is that USAID used its resources, first, to identify Salvadoran 
elite who were amenable to its preferred economic policy positions, and, second, to 
facilitate the development of an influential national think-tank through which it could 
create the foundation for later reform.  Once in place, the World Bank likewise 
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participated intimately in the work of FUSADES toward the same policy objectives.  
Since its’ founding, FUSADES has been – and continues to be – an influential actor 
in national politics. 
6.6.2 FEPADE 
 
In the realm of education, USAID founded a second organization in 1986 that 
would be dedicated to training for those technical, vocational, and business skills 
which the private sector deemed necessary and which “modern” public sector 
management required (FEPADE, 2013; McIlwaine, 1998).  However, beyond the 
enhancement of Salvadoran human capital through training programs to create 
technocrats and a “work-ready workforce” (INTACT29), FEPADE also prepared 
diagnostics and reports on the education system for the government (MINEDNL18), 
and even managed the Central American Technical Institute (ITCA) once it had been 
privatized (MINEDNL15).  Notably, the privatization of ITCA was the first time in 
El Salvador that a public educational institution had been taken over by the private 
sector (MINEDNL15).  
While USAID funded FEPADE, it was managed by “members of the 
entrepreneurial class” (Moncada-Davidson, 1995, p. 72).  To an extent, FEPADE was 
to the education system that which FUSADES was to the economy.  That is, 
FEPADE was a source of technically capable specialists who offered conservative 
thought and analysis about the role and needs of the education sector; unlike 
FUSADES, however, it was also a hands-on organization that implemented programs.  
For our purposes, though, perhaps one of the most salient aspects of FEPADE was its 
close relationship with both USAID and the MINED (INTACT29; MINEDNL18).  In 
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the words of a former education consultant who worked with USAID and FEPADE: 
“[FEPADE] had really good ties with both government and the private sector and that 
was something valuable to [US]AID, so everybody got along” (INTACT29).  
 Beyond immediate relationships, however, there are multiple levels on which 
the institutions of FUSADES and FEPADE should be understood.  That is to say, one 
should consider national institutional dynamics but also the international political 
economic context of the time.  Two quotes emphasize this point. First, with regard to 
the dynamics of Salvadoran institutions, a consultant who worked with USAID on 
education reform during the early 1990s commented:  
In the early 90s and late 80s, when the struggle was still going on for El 
Salvador, USAID had supported really the creation of parallel ministries or 
ministries in waiting. Because even though you have an ARENA government, 
… the public service was still controlled by public service unions which were 
more linked to the FMLN. … [Moreover], during this time … there wasn’t a 
lot of investment in public health, public education, etc … So you had sort of 
a more abandoned sector at that point … You had this sort of paralysis …. 
They were a response to that because the public service unions, including the 
teachers, were aligned with the FMLN.  It’s like they needed a separate 
education ministry … or planning ministry because those ministries – because 
the public servants, even the higher ranking ones, anyone who wasn’t a 
political appointee, had come through a very structured unionized system, and 
so were sympathetic to, or at least nominally sympathetic, to the social 
democratic party, you know Duarte’s government, the farmer. They weren’t 
necessarily sympathetic with the front – FMLN” (INTACT14).  
 
With regard to the international political economic context in which El Salvador was 
nested, that same consultant observed:  
“[FUSADES and FEPADE] were a parallel ministry of planning [and] 
ministry of finance. … So whereas FEPADE  was … nominally linked to the 
business community focused on education, FUSADES was linked to the 
private sector, but in that time it didn’t mean private sector, it meant pro-US. 
…. The support of FEPADE, like I said, it was part of larger strategy in El 
Salvador to promote these parallel sort of government in waiting ministries. 
… Lots of money, lots of development aid went into El Salvador for 
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geopolitical reasons … FEPADE became, you know, to a degree an 
operational arm of [US]AID (INTACT14).  
 
FUSADES and FEPADE, thus, were not only key organizational players through 
which Salvadoran elite and neoliberal thinking were fostered, they also served, 
practically, as “parallel ministries,” through which key planning and analytical tasks 
could be diverted away from the government’s traditional ministries.   
FUSADES and FEPADE served as alternative sites of activity for 
governmental tasks as well as alternative entry points during the late 1980s and early 
1990s through which (neoliberal) reform-minded individuals could transfer to high-
level positions within the government.  Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter seven, 
the Salvadoran Minister of Education from 1990-1998, was first a program manager 
within FEPADE.  Overall, then, not only were these two institutions at the nexus of 
international and national political-economic interests, but they served as “ministries 
in waiting” that entered the government in 1989 with the election of Cristiani.  By 
creating the institutional platforms of FUSADES and FEPADE in the mid-1980s, 
USAID ensured that its agenda and those of the entrepreneurial elite they supported 
would be able to enter the highest of government positions and thus begin the reform 
work for which they had been planning.  
6.6.3 United Nations Organizations and the IDB 
While both the United Nations as well as the IDB would play integral roles in 
the reform and reconstruction of El Salvador from the early 1990s onward (Eriksson, 
Kremer, & Margaret, 2000; Orr, 2001; Rosa & Foley, 2000; de Soto & del Castillo, 
1994), they did not represent significant forces in the context that preceded the 
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initiation of education reform in 1990.  That is to say, while the United Nations (and 
its associated organizations) would be instrumental in the negotiation and 
implementation of the Peace Accords and related programs, and while the IDB would 
extensively fund a wide array of programs in the post-1990 context, the fact is that the 
involvement of these institutions was minimal during the 1980s and into 1990 (Rosa 
& Foley, 2000).   According to its’ archives, the IDB, for example, provided only two 
small loans in the 1980s to El Salvador – one in 1987 for $30,00 which provided 
technical assistance to facilitate the “modernization of the state” and a second in 1988 
for $587,000 for the institutional strengthening of FUSADES. 
United Nations organizations, on the other hand, while not at all active in El 
Salvador prior to 1990, were active elsewhere in the world, and in ways that would 
soon be relevant to education reform there (i.e., in El Salvador).  To be specific, it 
was the work of UNICEF in Bolivia in the second half of the 1980s that would come 
into play in the politics of Salvadoran education reform a few years later.  During 
these years in Bolivia, the country was experiencing the effects of the structural 
adjustment program implemented in 1985 (van Dijck, 1998), and to counter the 
negative effects of austerity multilateral institutions were experimenting with 
emergency social funds (Reddy, 1998).53  Such funds were, at least in part, due to 
                                                 
53 To be specific, emergency social funds have been defined as follows: “Emergency 
Social Funds are intermediary institutions intended to disburse funds from 
governments to public, private, and voluntary implementing organisations in a rapid 
manner so as to meet social protection and other objectives. Their characteristic 
features are that they are multi-sectoral (i.e. they fund projects of a broad variety, 
typically including employment generation, infrastructure development, and social 
service provision), largely demand-driven (i.e. they release funds on the basis of 
proposals from local institutions, municipalities, and non-governmental 
organisations), intended to be transitory (i.e. designed to accomplish specific social or 
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advocacy by UNICEF and others during the 1980s for “adjustment with a human 
face” (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1988). It is in this context in Bolivia that UNICEF 
implemented projects for those most affected by the structural adjustment program – 
for example, projects aimed at literacy for indigenous communities and 
empowerment for mine workers (whose mines had been closed) (Basso, 1987; 
INTACT18).  Both these grassroots programs and the emergency social fund 
implemented in Bolivia received recognition in the development community as 
successes – recognition that would later lend credibility to consultants who 
transferred from Bolivia to El Salvador (Reddy, 1998; INTACT18).  
6.7 World Conference on Education For All 
Internationally, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, much attention was drawn 
to the idea that “participation” was a central component of “good” development 
strategies.  As has been mentioned earlier in this dissertation, by the late 1980s, such 
international institutions as the World Bank had begun to explore how to increase 
client participation in market-based development strategies (Edwards, 2012b), 
USAID raised the issue as a means to promote democracy and the effectiveness of 
public institutions (Montero & Samuels, 2004), and UNICEF sought to pursue 
participation at the grassroots level in order to increase literacy and foment 
empowerment of the disadvantaged (Basso, 1987). In March 1990, the high-profile 
declaration of the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) enhanced this 
                                                                                                                                           
political tasks in a specific period of transition or social strain), and administered by 
autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies specifically created for this purpose. 
Additionally, emergency social funds are often predominantly externally financed.” 
(Reddy, 1998, p. 4).  
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focus on participation by asserting that “partnerships at the community level … 
should be encouraged” because “they can help harmonize activities, utilize resources 
more effectively, and mobilize additional financial and human resources” (WCEFA 
Secretariat, 1990, p. 58, as cited in Bray, 2003, p. 32).  For our purposes, then, 
WCEFA not only elevated the necessity of enrolling all children in school, but did so 
in a way that reinforced the notion that this should be accomplished by incorporating 
community-level partnerships as a primary strategy.  To be sure, this aspect of 
WCEFA would be referenced by multiple parties working on education reform in El 
Salvador, each doing so in order to justify their particular version of participation, as 
will be shown.  
6.8 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I explained both the international political economic context of 
the 1980s as well as the transformation of national political dynamics that occurred 
within and – in large part – because of that international political economic context. 
In so doing, I have also attempted to demonstrate the powerful influence (both 
formally and informally) of such international organizations as USAID and the World 
Bank.  To be sure, by the end of the 1980s, the Cristiani administration was not only 
on the same page as USAID and the World Bank, but was intimately networked with, 
and took a cue from, them – and other neoliberal reformers – with regard to the way 
forward for El Salvador.  Within El Salvador, FUSADES and FEPADE became key 
spaces for the circulation and promotion of neoliberal thinking, both in terms of 
economic and educational policy.  Due to their connectedness, extensive resources, 
and well-respected national and international experts, these organizations would 
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remain primary actors in processes of policy reform into the 1990s.  It is to one of 
those processes – i.e., the process by which EDUCO emerged – to which I now turn 





Chapter 7: Transnational Influence and the Development of 
EDUCO as MINED Policy 
 
In this chapter, I detail the dynamics of the process by which the EDUCO 
program entered governmental policy.  I also explain the ways in which transnational 
influence impacted this process.  In so doing, I provide findings that answer the two 
questions to which this dissertation responds. As will be shown, the overall process 
can be subdivided into multiple stages which span 1988-1995. The process of policy 
formation can be said to culminate with the inclusion of EDUCO in the Ten Year 
Plan, which was finalized in November 1995.  Per the definition utilized in this 
dissertation for IPEPF (International Processes of Education Policy Formation), I 
present findings up to the point at which the TYP was produced, since this is the point 
at which EDUCO entered the government’s official reform strategy.  As is often the 
case, the strategy pursued by a MINED in practice does not necessarily align with or 
reflect the reform policies contained in policy documents.  El Salvador provides an 
instance where this is true, in that EDUCO began in practice long before it entered the 
Ten Year Plan, as will be shown.  
To continue, while I do explain in this chapter the various ways in which the 
development of the EDUCO program was transnationally influenced, further 
discussion of these various transnational forms of influence will also be provided in 
the next chapter.  In other words, the present chapter identifies and explains the 
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influence, while the subsequent chapter critically and comprehensively discusses it 
and the implications which follow. 
In all, I have identified three stages between 1988 – 1995 that characterize the 
development of the EDUCO program as an element of MINED policy.  The first 
stage occurred between 1988 – 1991 and reflected competing ideas of 
decentralization. The second stage took place during 1991 – 1993 and shows how 
EDUCO took root and began to be scaled up.  The third and final stage covered 1993 
– 1995 and led not only to EDUCO’s institutionalization in practice but also to its 
formalization in policy. In each section, in addition to explaining the dynamics of 
interaction of the involved actors and discussing the forms of transnational influence 
which manifest, I also characterize changes in context, as appropriate.  
7.1 Stage One, 1988 – 1991: Competing Ideas of Decentralization 
The first stage in the long process that eventually led to EDUCO being 
crystallized in the Ten Year Plan is two and a half years in length.  This stage begins 
in the lead up to when Cristiani took office in June 1989 and concludes with the 
decision by the Minister of Education to base the reform of the education system on a 
model of community management. In the interim, between late 1988 and February 
1991, what the education reform process reflected was a period in which multiple 
institutions favored different conceptions of decentralization.  I unpack this stage 
below by explaining three sub-periods. 
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7.1.1 Prior to the Election of Alfredo Cristiani 
 In the second half of 1988, various organizations – such as FEPADE, 
FUSADES, and USAID – worked together to explore options for educational reform 
that Alfredo Cristiani could pursue after the elections (MINED, 1999).  As part of 
these efforts, USAID funded a report for FUSADES which was produced by the 
Miguel Kast Foundation, a conservative neoliberal think tank based in Chile and 
named after Miguel Kast, one of the original Chicago Boys who held prominent 
positions as Labor Minister and as Governor of the Central Bank during the Pinochet 
Dictatorship (Gauri, 1998).  That USAID would hire consultants from this think tank 
is not surprising, as Chile during the 1970s and 1980s was promoted by the Reagan 
administration as a model for economic and social reform (Klein, 2007).  Similarly, 
FUSADES and the new business elite in El Salvador looked to Chile for inspiration – 
and even took study trips in 1988 to learn about the economic reforms being 
implemented there (INTACT36). 
The report produced by the Kast Foundation included recommendations based 
on the Chilean experience with education reform (Kast Foundation, 1988).54  For a 
summary of the key Chilean education reforms between 1979-1987, see Table 7.1, 
below.  In short, in the Kast Foundation report, there were three propositions. The 
report suggested (a) that there should be general deconcentration of administrative 
functions to regional or departmental units, (b) that the government should incentivize 
the private provision of education (e.g., by stimulating the creation of private 
education, or by allowing NGOs, funded with public resources, to manage schools),  
                                                 
54 See Gauri (1998) and Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein (2000) for more on Chile’s 
education reforms during the 1980s.  
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Table 7.1: Summary of Key Reforms 
to “Modernize” the Chilean Education System during 1979-1987 






Law of Municipal Revenues of 1979 served as the legal 
foundation for the transfer of schools and primary health 
clinics to municipalities. In Article 38 it declared a new 
municipal prerogative: "[Municipalities] can also assume 
control of services that are being provided by public or 
private sector entities”. Municipal mayors, most of whom 
were military officers, were ordered to assume control of 
educational services. 






A June 1980 decree (a) described the contracts required for 
the transfer of state properties to municipalities; (b) outlined 
the regular audits of municipal finances and subventions 
that the Comptroller General of the Republic, the 
government agency responsible for audits and issues of 
constitutionality, would perform; and, crucially, (c) 
stipulated that personnel working in transferred services 
would have the option of either surrendering their status as 
civil servants, transferring their pension benefits to a private 
pension manager, and receiving severance pay, or remaining 
under the government salary and pension benefit systems 
without receiving severance pay. The severance pay was set 
high enough to win over the support of teachers in the 
transferred schools, enticing almost all of them to enter the 









A decree law of August 1980 established a uniform 
subvention for private and municipal schools. The 
subvention's value was to be tied to an indexed unit of 
account, and would vary according to the costs associated 
with the level of education being taught and the geographic 
location of the school. This decree authorized the 
Corporation for the Construction of Educational 
Establishments, the legal entity that possessed the title to the 
school buildings, to enter into leasing contracts with the 
municipalities for periods of ninety-nine years. 






A September 1980 decree law authorized extraordinary 
payments to municipalities to cover the costs associated 
with the transfer of schools and health clinics. The same 
decree permitted municipalities to delegate the management 
of schools and clinics to subsidiary private corporations. 
The amendment held that municipal governments, "for the 
purposes of the administration and operation of [transferred 
services], will be able to form … together with 
organizations of the community interested in the said 
services, one or more not-for-profit, juridical persons of 
private standing". 
1987 Completion of 
Municipalization 
In 1987 the military government transferred those schools 
that remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education to municipalities. 
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Source: Adapted from Gauri (1998, pgs. 22-25) 
 
and (c) that there should be a voucher system through which parents could choose 
among schools (Kast Foundation, 1988). 
7.1.2 Cristiani’s Election and Three Proposals for Decentralization 
Upon election in 1989, the Cristiani administration immediately turned its 
attention to instituting economic reforms that would allow it to qualify for a structural 
adjustment loan from the World Bank (World Bank, 1995b).  Also in the post-
election period, Cristiani appointed a new Minister and Vice-Minister of education, 
both of whom came from the “hard core” of ARENA (INTACT18).55  By August of 
1990, Cecilia Gallardo de Cano, who had previously worked as an education 
specialist with FEPADE, not to mention with FUSADES and Chilean consultants on 
Cristiani’s proposal for social sector reform, moved from being Vice-Minister to 
being the Minister of Education.  She was not only politically ambitious, but also 
politically savvy, and passionate about education.  It was these traits that helped her 
replace her predecessor, who, while also an integral member of the ARENA party, 
was more of a diplomat than a reformer (MINEDNL21). Importantly, Cecilia 
Gallardo would remain the Minister of Education for eight years.  
 As explained in chapter six, once in office, Cristiani adopted the economic 
and social reform priorities that had been established by FUSADES.  With regard to 
education, FUSADES had, in turn, relied on the proposal put forth by the Kast 
Foundation (Marques & Bannon, 2003).  The result was that Cristiani’s 
                                                 
55 Beyond coming from the “hard core” of ARENA, Cecilia Gallardo had a close 
relationship with Alfredo Cristiani. Their families knew each other well, and he put a 
great deal of trust in Cecilia’s abilities within the Ministry of Education.  
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Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990-94, in addition to stating a focus on 
programs for the rural poor, also called for improvements in the delivery of basic 
social services and “institutional improvements in the overly centralized … [Ministry 
of Education] to gradually decentralize management responsibilities to the regional 
and local levels” (World Bank, 1991c, p. 21).   
With these strategic lines in mind, various international actors began to collect 
data on the state of the education system.  For a summary of the dire state of the 
education system in the late 1980s, see Table 7.2, below.  Additionally, from mid-
year 1990 onwards, these international actors began to offer more specific 
recommendations regarding the form that decentralization would take. Between May 
and September three reports emerged – one each from the World Bank, the Kast 
Foundation, and UNESCO.   
Noticeably, activity around education reform began to pick up steam during 
the time these reports were being produced.  This was for two reasons. First, in April 
1990, the government and the guerillas resumed peace negotiations, led by the United 
Nations, with a seriousness which suggested that an end to the civil war could be a 
possibility.  Second, the World Bank had made it clear since late 1989 that it intended 
to engage with the government of El Salvador to provide a loan for the education and 
health sectors.  Both of these events, together with the publication of the 
government’s Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990-94, prompted involved actors 










Urban population completed 6 years of schooling, while the 
rural population completed only 3.1 years 
 
Population with no education = 30%, rural population with no 
education = 42% 
Enrollment rates Primary (net enrollment): 70% in 1988, in rural areas primary 
enrollment estimated at 60% 
 
Pre-primary: Only 14% of El Salvador's approximately 
600,000 children between the ages of four and six were 
enrolled in pre-school, and almost 90 percent of these children 
were from middle and upper class families 
Access 265,000 children between ages of 7 and 12 lacked access to 
primary education, mostly in rural areas 
 
37% of children ages 7-14 were out of school 
Schools offer few 
grade levels 
66% of the schools offered less than six grades and 29% only 
offered between one and three grades. In rural areas, 82% of 
the schools offered less than six grades and 40% only had 
between one and three grades 
Schools closed/ 
destroyed 
Due to the war, 877 out of 3,000 schools were closed in 1982, 
and 575 remained closed in 1989 
Student/teacher 
ration 
National average = 52 students per teacher; Urban areas = 46; 
Rural areas = 62. In some rural areas, student/teacher ratio of 
over 80 
Teacher salary Real wages fell by over 67 percent between 1968 and 1989; 
Moonlighting was widespread; teachers frequently held not 
just one-two other jobs to maintain their previous income level  
Teacher 
abandonment  
Teachers refused to teach in many rural areas due to on-going 
conflict 
Teacher surplus 6,000 qualified unemployed teachers 
Funding to 
education 
Real public expenditures in education fell by over 40% 
between 1980 and 1988, and remained below the 1979 
expenditure level 
 
As a percentage of the GDP, education expenditures fell from 
3.9% in 1980 to 1.8% in 1989 
 
96% of the MINED’s budget was dedicated to teacher salaries 
Foreign aid Represented 20% of spending on education sector in 1989, 
majority from USAID. IDB, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, and 
OAS provided minor support and technical assistance 




The World Bank’s report appeared first – in May 1990 – and echoed the 
content of the report by the Kast Foundation from two years earlier.  That is, it 
suggested “opening channels for the participation of local levels of government, the 
private sector and NGOs in the delivery of education” (World Bank, 1990, p. 4).  The 
idea was that “the decentralization of school administration and resources to local 
levels of government” could occur through the creation of “non-profit private 
corporations,” also termed “associations of municipalities” (p. 4).  Individual 
municipalities were thought to be too small and did not have the capacity in 1990 to 
successfully or efficiently administer educational services (World Bank, 1990).  
According to the World Bank, these corporations “would be private non-profit 
organizations that would operate under the technical supervision of the [Ministry of 
Education] and under the financial supervision of the Treasury,” in addition to being 
audited by independent auditors (p. 39).  The board of directors of these corporations 
would be composed of the mayors of the associated municipalities, as well as 
representatives of teachers and parents.  
In the second report from 1990, the Kast Foundation built on and further 
detailed its original recommendations from 1988.  They again proposed the following 
actions: Administrative deconcentration to the regional level, empowerment of the 
municipal level to manage education services, the promotion of private schools, and a 
system through which educational subsidies would follow the child – in effect a 
voucher system (Kast Foundation, 1990).  Both the World Bank and Kast Foundation 
proposals mirrored the education reforms of the 1980s in Chile (Gauri, 1998). The 
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primary difference between the World Bank and Kast Foundation recommendations 
related to the question of whether to devolve certain responsibilities either to 
individual municipalities or to groups of them.        
The report by the Kast Foundation was produced during June and July of 
1990. Up to that point, the MINED was on board with the idea of creating a more 
central role for municipal mayors in the governance of education.  Indeed, as of late 
July, internal documents from the World Bank reveal that the MINED’s priorities 
were “largely consistent with … Bank … recommendations.”56  Moreover, the World 
Bank was, at this point, planning to provide technical assistance “for reorganization 
of administrative functions within decentralized departments.”57  
While the World Bank, which did not have a permanent mission in El 
Salvador, was intent on supporting its version of decentralization, the third report was 
being created.  This report was produced at the end of September by a consultant 
from UNESCO – the same consultant who had implemented large scale literacy 
campaigns for indigenous communities in Bolivia a few years prior.  As a consultant 
for UNESCO, she was on a six-month contract in order to produce a report that 
characterized the education system based on data collected in all fourteen 
departments in El Salvador.  Significantly, when the team led by this UNESCO 
consultant went to the countryside to collect data on the state of education services, it 
was the first time that outsiders linked with the government had visited many of the 
rural areas of the country in over a decade.   
                                                 
56 Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, July 27, 1990; IFC; WB 
IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank 
Group Archives.  
57 Ibid.  
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Two aspects of this report stand out in contrast with the reports of the Kast 
Foundation and the World Bank – first, its ethos, and, second, its recommendations. 
With regard to the former, the fact is that, rather than lamenting the centralization of 
the Ministry of Education, the inefficiency of government bureaucracy, and the 
difficulty of firing teachers, this report emphasized the importance of the variety of 
specialists found within the Ministry of Education.  It also called for collaboration 
among all actors and stakeholders in education, in addition to stating that the role of 
teachers and other education personnel should be recognized and optimized 
(UNESCO, 1990).   
In terms of recommendations, the UNESCO consultant based her ideas on 
what she observed in the field.  Not surprisingly, what the team had observed was the 
community provision of education, both within and beyond areas formally controlled 
by the FMLN. In part, what they witnessed were popular education schools; however, 
the phenomenon of community-provided education was not restricted exclusively to 
popular education in FLMN territories – it had also emerged in other areas that lacked 
government-provided services during the war.  That said, the strongest forms of 
community provision and participation were indeed witnessed in those areas 
associated with the FMLN (UNESCO, 1990).  In all cases, what the team witnessed 
were volunteer teachers who were paid by the community either with a nominal 
donation or with the provision of food.  A later report estimated that 1,000 schools 
had community-provided education in 1990 (World Bank, 1991c).  
On the basis of such observations, the UNESCO consultant recommended that 
the government should build on the community strategies which had developed 
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during the war.  She also recommended support at the community level for adult 
education, in order “to create community consciousness about the rights and basic 
educational needs of children” (UNESCO, 1990, p. 98). For her, the empowerment of 
the community level was an important aspect of development, one which the 
government should support. Moreover, she was opposed to the Chilean model.  She 
thought it had been unsuccessful in Chile and that it had no place in El Salvador, 
where there was an organic model of community management that could serve as an 
example of the way forward.  She had always combated the privatization of 
education, and she saw her role in El Salvador as one of resistance to the model that 
the World Bank and others were putting forward.  She strove to “transform the 
strategy … that came from the Bank” (INTACT18).  
In that the UNESCO consultant delivered her report at the end of September, 
it came at an opportune time.  The MINED was then in preliminary discussions with 
education specialists from the World Bank; both sides knew that the plan was to 
approve an education sector loan during mid-year 1991.  Additional pressure to 
decide the direction that education reform would take was generated by the fact that a 
structural adjustment loan with the World Bank was in its final stages of preparation 
and would be presented to the Bank’s board of directors on February 12th, 1991.   The 
immediate relevance for the education system of the structural adjustment loan was 
that it (i.e., the structural adjustment loan) would require guarantees of increased 
funding from the government for this sector.  Education was drastically underfunded, 
and if the government did not increase funding it would not be able in subsequent 
years to absorb and institutionalize new social sector reforms. 
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7.1.3 Countervailing Forces and the Need to Make a Decision 
By October of 1990, a complex context had emerged in which a number of 
(somewhat) countervailing forces were in play.  Although the end result would be a 
decision to pursue a pilot program based on the community participation model 
observed by the UNESCO consultant during her field visits, there are a number of 
factors which must be unpacked to understand this outcome.  These include the desire 
of the government to subjugate FMLN-controlled areas, the anti-union sentiment 
among key actors, the persistent pressure to imitate the example of Chile, the 
confounding actions of teachers’ unions, the political astuteness of the Minister of 
Education, and the need to put in place a project which the World Bank would be 
amenable to financing. I explain the intersection and interaction of these factors in 
what follows.  
To begin, one must recall that the relationship between the government and 
the FMLN was at this point in time – when the conflict was still ongoing – still very 
antagonistic, and would be for many years.  This antagonism had repercussions in 
practice.  As one education specialist who worked with USAID in the early 1990s 
commented:  
They, at times, would sabotage … anything that would get moving forward 
with [the FMLN]. … They would just not be in agreement that part of this 
money [(i.e., international assistance)] would go to them … And that … 
negative response toward the rebels was, you know, sort of like a rich man, 
poor man kind of thing. … If they behave and stay in their place, they’re okay, 
but, if they don’t, then … we need to get rid of them. And she, the minister, 
 225 
 
had that attitude – not to deal with them. … And when it came to the [popular 
education] schools, they wanted them to disappear (INTACT4, p. 15). 
More than wishing to avoid working with the FMLN, the government did not want 
development partners such as USAID implementing programs for them (the FMLN) 
either. Likewise, the government had very low tolerance for those who sympathized 
with the rebels and, in the course of reform, sought to undo the popular education 
system that operated in certain regions of the country.  
 The second issue at the time pertained to anti-union sentiment.  The World 
Bank as well as the government itself sought to break the teachers’ unions, which 
represented 30 percent of all public workers (World Bank, 1990).  In the words of the 
UNESCO consultant working in El Salvador at that time, “Yes, the government in 
that moment, and the MINED, as a subsystem, aimed to decouple and dismantle the 
teachers’ unions. The teaching syndicate was a great force and it applied great 
pressure, pressure that made Cristiani’s government very uncomfortable” 
(INTACT18).  Thus, in addition to overcoming the FMLN, the government sought to 
undermine the unions, which were closely aligned with the FMLN.  
 The third factor is that, in this context, the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the consultants from the Kast Foundation all strongly 
supported the Chilean model, as mentioned earlier. In the words of a senior MINED 
official from that time, “the great pressure of the World Bank, of all the 
organizations, was to decentralization the schools to the municipalities” 
(MINEDNL21).  In addition, even the Minister of Education herself initially intended 
to follow this path, because, ideologically, it was compatible with her worldview and 
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with the goals of the Cristiani administration (INTACT18).  To be sure, not only 
would the Chilean model lead to decentralization at the level of the municipalities, it 
would also engender privatization of public education and serve as a blow to teachers 
because they would be contracted directly by private schools and therefore without 
the job security that accompanied employment with the Ministry of Education.   
However, by October of 1990, the Minister realized that it would not be 
possible to pursue this option.  In large part, this was because of the fourth factor –
i.e., the reaction of the teachers’ unions.  These unions objected strongly to the 
possibility of the Chilean model: “[They] were still strong … they paralyzed 
everything, and they were aggressive,” said a high-ranking MINED official from the 
time (MINEDNL21).  Many of the mayors were intimidated.  Beyond that, mayors 
lacked the capacity to govern education in their jurisdiction due to inexperience and a 
shortage of human resources (MINEDNL21).   
While experiencing this convergence of factors, the Minister of Education 
needed to look for a suitable alternative.   To that end, one member of the UNESCO 
consultant’s team from 1990 recounted the following: “[The Minister] said, suggest to 
me something so that we can get these kids in the system quickly [and] give 
employment to the teachers, but through other mechanisms, not the current 
mechanisms” (MINEDNL19).  The Minister did find an alternative to the traditional 
system – one based in the community models that had been documented in the report 
by the UNESCO consultant at the end of September 1990.  
In a move that would change the course of Salvadoran education reform, 
Minister Gallardo recruited this consultant shortly after the UNESCO report was 
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finalized in order to elaborate the design of a strategy to provide education at the 
preschool and lower primary level (grades 1-3). Between October and December the 
consultant worked with the Minister, showing her that a model based on community 
control could work.  On this point, a member of the office within the MINED that 
coordinated international assistance during 1990 commented the following: “Once the 
Minister sought to create something different, … [the UNESCO consultant] was the 
first person to start the design, the person charged with … bringing EDUCO into the 
world” (MINEDNL2).  
Notably, however, the World Bank was not initially on board with this model. 
The Bank had for at least six months been under the impression that the MINED 
would pursue the Chilean model.  UNESCO’s consultant was able to overcome their 
initial apprehension by relying on her previous experiences and the credibility she had 
amassed as a result. As she says: 
I was coming from working with many communities in Bolivia for years, with 
the poor, with women, with community participation. And, well, we showed 
that it was something that wasn’t going to scare anyone, that they could have a 
high impact with this, and that evidently it was going to increase coverage in a 
proper (propia) and efficient way (INTACT18).  
Beyond the initial idea, however, moving forward required evidence that the program 
could work under the mantle of the MINED. 
 Thus, with minimal funding from UNICEF through its Expansion of 
Educational Services project, the MINED began in December a three-month pilot 
program in six communities (MINED, 1994a).  The key for the MINED was to show 
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that they could create and operationalize the systems and legal protocols necessary for 
communities to form ACEs (Community Education Associations) and to be 
responsible for the hiring, management, firing, and payment of teachers – with the 
funds for payment being transferred from the MINED to the bank accounts of the 
ACEs (MINED, 1995a).  A separate task for the UNESCO consultant and the 
Minister of Education was to overcome the initial hesitation of the government. As 
this consultant recounted: “The Cristiani government was afraid that the program was 
too leftist58 for them, but, quickly, once they began to see the results of the pilot 
experience, the government began to engage with it” (INTACT18).  The point here is 
that the government’s aversion to the program – the design for which had been based, 
in part, on the experience of the popular education schools – started to dissolve once 
it realized that this program allowed the government to accomplish its goal of 
implementing an alternative, decentralized form of management that could weaken 
the teachers’ unions and co-opt through incorporation those areas controlled by the 
FMLN.  
 For many of the same reasons, the aversion of the World Bank was further 
diminished over the course of the pilot program.  Despite the roots of the program 
being based in the experience of the rebels, the World Bank, too, started to see such a 
model as a real possibility once representatives of this institution had the opportunity 
to see it in action.  Indeed, there were two supervisory missions between November 
1990 and February 1991, the purpose of which was to investigate if the pilot operated 
in practice as UNESCO’s consultant had suggested it would (MINEDNL17).   This 
                                                 
58 Leftist here refers to the fact that the model was based on a strategy which emerged 
from FMLN communities. 
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consultant characterized her interaction with Bank staff during these supervisory 
missions in the following way: 
I defended the program a lot on all the missions, always with firmness, with 
technical proficiency. I have training in education and … political science, 
very solid training that allowed me to imagine all possible scenarios and to put 
my back into the questions, the questioning, in such a way that the World 
Bank would have more confidence [in the program] (INTACT18). 
There were two results of these missions and the defense offered by UNESCO’s 
consultant.  First, the World Bank observed, first-hand, that a new and extreme form 
of decentralization was possible in practice.  Second, the World Bank saw an 
opportunity: This model of decentralization shifted accountability dynamics away 
from the central ministry and towards the community, while at the same time offering 
the possibility of instituting cost recovery mechanisms – meaning that parents would 
contribute either in cash or in kind to finance the school.  Cost recovery schemes 
were, in addition to decentralization, one of the themes with which the World Bank 
was primarily preoccupied during these years (Psacharopoulos, Tan, & Jimenez, 
1986).  
 In the scheme of things, important shifts in the intentions of key actors had 
occurred by the end of February 1991.  To be sure, this month constituted a crucial 
moment in the trajectory of education reform in El Salvador.  Although the consultant 
from UNESCO was able to redirect the attention of both the World Bank and the 
Minister of Education, the structural constraints of the moment ensured that no 
program would be successful which departed from the country’s neoliberal trajectory 
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under Cristiani.  Put differently, the Minister of Education and the World Bank 
considered the pilot program to be a legitimate model which could be replicated and 
scaled up not because it empowered the community and not because it engendered 
increased participation, but rather because it fulfilled the exigencies of the moment.  
Indeed, going forward, although the government and the Bank would emphasize the 
participation aspect and the ability of the program to increase coverage in areas where 
government-provided educational services were lacking, the fundamental issue at this 
point in time was that the pilot program represented an avenue through which the 
Cristiani administration, with the support of the World Bank, could attempt to shock 
what it perceived as the overly-bureaucratic and lethargic nature of the central 
ministry of education, create quasi-privatization arrangements at the community 
level, weaken teachers’ unions (since teachers were not eligible to join the unions if 
they worked for the program), and bring the popular education schools under the 
supervision of the government.  In addition, it was thought that the program offered a 
comparatively less expensive way to increase access to preschool and primary 
education, given that funding was not initially provided for creation of school 
structures in participating communities.  For political reasons, these issues 
overwhelmed ideas of community empowerment and the conscientization of adults 
about childrens’ right to education, though the rhetoric around what would become 
the EDUCO program would certainly still draw on such ideas.  
 Concretely, then, by February 1990 the Minister of Education had decided 
that she would bet on community management of education.  Given the larger context 
and the forces in play, she knew that community management represented the best 
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option for success. Scaling up such a program provided her with an opportunity to 
make a name for herself.  She could set the MINED down a new path, one which 
represented innovation and which resonated with the worldviews and prerogatives of 
key governmental staff and World Bank representatives.  If this program succeeded, 
her profile would be raised within the ARENA party, and she would be eligible for 
more prominent governmental positions. Many interviewees attested that she sought a 
successful and high profile career for herself.  In terms of the overall process, 
however, the point here is that both the Minister of Education and key representatives 
of the World Bank were on board with pursuing community management of 
education.  As will be shown, after this point, and thanks to the overwhelming 
support of the World Bank, community management of education would be set on a 
completely different trajectory. 
7.2 Stage Two, 1991-1993: EDUCO Takes Root 
 A great bit of activity occurred around the program for community 
management of schools from March 1991 to June 1993.  This activity can be divided 
into four groups, with each group of activity occurring more or less in chronological 
order.  To be specific, I will detail, first, the negotiation of the first World Bank 
education loan, second, the rapid implementation and expansion of the program for 
community management, third, the negotiations between the government and the 
popular education teachers, and, fourth, how the program increasingly drew attention. 
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7.2.1 The World Bank Social Sector Rehabilitation Project 
 During the beginning of March 1991 representatives of the World Bank were 
in El Salvador to appraise the MINED’s proposal for the Social Sector Rehabilitation 
Project (SSRP).  This is the loan for which the World Bank and the government had 
been preparing for nearly a year. In appraising and discussing the community 
management strategy, the Bank suggested that the approach be called EDUCO, or 
Education with Community Participation. By this time, the World Bank was excited, 
if somewhat tentative, regarding this new, previously untested approach. As one 
member of the World Bank team working in El Salvador recalled, “We thought 
EDUCO was the ultimate way of decentralization” (INTACT12).     
The Minister of Education was equally enthused, and having committed to 
pursuing education reform through community-management, she sought large 
quantities of funding to put this strategy into action.  The World Bank, though, had its 
doubts about the MINED’s capacity at that time. As a result, the Bank insisted on a 
lower loan amount, in order to ensure that the program would be manageable.  To that 
end, a key World Bank team member stated:  
The Minister wanted a lot of money … there were so many demands. They 
wanted a lot of money to solve all the problems that they had. … And she was 
not pleased with the things that I was cutting because … the capability was 
very low. And I tried to convey to her this message: Much better for us to do 
something that is focused, that has impact, than to do all kind of things. I told 
her, I said, “listen, Cecelia, if we … really implement a very tight and well-
done project, later we are going to get money from every place.” And this 
happened. (INTACT12) 
 
In the end, rather than issuing a loan for $46 million, as the Minister had requested, 
the World Bank included $10.3 million for education in the SSRP.   
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Table 7.3, below, summarizes the funding issued by the World Bank during 
1991-1995 for the reform of the education system. To put these loan amounts in 
perspective, the total government budget for education in 1992 was approximately 
$109 million (MINED, 1994b).  Moreover, 96 percent of this amount was dedicated 
to teacher salaries (MINED, 1999), meaning that the MINED could not use its own 
funds for experimentation or expansion.  
Table 7.3: Summary of World Bank 



























Notes: *Figures in this column represent funding 
negotiated from World Bank.  Total amounts for each 
loan surpassed these figures; contributions of other 
organizations and counterpart funding from government 
not are included here. **Note that these figures are 
conservative, as the EDUCO program benefitted from 
other project components and the funding designated to 
them. ***An additional $37.3 million was contributed by 
the Inter-American Development Bank under the Basic 
Education Modernization Project (BEMP). 
****Represents actual funding; initial funding expected 
to be allocated to EDUCO under BEMP was $12.5 
million. 
 




Over the course of negotiations for the SSRP, which culminated in May 1991, 
many other recommendations and requirements would emerge.  Indeed, my archival 
research for this dissertation revealed that a series of agreements, assurances, and 
conditions were attached to this loan; they have been summarized in Table 7.4, 
below. We see that, in addition to obtaining agreements around formative evaluations 
and cost recovery, as well as assurances around staff selection and the 
implementation of a communication campaign, the World Bank also made the loan 
conditional on the following: (a) World Bank approval of the national budget for 
education for 1992 (not to mention assurances regarding increased funding in 
subsequent years) and (b) the creation of a clear legal basis for teachers to be 
managed by ACEs.  The World Bank also required that participating communities 
must be accessible to Bank staff on its supervision visits – visits which occurred 
between one and three times annually during the life of the SSRP.  In all, there would 
be nine supervision visits between July 1991 and February 1996, the majority lasting 
from 4 to 10 days (World Bank, 1997a).  
The government took action in response to these conditions.  First, according 
to internal Bank documents from mid-1990, the government provided the Bank 
assurances that it would increase public spending in education from 1.6 percent of 
GDP in 1991 to 2.7 percent in 1994.59  Between 1991-1996, the government more 
than doubled the MINED’s budget, though in real terms spending held constant 
(World Bank, 1997a).  Separately, the President, Alfredo [continued after table] 
                                                 
59 Memorandum, Jean-Jacques de Saint Antoine to Alfred Heron, March 7, 1991; 
IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World 
Bank Group Archives. 
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Table 7.4 – Agreements, Assurances, and Conditions related to the World Bank 
Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (1991-1996) 
Agreements  
1.  Evaluations: The MOE would (i) submit terms of reference for the formative evaluations 
of the community operated school programs, no later than six months after project 
effectiveness; (ii) submit, no later than March 31 of each year during project implementation, 
the results of the respective formative evaluations; and (iii) prepare action plans including a 
timetable for implementation and implement such action plan. 
 
2. Cost Recovery: The criteria for selection of communities to benefit from the pre-primary 
and primary education programs under the proposed project would include counterpart 
contributions (in cash, kind or labor) equivalent to at least 10 percent of the resources 
provided by the MINED.  
 
Assurances  
1. Communication Campaign: The Government would present to the Bank for review an 
action plan for purposes of promoting and disseminating information about the community 
operated school program and timetable for implementation by December 31, 1991. 
 
2. Staff Selection: At negotiations, assurances were obtained that Project Coordination Unit 
staff, with qualifications, experience, functions, and terms of employment satisfactory to the 
Bank, would be maintained. 
Conditions  
1. National Education Funding: Prior to effectiveness, the Government will consult with the 
Bank regarding the 1992 budget before its presentation to the National Assembly, to assure 
the Bank that additional resources for pre-primary and primary education will be available.  
 
2. Legal Framework: The President and the Ministry of Education would approve norms and 
procedures ("reglamento") to regulate implementation of community operated schools 
including eligibility criteria for CCG, satisfactory to the Bank, and would furnish to the Bank 
evidence of contracts (convenios) with 27 community groups. 
 
3. Legality: The government would present legal opinion assuring there are no legal 
impediments for community groups to hire teachers and administer schools.  
 
4. Auditors: The Government would prepare, satisfactory to the Bank, terms of reference to 
be used by the auditors for the auditing of community operated schools. 
 
5. Community Access: Loan proceeds would not be disbursed in municipalities which would 
be inaccessible for purposes of project implementation and supervision according to Bank 
assessment. 
 
6. Loan Disbursement: Loan proceeds would not be disbursed for any project activity carried 
out by a community group unless such community group has signed a contract (convenio) 
with the MOE. 
Source: World Bank (1991c) and World Bank Group Archives.60 
                                                 
60 Memorandum, Kye Woo Lee to Mirna Lievano de Marques, March 15, 1991; IFC; 




Cristiani, issued a decree which ensured that the EDUCO program operated on the 
basis of unambiguous legal terrain.  This presidential decree was issued on June 17, 
1991, just two days before the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved the SSRP 
(MINED, 1994b). 
The above-mentioned agreements, assurances, and conditions pertain, 
primarily, to foundational elements of the EDUCO program, such as counterpart 
funding and legal framework.  What these stipulations did not encompass were the 
specific actions to which funding from the World Bank was to be dedicated.  
Nevertheless, given that 96 percent of the MINED’s budget was consumed by teacher 
salaries, the SSRP provided the government with the resources necessary to fund 
reform actions – actions which I discuss in the following section.  
7.2.2 EDUCO’s Rapid Implementation and Expansion 
 As part of SSRP negotiations, the UNESCO consultant who inspired the 
community management pilot became the coordinator of the EDUCO Project Office 
within the MINED.  Over time, this office, which was located directly under the 
Minister of Education, would serve as the mechanism through which MINED 
leadership would leverage reform – i.e., “modernization” – of the entire education 
system.  Such leverage would be possible because of the success of this office in 
widely implementing a program that was seen as highly innovative.  To that end, 
three elements were key to this program’s success in practice, in addition to the 
                                                                                                                                           
Bank Group Archives; Memorandum, Michelle Riboud to Shahid Hussain, May 2, 
1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, 
World Bank Group Archives. 
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Minister’s political commitment and the World Bank’s funding. These elements 
were: (a) The scale of EDUCO’s implementation, (b) technical assistance from the 
World Bank, and (c) the EDUCO communication campaign.  
 With regard to the first element, the staff of EDUCO’s office worked 
assiduously during 1991-1993 to implement the program. Initially, the program was 
targeted to about 80 communities, though it was quickly scaled up to 236, primarily 
in three departments. These departments were, not surprisingly, in the heart of FMLN 
territory (World Bank, 1991c).61 As Table 7.5, below, indicates, during 1991-1993 
the EDUCO program more than quadrupled in terms of the number of participating 
ACEs, teachers, and students.  Table 7.5 also shows that, by 1993, enrollment in 
EDUCO represented the equivalent of 10.2 percent of the student population in 
traditional public schools between preschool and grade four.  As can be seen, these 
upward trends would continue, and by 1995 EDUCO would serve the equivalent of 
26.7 percent of students in those levels (preschool-grade four) in public schools.  
Table 7.5 – Growth in EDUCO Program, 1991-1995 
Year ACEs Teachers Students EDUCO enrollment as % of Traditional 
Public Enrollment for Preschool through 
Grade 4 
1991 236 263 8,416 4.2%* 
1992 845 1,009 32,288 8.5% 
1993 871 1,311 41,952 10.2% 
1994 1,334 2,316 74,112 17.6% 
1995 1,341 2,918 113,664 26.7% 
*This figure represents the enrollment in EDUCO as a percentage of preschool 
through grade 6 enrollment in traditional public schools; data are not available by 
grade level for the public sector for 1991.  
Source: MINED (1992, 1995a, 1995d).  
 
                                                 
61 To be specific, the departments to which EDUCO was targeted under SSRP were 




In terms of timing, the table above also indicates that EDUCO not only had 
been created but was rapidly expanding before the Peace Accords were signed in 
January 1992.  Put differently: Before much of the country had even experienced 
peace, let alone the opportunity to engage in education reform, the World Bank and 
the MINED had already negotiated and begun to implement a new form of education 
governance.  This new form of governance was the central prong of reform for the 
education system, and was, as will be shown, non-negotiable in the post-war period.  
In practical terms, the expansion of the EDUCO program was an intense task, 
given that its coordinating office during stage two only contained three staff, the 
coordinator and two other functionaries.  They dedicated themselves to the 
operationalization of the program, which required the development, testing, and 
revision of a number of administrative processes, such as the creation of thousands of 
bank accounts and the approval of bank transfers from the MINED to ACEs.  In 
addition, as can be seen in Table 7.6, below, the augmentation of the EDUCO 
program entailed not just the formation of ACEs at the community level, but also a 
range of other tasks, such as training for EDUCO supervisors and ACE members, not 
to mention an on-going communication campaign.  By 1993, the program reached all 
fourteen departments, and the MINED started the process of deconcentrating to its 
three regional offices those tasks related to technical assistance for EDUCO 
communities. Respectively, the years 1991-1993 represent periods of 
experimentation, implementation, and expansion.  An indication of Bank satisfaction 




Table 7.6 -- Summary of EDUCO Program Actions by Year, 1991-1995 
Year Characterization Actions 
1991 Experimentation   - Pilot project with 6 schools 
- Creation and revision of bureaucratic processes  
- Establishment of legal basis for ACEs 
- Negotiation of loan with World Bank 
- Implementation of program in three departments  
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and for ACEs  
- Definition of roles for MINED staff 
- Execution of communication campaign to sensitize 
communities, stimulate interest, and assuage fears of 
teachers’ unions 
1992 Implementation - Preparation of technicians to promote EDUCO 
- Identification of communities for program 
- Creation of new EDUCO sections 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs 
- Improvement of bureaucratic processes 
- Reception of World Bank supervision visit 
- Execution of communication campaign 
- EDUCO begins to receive international study delegations 
1993 Expansion - Expansion of EDUCO in all 14 country departments 
- Deconcentration of technical assistance to three 
administrative regions of the country 
- Regional offices assume responsibility for program 
expansion 
- Increase in EDUCO program budget to expand its central 
coordination unit personnel  
- EDUCO identified by Minister as central mechanism 
through which to increase enrollment and modernize the 
entire MINED going forward 
- Creation of libraries in EDUCO schools 
- Reception of World Bank supervision visit 
- Execution of communication campaign 
1994 Appropriation - Salvadorans assume leadership of EDUCO office 
- Delegation of financial management to regional offices 
- Rapid incorporation of communities into EDUCO 
- EDUCO program begins expansion through grade 6 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs 
- Execution of communication campaign 
- Reception of World Bank supervision visit 
1995 Institutionalization - Integration of EDUCO office responsibilities into structure 
of MINED 
- Negotiation of new loan with World Bank 
- Rapid incorporation of communities into EDUCO 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs 
- Execution of communication campaign 





on the basis of program accomplishments, the former (World Bank) saw and referred 
to the achievements of the latter (MINED) as “magnificent work.”62 
While the staff of the EDUCO office performed the tasks listed in Table 7.6, it 
should be noted that the World Bank also contributed technical assistance, 
particularly during its supervision visits.  According to staff from the EDUCO office 
during its early years, representatives of the World Bank came and wanted to see 
results.  One staff person mentioned that “the World Bank doesn’t play” – that 
beyond review of statistics and reports, they also wanted to visit some of the 
communities where EDUCO was being implemented, to see if it was working as 
reports suggested (MINEDNL17).  
 Apart from observation, however, World Bank staff were interested to 
eliminate any obstacles to the program’s success.  For example, they were interested 
to resolve issues around the delayed payment of teachers, since this caused 
frustration.  Moreover, and interestingly, upon noticing that teachers would transfer 
from EDUCO to traditional schools as soon as they had the opportunity, the World 
Bank also stipulated that EDUCO teachers should receive additional financial 
incentives63 in order to encourage them to remain in the program.64 More generally, 
however, with regard to World Bank technical assistance, a long-time education 
                                                 
62 Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, August 3, 1992; IFC; WB 
IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 2; 1121342, World Bank 
Group Archives. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Although EDUCO teachers were paid less than traditional teachers, by 1995 the 
MINED began to offer a monthly bonus of $40 for rurality to EDUCO teachers. With 
this bonus, EDUCO teachers made, on average, 7 percent more than teachers in 
traditional schools (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010).  Initially, according to World 
Bank documents, EDUCO teachers at the preschool level were to be paid $160 per 
month (World Bank, 1991c).  
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specialist with the MINED who worked with the EDUCO program early on 
explained:  
In the 1990s, this country advanced in education like few countries in the 
world have. … It’s because the World Bank guaranteed that the country was 
going to meet its commitments, and because they monitored us very closely. 
… We were here with constant visits from World Bank people … from the 
[Team Leader] and her army – at times there were up to twelve consultants 
and they came to see the finances, the accounting, the audits, the curriculum, 
the training, the evaluation system, the technology, etc. (MINEDNL19).  
 
Representatives of the World Bank were, thus, clearly invested in the success of the 
EDUCO program.    
 Similarly, the World Bank sought to develop interest on the part of education 
stakeholders in El Salvador – both at the community level and within the teachers’ 
unions.  They did this by including financing in the SSRP for a communications 
campaign.  While exact figures for this campaign from the SSRP are not available, 
documents show that, in the second World Bank education loan (discussed in more 
detail in a section below), $1.3 million was included for the communication strategy 
(Basaninyenzi, 2011).   As the World Bank team leader for El Salvador would later 
recount, “At the beginning of the project, a big effort was made to persuade people of 
the benefits of the EDUCO education reform program and minimize the propaganda 
of the opposition groups,” particularly “teachers unions and members of the guerrilla 
movement” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, pgs. 2, 4).   
The communication strategy itself contained three prongs.  First, staff of the 
MINED engaged in awareness raising campaigns (campaña de socialización) at the 
local level in which they held workshops and went to communities to explain what 
EDUCO was and to begin to create ACEs (MINEDNL13, MINEDNL14).  Second, 
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the MINED disseminated information through multiple mediums. They created radio 
programs, hosted televised discussions, made informational videos, and, in particular, 
utilized the newspapers, where interviews with the Minister of Education would be 
published (INTACT18, MINEDNL21).  Newspapers were an especially valuable 
outlet for information on EDUCO because the MINED was able to publish weekly 
reports in the Sunday edition, which had a “short journal annex with information on 
the progress of projects and the results of enrollment by region” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, 
p. 3).  Figure 7.1, below provides an examples of how the EDUCO program was 
announced in newspapers.  
The third and final prong of the communication campaign involved direct 
interaction between World Bank staff and opposition groups.  For example, the task 
team leader from the World Bank engaged in conversations with teachers unions and 
the FMLN members (Basaninyenzi, 2011).  As this task team leader has said: “I held 
very open and frank discussions about the development and plans of the Ministry,” 
and, though “the negotiations with these opposition groups took a long time, … they 
finally succeeded in persuading these groups that most parties shared the same goal – 
providing education to the poorest communities” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, p. 2).   
In the end, due to such public relations victories, the World Bank perceived 
that the communication campaign was a success.  In their words: “The 
communication interventions made an impact on stakeholder relations, including 
those originally opposed to EDUCO” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, p. 3). It should be noted, 
however, that not everyone was persuaded to join EDUCO; a few communities in 
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FMLN strongholds opted to remain independent, thus seeking other sources of 
funding for their schools in order to preserve their autonomy (ADES, 2005).  
Figure 7.1: Newspaper Experts from the EDUCO Communication Campaign 
 
Source: MINED (1994a, p. 22).  
 7.2.3 Government Negotiations with Popular Education Teachers 
 In relation to the above point, it should be mentioned that the MINED, 
without the World Bank, engaged in negotiations with the popular teachers as the 
EDUCO program was being scaled up.  At the end of 1991, in anticipation of 
negotiations in the post-war period, popular education teachers in departments such as 
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Morazán and Chalatenango, among other areas, began to collect information about 
the popular education teachers (LOCACTNM1). During negotiations, which began 
sporadically in 1992, the popular educators communicated with the MINED through a 
few grassroots organizations,65 as well as through the public school teachers’ union, 
which supported the cause of the popular teachers (Hammond, 1997). 
 Through negotiations, popular educators wanted, both, to keep their autonomy 
and to be recognized by the MINED (Hammond, 1997).  That is, the coalition of 
approximately 1,000 popular educators, which served approximately 13,500 students, 
did not wish to abandon the parallel system that they had developed in the preceding 
years (Alvear, 2002).  At the same time, however, they wanted their status as teachers 
and the educational attainment of their students to be accepted by the MINED. They 
also desired governmental funding.   
The response of the MINED was to offer funding only if the communities 
accepted the EDUCO program.  The MINED also required that the popular education 
teachers attain their teaching certificates in order to be eligible for a position either 
with EDUCO or within a traditional school. In practice, this meant that that if 
communities accepted government funding, they would be abandoning the approach 
of popular education  
According to Hammond (1997), during 1992-1993, the MINED stalled when 
it came to offering, or even approving, equivalency courses so that popular educators 
                                                 
65 Examples of these grassroots organizations include the following: Trustees for the 
Development of the Communities of San Miguel and Morazán (Patronato para el 
Desarrollo de las Comunidades de San Miguel y Morazán), the Association of 
Communities for the Development of Chalatenango, and the Educational Coalition of 
El Salvador (Concertación Educativa de El Salvador).  
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could work towards their teaching certificates (Hammond, 1997).  While Hammond’s 
(1997) research was in Chalatenango, other research done in neighboring Cabañas 
(ADES, 2005) found that the MINED did in fact recognize the high-school 
equivalency classes taken by the popular education teachers.  Even in the latter case, 
however, it should be noted that the process of attaining the minimum teaching 
credentials required about ten years for the popular teachers (ADES, 2005).  Due to 
the low initial levels of education, these teachers had to complete a high school 
equivalency and then attend university classes on the weekends while working 
fulltime (as teachers who were unrecognized by the MINED and who were 
compensated minimally through donations from community members and NGOs).   
It is only because of the scholarships and funding provided by local and 
international NGOS and USAID, as well as by universities from Spain, that these 
teachers were able to complete this process, as the MINED was not forthcoming with 
resources for this effort.  Similarly, it is only because of contributions made by NGOs 
and the Catholic Church that a few communities were able to resist the EDUCO 
model long enough such that they could wait to hire their own popular education 
teachers, once they attained the required credentials (ADES, 2005). Indeed, most 
communities where the popular education approach had been implemented joined 
EDUCO before that could happen due to dire financial circumstances; they needed 
the MINED’s resources in order to continue to fund their school. 
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7.2.4 Increasing Attention to EDUCO: International Delegations and 
Dissemination 
 On an international scale, and unlike with the popular education communities, 
the EDUCO program experienced increasingly positive attention once word got out 
about it.  Indeed, during stage two, as news of the EDUCO program and its success in 
implementation circulated within and beyond the Central American region, the 
MINED not only began to receive international delegations but it was also asked to 
send representatives to other countries to speak about the program.   
With regard to the former (i.e., international delegations), the first occurred in 
September 1992. The Minister of Education of Guatemala, who was also in the 
process of negotiating a loan with the World Bank (and following the conclusion of a 
civil war there, no less), contacted the Salvadoran MINED to arrange a study tour.66  
This would be the first of many international study tours to examine the EDUCO 
experience.  To be sure, the data collected reveal that other governmental study 
groups came in subsequent years from Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, 
Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, and Thailand, as well as additional study groups from 
Africa, the Caribbean, and Europe.  
Furthermore, interviews revealed that the World Bank played a key role in 
financing these study trips, which was not an unusual practice at the time. An 
education specialist from the World Bank explained this with reference to El 
Salvador:  
                                                 
66 See Poppema (2009) and Gershberg, Meade, and Andersson (2009) or more on 
Guatemala’s version of community-managed education, which was adapted from the 
EDUCO model.  
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They had an open door for delegations to come and learn about the EDUCO 
program. The bank was actually instrumental when we were able to finance or 
support countries from other continents to come and do study programs for 
different programs – Colombia to look at Escuela Nueva, El Salvador to look 
at EDUCO, Brazil to look at Bolsa Escola. So, for a long period, the Bank 
facilitated those exchanges. Of course, for delegations to come into a country, 
the local authorities, the local MINED had to have an open-door policy, which 
was the case of El Salvador. Again the difference of El Salvador, and I want 
to stress that, is that they presented their model without packaging it, but just 
allowing those delegations that would come from Thailand, Bangladesh, 
African countries to be able to absorb the principles, some of the lessons 
learned, to be able to develop their own school based management with 
community participation programs. But, yes, I think for a while El Salvador 
became a common place for foreign delegations to come to learn about 
community participation in management of schools (INTACT34). 
 
A combination of factors thus raised EDUCO’s profile internationally – these being 
the MINED’s openness combined, first, with World Bank financing and, second, with 
an example of reform that was taking root on the ground in El Salvador.  By the late 
1990s, the MINED reported that it had received more than twenty such delegations 
(MINED, 1999).  
 The MINED’s own role in promoting EDUCO went beyond accepting 
delegations, though.  Indeed, MINED representatives themselves went to numerous 
other countries. Interviewees mentioned that, over time, they were sent by the World 
Bank to such countries as Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Spain, and the United States.   
One key functionary, who worked with the EDUCO program early on, and for 
many years, mentioned that she would eventually “know all of Latin America … and 
a great part of the world because of EDUCO” – about 25 to 30 countries in all 
(MINEDNL8).  According to her, “people wanted to know how it was possible that 
illiterate rural people could manage, could hire, could fire teachers, how it was that 
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the poor could be interested in school. That is was people had a hard time 
understanding” (MINEDNL8).  More recently, in 2011, this same interviewee was 
sent by the World Bank to Afghanistan to discuss the EDUCO model.  For the World 
Bank, such Salvadoran education specialists have played a key role in EDUCO’s 
promotion. In the words of the above-mentioned interviewee, “I helped a lot with the 
community theme. When people [(i.e., governments)] were scared to give money to 
the parents, I helped to make the school boards and transfer the funds to the schools 
… in many places” (MINEDNL8).  This Salvadoran education specialist served as 
reinforcement when officials in other countries were reluctant.  
To continue, informational trips disseminated the EDUCO model while also 
reinforcing the EDUCO model at home.  From the perspective of MINED 
representatives, these trips were not only inherently desirable for the ability to travel 
to other countries, but they also served as status symbols and created jealousy.  This 
was because, in the words of the UNESCO consultant who coordinated the EDUCO 
program, staff within the MINED saw the World Bank as the “paradise” to which 
they wanted to arrive – a paradise that might be attainable by working with the 
EDUCO program (INTACT18).  While very few MINED staff would be able to work 
for the World Bank as a result of the EDUCO, what the years after 1993 evinced was 
an even more central role for this program within the broader reform of the 




7.3 Stage Three, 1993-1995: EDUCO’s Institutionalization and Formalization 
 On the basis of the actions and accomplishments of stage two, both the 
MINED and the World Bank dedicated themselves to continuing with the expansion 
and institutionalization of EDUCO in stage three.  This would be the period during 
which EDUCO would shift from being the preferred education governance 
mechanism of the MINED in practice to being the official mechanism of the MINED 
as reflected in policy.  The MINED strategy document that would in fact officially 
incorporate community level decentralization was the Ten Year Plan, which would be 
finalized in November 1995.  
Stage three thus extends from mid-year 1993 through the end of 1995. As will 
be shown, two separate processes manifested in stage three – one through which the 
World Bank and the MINED engaged to reinforce EDUCO and institutionalize it as 
the foundation of the education system, and another, more public process through 
which USAID and other organizations would engage, also along with the MINED, in 
order to discuss areas of education reform not directly related to the governance of the 
system. At the last moment – and in ways that will be detailed – these two processes 
dovetailed.  
In order to explain stage three, I unpack a range of issues across four sub-
sections.  In the first section, I address the larger context of public sector 
modernization. In the second, I briefly detail five separate developments from 1994. 
In the third, I discuss the second education loan from the World Bank. And in the 
fourth section, I review and problematize the relationship between EDUCO and the 
more formal and public process of policymaking which occurred during 1993-1995.  
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7.3.1 Public Sector Modernization and EDUCO 
 In 1993, while EDUCO was sailing along and gaining attention, preparations 
were being made for another structural adjustment loan from the World Bank, this 
one for $75 million. Just like the first one of these (which spanned February 1991 – 
June 1993), the second one would also focus on neoliberal economic reform; the 
difference is that the second one would seek “a comprehensive public sector 
modernization effort” (World Bank, 1996, p. i).  According to World Bank 
documents, public sector modernization had been a policy priority for President 
Cristiani since his election in 1989, though he was not able to give priority to this 
issue until 1993, presumably due to the demands of the Peace Accords and the 
numerous actions that were being implemented in accordance with the first structural 
adjustment loan (World Bank, 1996).  
In practice, this second structural adjustment loan, together with the technical 
assistance that accompanied it, focused on the privatization, decentralization, 
debureaucratization, and restructuring of governmental ministries.  It also meant the 
elimination of the Ministry of Planning (World Bank, 1993).   The other element of 
note to emerge from the technical assistance which accompanied the structural 
adjustment loan was the Public Sector Modernization Action Plan.  Not only was the 
basis of this Action Plan created by World Bank technical assistance but, just as had 
happened with FUSADES and President Cristiani plan for economic and social 
reform, the Action Plan provided a “foundation for the incoming Government [of 
President Armando Calderón Sol] to develop and implement a Public Sector 
Modernization Program” (World Bank, 1997b, p. 15).  
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Thus, in late 1993 and early 1994, in the lead-up to the election of ARENA’s 
candidate, Armando Calderón Sol, who took office in June 1994, the focus on 
government-wide modernization had implications for the education sector.  This was 
particularly so because the Ministry of Planning (before its elimination) declared that 
“one of the strategic priorities in the modernization of the public sector should be to 
technicize, debureaucratize, and decentralize systems of financial management, 
public investment, and governmental control” (MINED, 1994a, p. 27).  In the 
education sector, EDUCO fit the bill – and, as such, efforts around its amplification 
and institutionalization would only strengthen, both on the part of the MINED and the 
World Bank.  The largest action to that end would come about in early 1995, when 
the MINED would negotiate its next education loan with the World Bank.  However, 
in the interim, that is, during 1994, there were a number of relevant developments that 
must be detailed. I discuss these briefly in the next sub-section.  
7.3.2 Developments around EDUCO during 1994 
 Five developments stand out during 1994.  The first was the decision by the 
Minister of Education that the expansion of education in rural areas would only be 
permitted through EDUCO. Not surprisingly, this decision occurred in the context of 
heightened attention to government-wide modernization, explained above.  The point, 
to reiterate, is that, with regard to the education system, EDUCO aligned with the 
push by the government and the World Bank to “modernize” the public sectors.  
The second development was the departure of the UNESCO consultant as the 
coordinator of the EDUCO program.  Her exit occurred not only because there was 
increasing jealousy around the program’s management, but also because it was 
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undesirable to have an international consultant managing the MINED’s key program.  
For these reasons, the Minister of Education decided to place EDUCO under the 
leadership of one of the Salvadorans who had experience with the program.  
Third, the capacity of the EDUCO program office was expanded through the 
doubling of its’ staff from three to seven.  Additional capacity was necessary to 
accommodate the growing size of the program.  By 1994, there were 1,334 ACEs, 
2,316 teachers, and 74,112 students in the program – and it would only continue to 
expand.  In that respect, 1994 was the first year that EDUCO schools began to 
educate students in grade four. 
Fourth, the World Bank made clear its intentions of using the EDUCO 
program as a model for the nation.  It did this in a mid-1994 study in which it stated 
that – pending the outcome of a first quantitative evaluation – it would prepare “a 
strategy for expanding the program as the preferred delivery system for pre-primary 
and primary education in all rural areas in the next five years” (World Bank, 1994b, 
p. 43).  That same study mentioned that EDUCO could possibly be adapted to urban 
areas. 
 Fifth, just before the end of the year, the World Bank produced a cursory 
evaluation. This evaluation was mentioned in the first public World Bank report to 
overview the EDUCO program (World Bank, 1994a).  According to this report, the 
cursory evaluation of the EDUCO program showed better first and second grade 
mathematics test scores for students from EDUCO schools, when no controls were 
used (World Bank, 1994a).  Though the positive effects of EDUCO disappeared when 
background controls were applied, the findings still garnered significant attention, 
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especially within the World Bank and the MINED (INTACT35). With this report in 
hand, preparation for the next education loan proceeded in earnest.  
7.3.3 The World Bank Basic Education Modernization Project 
 While the government had doubled the budget of the MINED between 1991 
and 1994, it sought additional funds and technical assistance from the World Bank in 
order to continue to expand the EDUCO program (MINED, 1994b).  To that end, a 
second World Bank education loan was put together in early 1995.  The project that it 
financed was known as the Basic Education Modernization Project (BEMP), and it 
(the loan) would eventually provide an additional $17.5 million to support EDUCO 
(World Bank, 2002).  Among other things, the resources from this loan would be 
directed at scaling up the program through grade six and creating 3,000 new ACEs 
(World Bank, 1995c).  
 As with the SSRP, the World Bank obtained agreements and assurances in 
relation to the BEMP, as well as attaching conditions.  Notably, however, the 
agreements, assurances, and conditions established for BEMP did not relate to the 
EDUCO program.  Whereas the first education loan – SSRP – focused on EDUCO, 
the second one was preoccupied with other reforms within the MINED, such as the  
consolidation of multiple departments in order to streamline administrative processes.  
The EDUCO program was already entrenched and doing well.  As such, the role of 
the BEMP with regard to EDUCO was to ensure that sufficient funding and technical 
assistance were provided for its continued augmentation countrywide and its 
integration to the other administrative departments within the MINED.   
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7.3.4 A Separate, Public Process of Education Policy Formation 
 It should stand out by this point that the findings presented in this chapter, 
while they have detailed the birth, expansion, and institutionalization of EDUCO, 
they have not discussed any formal policymaking processes.  To that end, through the 
research conducted for this dissertation, though I found that there was a more public 
and formal policymaking process which took place during 1993-1995, it seems to 
have performed more of a symbolic function – and, as such, seem to have had very 
little bearing on EDUCO’s trajectory.  That said, it should be noted that the education 
strategy document produced during 1993-1995 did officially make the governance 
strategy which EDUCO represented a key priority.  I will explain this below, in 
addition to summarizing and commenting on this parallel policy formation process.   
Others’ research reveals that, between late 1993 and late 1995, there were four 
events and sub-processes that led to the finalization of the Ten Year Plan (Guzmán, 
2005; MINED, 1999; Reimers & McGinn, 1997).  They can be summarized in the 
following way:  
1. Education Sector Assessment (October – December 1993): A USAID-
funded education sector assessment was carried out by international and 
local consultants and was simultaneously discussed by a pluralistic 
advisory committee of key actors from across the Salvadoran political 
continuum (Reimers, 1995).  The advisory committee not only helped to 
inform the on-going research but was also important because it helped to 
build the relationships and consensus that would later facilitate the 
finalization of the resulting education strategy.  The process of conducting 
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both the sector assessment and the dialogue of the advisory committee 
were led by the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) in 
conjunction with the Central American University (UCA) – a private, 
Jesuit institution – and FEPADE.  
2. Promotional Workshops (January 1994): HIID, UCA and FEPADE 
conducted workshops on results of the sector assessment with key groups 
of governmental, educational and private-sector stakeholders in the 
country.  For the rest of the year, an inter-institutional promotional 
committee (“comité dinamizador”) comprised of individuals from 
influential political and technical organizations (including unions, private 
universities, NGOs, and the MINED) continued to share the study with 
stakeholders from the education sector who would be integral to 
developing and implementing changes in policy that resulted from the 
study. 
3. National Commission on Education, Science, and Development (October 
1994 – June 1995): President Armando Calderón Sol (who took office in 
June 1994) appointed a diverse group of twelve high profile educational 
actors to the National Commission on Education, Science, and 
Development (hereafter, National Education Commission), which spent 
seven months developing a vision for the reform of the education system 
(Comisión Presidencial, 1995).  
4. Consultative Forum (January 1995): With financing from USAID and 
administrative support from FEPADE, the aforementioned inter-
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institutional promotional committee organized a final “consultative 
forum” attended by over 200 people from a wide range of institutions, 
including the National Legislative Assembly, teachers’ unions, donor 
organizations, women’s groups, community-based NGOs, universities and 
the MINED, among others, in order to share and receive feedback on both 
the education sector assessment as well as directions for education reform 
in general (MINED, 1995b).   
5. Education Strategy Finalization (November 1995): The MINED finalized 
and published the Ten Year Plan, taking into account the sector 
assessment, the process of consultation, and the report of the National 
Education Commission.  The five objectives of the Ten Year Plan were to 
improve educational quality; to increase the efficiency, efficacy and equity 
of the education system; to expand coverage; to create “new modalities of 
service provision”; and to strengthen “teaching of human, ethical, and 
civic values” (MINED, 1995c, p. 11).  
During these two years, an enormous amount of time and energy was 
dedicating to conducting these events, performing research, and soliciting feedback.  
Upon review, however, it is striking that the EDUCO program was almost entirely 
overlooked.  It was barely mentioned in the education sector assessment, and not at 
all in the report of the National Education Commission. Where it was mentioned, for 
example, in the consultative forum, discussion tended to pertain to how better to 
incorporate it into the MINED, not whether or not it should be a central strategy for 
the provision and governance of education.   
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When I asked an education specialist familiar with the EDUCO program how 
it was that this program ended up in the Ten Year Plan, she simply informed me that, 
within the MINED, the people who were responsible for creating the Ten Year Plan 
were the exact same people who favored EDUCO (NATACTNM1). Thus, from an 
insider’s perspective, it was not – and should not be – surprising that EDUCO (or, 
more specifically, the strategy that it represents) featured prominently in the Ten Year 
Plan.  EDUCO had key supporters in the MINED, and these supporters influenced 
those priorities which would be crystallized in the Ten Year Plan.  
Most relevant for our purposes, however, is the fact that that EDUCO did not 
enter this more formal and public process of determining priorities for education 
reform until the finalization of the Ten Year Plan – that is, in November 1995. 
Moreover, when it did become part of the MINED’s official strategy, its 
manifestation was veiled.  That is to say, while the MINED called for 
decentralization, increased community participation, and “new modalities of service 
provision,” it did not single out EDUCO specifically (MINED, 1995c).  Scholars 
have referred to this phenomenon as internalization – when national actors remove 
traces of transnational influence in order to enhance their legitimacy before their 
stakeholders (Spreen, 2004).  
Nevertheless, the point here is that, by including these priorities in the 
MINED’s education strategy document, it created an official policy document 
through which EDUCO had been incorporated, if only symbolically.  The principles 
and approach which EDUCO embodied had finally been crystallized in a document 
which, at least nominally, represented the priorities that would guide the MINED for 
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the ensuing ten years.  As such, though the implementation of EDUCO would 
continue for many more years, the IPEPF that generated EDUCO can be said to have 
concluded at this point.  
Having explained the process by which EDUCO evolved and entered MINED 
policy, I now turn to a further discussion in the next chapter about mechanisms of 




Chapter 8: Discussion of EDUCO’s Development and 
Transnational Influence  
 
 In the preceding chapter, I provided a detailed account of the development 
EDUCO during 1988-1995. In the present chapter, I continue by focusing more 
squarely on the mechanisms of transnational influence that were in operation, as well 
as the implications of the combination of these mechanisms for education reform in 
El Salvador more generally. I break this discussion down into two sections.   
In the first, I briefly summarize the process by which EDUCO developed and 
then delve into a detailed assessment of those mechanisms which the findings in 
chapter seven brought to the fore.  In my assessment of these mechanisms, I begin by 
highlighting those mechanisms which were contained in the analytic framework 
which I presented in chapter four (the analytic framework based on the work of Dale, 
1999, and Samoff, 2009). I then continue my assessment by reflecting on the 
implications of my findings regarding EDUCO’s development for the analytic 
framework itself.  That is to say, point out those mechanisms that appeared to be in 
operation in EDUCO’s development which are not currently suggested by the 
dominant frameworks for understanding mechanisms of transnational influence.  
In the second part of this chapter, I move from considering mechanisms 
individually to considering them together.  Stated differently: I will contemplate the 
effects that resulted from the simultaneous and sequential operation of numerous 
mechanisms.  These implications will then be juxtaposed with a discussion of the 
importance of the role of local and national actor agency.  Finally, I will conclude this 
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section by placing emphasis on the development of the national context itself, for 
mechanisms do not operate in a vacuum and must be considered in relation to the 
nature of the context in which they are received. 
8.1 The Development of EDUCO and Transnational Influence 
We have seen how transnational influence was pervasive in the case of 
EDUCO.  To that end, Figure 8.1, below, is a causal network which visually depicts 
the evolution of institutional relationships and process dynamics in relation to 
EDUCO’s development. Also below is Table 8.1.  This table is a timeline of the 
critical events associated with EDUCO’s development.  As such, it is a companion to 
Figure 8.1.  Together Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1 convey the most essential aspects of 
EDUCO’s development between late 1988 and late 1995. Both Figure 8.1 and Table 
8.1 are meant to anchor the discussion that follows, and will be referenced as 
appropriate.  
8.1.1 Summary of EDUCO’s Development 
In chapter seven, the dynamics depicted in Figure 8.1 were broken down into 
three stages.  I briefly summarize these three periods in order to contextualize a 
discussion of the implications of transnational influence.  To start, the first period 
(December 1988 – February 1991) not only began with a change of administration at 
the highest level of Salvadoran government, but was also characterized by the 
presence of multiple conceptions of decentralization. [Paragraph continues after 





Source: Author.  
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Table 8.1: Critical Events Timeline of EDUCO’s Development 
Stage One: December 1988 – March 1991: Competing Ideas of Decentralization 
1988 
 FUSADES takes study trip to Chile to study governmental reforms 
December USAID, FUSADES, and FEPADE explore options for education reform in 1989, after 
the presidential election. USAID funds report by Kast Foundation, from Chile, for 
FUSADES. This report recommends deconcentration, municipalization, privatization, 
and vouchers 
1989 
June Crisitani administration assumes enters government, produces a Socioeconomic 
Development Plan 1990-1994 which calls for MINED decentralization 
November World Bank indicates intention to provide a loan to the education and health sectors 
1990 
May World Bank report and recommendations published which echo Kast Foundation’s call 
from 1988 
July Kast Foundation produces another report for FUSADES, reiterating recommendations 
based on Chilean model 
August Reform-minded and ambitious minister of education from FEPADE is appointed 
September Report by UNESCO consultant recommends building on community management 
experience which resulted from the civil war 
October – 
December 
(a) Government wishes to subjugate the FMLN; (b) key political actors harbor anti-
union sentiment; (c) pressure felt by MINED to follow Chilean example from World 
Bank, Kast Foundation, and USAID; (d) Minister of Education must “innovate” by 
pursuing non-traditional reform; (e) municipalization not possible due to teachers’ 
unions actions and insufficient capacity of mayors; (f) World Bank looking for an 
acceptable project of finance; and (g) UNESCO consultant pushes for model based on 




Structural Adjustment Loan I approved by World Bank; 
Pilot project for community management of education financed by UNICEF; 
MINED and World Bank both buy-in to idea of community-managed schools 
Stage Two: March 1991 – June 1993: EDUCO Takes Root, Scaled Up 
March-
May  
Negotiation of World Bank’s Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, used to scale up 
EDUCO 
1992 
January Peace Accords signed 
MINED negotiations with popular education teachers begin; they continue into 1993 
Ongoing Rapid amplification of EDUCO, World Bank technical assistance, communications campaign, study tours by foreign ministries of education begin, international 
dissemination of EDUCO experience begins 
Stage Three: July 1993 – November 1995: EDUCO Institutionalized and Formalized 
1993 
July Structural Adjustment Loan II negotiated, focuses on public sector modernization. 
World Bank drafts government modernization action plan for incoming President 
Calderón Sol 
1994 
January  The MINED announces that it will only increase access to education through EDUCO 
June The World Bank makes clear its intention to use EDUCO as a model for the nation 
1995 
February 
– March  
The World Bank appraises its next education loan, the Basic Education Modernization 
Project (BEMP), which provides resources to continue to scale up EDUCO 
September BEMP approved by Bank Board 
November Ten Year Plan (TYP) finalized. The TYP states that the governance model represented 
by EDUCO is a key priority for education reform during 1995-2005. 
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Noticeably, the World Bank and the Kast Foundation were advocating for 
decentralization-oriented reforms which, while not identical, were both based on the 
model of reforms implemented in Chile in the 1980s.  Such reforms would have 
implied three actions: (a) a shift in responsibility for education to the municipal level, 
(b) privatization through the creation of for-profit non-governmental education 
service providers, and (c) the creation of a voucher scheme.   
Just as these institutions were advancing these concepts, a UNESCO 
consultant began to strongly argue for a form of decentralization which would be 
based on the experience of the community management of education which emerged 
during the civil war due, in part, to a lack of government-provided services.  As 
explained in chapter six, for many (though not all) communities, the education that 
they provided to their students in this context was based on the approach of popular 
education, which tended to be associated with those areas of the country where the 
FMLN had strongholds. In all, there were about 1,000 communities across El 
Salvador that had secured a teacher for their children, both within and outside FMLN 
areas, without assistance from the national government.  
Due to pressure from teachers’ unions, combined with a lack of mayoral 
capacity at the municipal level, the Minister of Education could not pursue the 
strategy being advocated by the World Bank and the Kast Foundation.67  This is 
                                                 
67 According to Montgomery (1995), ARENA experienced a “victory in the 1988 
legistlative and mayoral elections” (p. 213).  In the 1991 municipal elections, 
ARENA won 181 municipalities while the next largest party – the Christian 
Democrats – won 70 (Montgomery, 1995, p. 223). The outcome of both elections 
would indicate that political affiliation did not influence the decision of the Minister 
of Education not to pursue the municipalization strategy.  
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reflected in Figure 8.1 by the X has been placed over the word municipalization. The 
other option at the time was that being suggested by the UNESCO consultant.   
Despite the fact that this latter strategy originated from an educational 
approach primarily, though not exclusively, associated with the rebels, the Minister 
came to see that a reform program based on this model would be acceptable.  This 
was because it allowed her to meet the expectations to which she was subject – 
namely, that she pursue a reform strategy that would “innovate” by engaging with 
non-traditional arrangements for the provision of education services.  At the time, 
pursuing a non-traditional strategy meant selecting one that would both circumvent 
the central bureaucracy of the MINED and weaken the teachers’ unions, which 
represented a major oppositional force within the country.  Ultimately, by building on 
and, to be sure, modifying the governance model that desperate and/or rebellious 
communities had implemented during the civil war, the Minister of Education was 
able to meet these requirements.   
This strategy would also debilitate FMLN communities. By setting teacher 
certification requirements for popular education teachers for which they would 
require numerous years to fulfill, the MINED also ensured that FMLN communities 
and their approach of popular education would be co-opted to join the regular 
education system.  Indeed, in the post-war period, as international assistance to the 
conflict-affected areas and the NGOs that worked there diminished, those 
communities which were associated with the FMLN and which followed a popular 
education approach joined the EDUCO program in order to receive funding from the 
government.  Without such funding, the majority of communities could not sustain, 
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let alone improve the quality of, their education. But governmental funding came 
along with teacher requirements that popular education teachers could not 
immediately meet.  As such, not only were these communities forced by their 
circumstances to join the EDUCO program, but they were also required to hire 
teachers other than those that had worked previously in their communities during the 
civil war.  
At the outset, however, the seeds of EDUCO were contained in a pilot 
program organized by the UNESCO consultant and funded by UNICEF. This 
program was possible due, in late 1990, to the Minister of Education’s amenability to 
seeing if the model of community management could work in practice.  On the one 
hand, the pilot program of six schools showed that such an arrangement could work if 
managed by the MINED; on the other hand, the conviction and persistence of the 
UNESCO consultant won over the staff of the World Bank, who previously were 
convinced that municipalization would be the best option.  To be sure, World Bank 
staff watched the pilot program closely, due to their initial skepticism regarding its 
feasibility.  
Just like the MINED, however, once the World Bank realized that the 
community-management model aligned with its interests (see sections 2.2.1 and 7.1.3 
for more on this), it pursued it vigorously.  That is to say, once representatives of the 
World Bank’s task team working in El Salvador were on board, they saw that the 
community-management model represented a form of education governance that 
would allow them to experiment with an extreme form of decentralization. 
Importantly for them, not only would this form of decentralization be centered on the 
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community level, but parents would be formally responsible for hiring and firing 
teachers.  For the World Bank, this was the most appealing aspect of what would 
become the EDUCO program – more so than concept of efficiency or effectiveness, 
as I will discuss further in a section below (INTACT30).  Here, the point is that the 
World Bank was attracted to the possibility of weakening teachers’ unions and 
reducing the monopoly of the State, for this resonated with what had been a decade’s 
worth of World Bank thinking, thinking that was explained in chapter two of this 
dissertation.  
With regard to EDUCO’s development in El Salvador, however, the second 
stage began in earnest in May 1991, once both the Minister of Education and the 
World Bank were committed to pursuing the community management model.  
Fundamentally, this stage was about ensuring that the EDUCO program had not only 
the legal and institutional foundation that it needed but also the financial and 
technical resources to ensure that it could be scaled up quickly.  Noticeably, these 
reforms began in January 1992, a full year before the signing of the Peace Accords, 
though during a period of reduced conflict.  
In the third stage (July 1993 – November 1995), the rapid expansion of the 
EDUCO program continued.  There was no doubt about the centrality of this reform 
to the efforts of the MINED during this time, as the Minister of Education made it 
clear that the EDUCO program would, from them on, be the only option for 
expanding coverage in the rural areas of the country.  Despite the fact that EDUCO 
became the mode through which public education services were provided to much of 
the country, the cost of implementing the program was born by the community 
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members themselves.  Parents in disadvantaged rural communities were asked to 
assume responsibilities traditionally borne by the State, and without compensation.  
In addition, community members were expected to provide the time, labor, and 
materials either to construct or maintain their local school – and this was in addition 
to the informal school fees they already incurred to cover basic costs associated with 
schooling.   
During this stage, it was of note that the legitimacy of the EDUCO program 
was never truly in doubt or challenged.  Though teachers’ unions and many FMLN 
communities were initially opposed to the program, the steadfastness of the Minister 
of Education and the World Bank ensured that its implementation and expansion 
proceeded.  Similarly, though a range of issues were discussed during the formal, 
two-year process of policy formation that occurred in El Salvador between late 1993 
and late 1995, the incorporation of the EDUCO program into the MINED was never 
really questioned.  Along the way, a few teachers raised concerns about various 
aspects of the program during the national consultation, but by that time the 
commitment of the Minister of Education had already been solidified.  Community-
level decentralization thus entered the TYP (Ten Year Plan) at the end of 1995 as one 
of the four main priorities for system-wide education reforms going forward, a reform 
which would continue to grow and serve as a cornerstone of the Salvadoran education 
system for many years to come.  
8.1.2 Transnational Influence in EDUCO’s Development 
In chapter seven, in the summary provided above, and in Figure 8.1, it is clear 
that numerous forms of transnational influence were at play in relation to the EDUCO 
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program.  While the above summary of EDUCO’s development glossed over the 
various forms of transnational influence which manifested, I discuss them in detail 
here.  Subsequently, I will discuss their implications for theory. 
  For a summary of each mechanism of transnational influence during 1988-
1995 in relation to the development of EDUCO which will be discussed, see Table 
8.2, below. In discussing the content of this table, I will provide commentary on each 
of the mechanisms; after doing so, I will also reflect on their significance for the 
predominant analytic frameworks used to assess the operation of transnational 
influence in relation to national education systems.  These frameworks are those 
elaborated by Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009), both of which were previously 
discussed and then combined in chapter four.  In that chapter, see Box 4.1, where I 
defined 14 separate mechanisms of transnational influence.  In Table 8.2, below, I 
invoke those same mechanisms, where appropriate, to label the forms of influence 
present in relation to EDUCO’s development, as can be seen in the third column.   
It should be noted, however, that not all of the mechanisms listed in Table 8.2 
have been suggested previously by Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009). This is because 
the findings from chapter seven of this dissertation indicate that there are additional 
mechanisms of transnational influence through which education reform at the national 
level was affected in El Salvador.  In my discussion of transnational mechanisms, I 
begin by focusing, primarily, on the manifestation of those mechanisms which 
scholars (i.e., Dale and Samoff) have suggested previously.  Then, in the latter part of 
my discussion, I dedicate more attention to highlighting the additional mechanisms 




Table 8.2: Summary of Transnational Influence in Relation to EDUCO’s Development 
No. Instance(s) of Transnational Influence in relation 
to Development of EDUCO 
Associated Mechanism(s) of 
Transnational Influence 
1 Circulation of international rhetoric around 
participation, decentralization, Education For All, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, etc. 
Dissemination, International 
Events 




3 UNESCO consultant implements the pilot program Technical Assistance 
4 UNICEF funding for pilot program; World Bank 
funding for EDUCO program 
*Financial resources 
5 Chicago Boys elaborate Socioeconomic Development 
Plan 1990-1994 for Cristiani administration; World 
Bank staff draft the Public Sector Modernization 
Action Plan for the Calderon Sol administration 
Technical Assistance 
6 Guidance from World Bank to MINED on amount of 
education loan for Social Sector Rehabilitation Project 
Technical Assistance 
7  Support in designing administrative processes; 
identifying communities to participate; creating 
training manuals and implementing training; 
correcting problematic procedures; etc.  
Technical Assistance 
8 Loan requirements to increase education sector 
spending, introduce legal framework for EDUCO 
program, etc. 
Conditionalities 
9 Agreements and assurances secured by World Bank 
from MINED at loan negotiations regarding program 
evaluations, cost recovery, staff selection, etc.  
Loan-Related Actions 
10 Communications campaign to raise awareness about 
EDUCO, secure buy-in from oppositional actors, and 
create demand for the program 
Dissemination 
11 Supervisory visits by the World Bank Loan-Related Actions 
12 Passion, enthusiasm, dedication, and persistence on 
the part of World Bank staff regarding EDUCO’s 
possibility, example, and success 
*Transnational Excitement 
13 Delegations of foreign officials participate in study 
tours to El Salvador to learn about the EDUCO 
*Transnational Excitement, 
International Events 
14 Salvadoran MINED staff travel abroad to share the 
experience of the EDUCO program 
International Events 
15 Creation and support of FUSADES and FEPADE, 
both new, national-level institutional actors 
*Intermediary Organization 
16 Economists in FUSADES and government (e.g., 
Minister of Finance) previously worked with key 
international organizations, namely the World Bank; 
the coordinator of the EDUCO project office in the 
MINED transferred from UNESCO 
*Policy Entrepreneur Transfer 
17 Persistent presence of the World Bank *Global Reach 
Note: * indicates that the mechanism is being suggested here, and was not present in the analytic 
framework presented in section 4.4 of this dissertation.  
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, mechanisms of transnational influence drawn from Dale 




As chapter six of this dissertation made clear, there were numerous examples 
of how actors and ideas from elsewhere influenced the course of events in El 
Salvador.  Some of the mechanisms at play were dissemination, technical assistance, 
international events, conditionalities, and loan-related actions. Below, I briefly 
comment on the examples related to EDUCO that can be associated with each 
mechanism: 
Dissemination: The mechanism of dissemination was activated repeatedly. 
With regard to the process that produced EDUCO, it began when the Kast Foundation 
produced a report in which it recommended a model of education system reform 
based on Chile.  Dissemination then continued when the World Bank did the same.  
The UNESCO report, though it advocated for a model based on the Salvadoran 
experience of community-based management, also constitutes and example of 
dissemination because it spread information on Education For All and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child – both of which the report mentioned and invoked as 
justifications for the path of reform it suggested.   
Moreover, it is important to recognize that the buzzwords (e.g., participation, 
decentralization) and international rhetoric found in the reports of the Kast 
Foundation, World Bank, and UNESCO did not circulate on their own.  That is to 
say, institutional actors enabled and promoted dissemination through technical 
assistance and international events.  In this way, the mechanisms reinforce one 
another.   
 271 
 
As a final comment on dissemination, we saw in the case of EDUCO that 
dissemination also occurred at the sub-national level.  That is to say, World Bank 
representatives purposively engaged in dissemination across El Salvador.  It did this, 
first, by financing a communications campaign to spread favorable coverage of 
EDUCO and, second, by meeting directly with the oppositional groups.  
Technical assistance:  The mechanism of technical assistance was also in play 
at various points.  As mentioned above, through the technical assistance offered by 
international actors, certain recommendations made their way into key reports.  
Separately, technical assistance was integral when, for example, the Chicago Boys 
worked directly with FUSADES to define the priorities that would serve as the basis 
for the Socioeconomic Development Plan of President Cristiani.  A similar example 
occurred in 1994, when World Bank staff drafted the Public Sector Modernization 
Action Plan for the administration of President Calderón Sol.  Technical assistance 
also played a key role in the elaboration of the loan requirements targeted at 
bolstering the EDUCO program, as well the operationalization of the pilot program 
and the EDUCO program itself.  Indeed, without the technical assistance of 
international actors, it is unlikely that the idea of basing education reform around the 
community-level would have arisen, let alone succeeded, considering the antagonism 
felt between the central government and FMLN communities, as well as the limited 
capacity which characterized the MINED in the early 1990s.  
International events: The mechanism of international events was present in 
two primary ways.  On the one hand, there were the delegations of foreign MINED 
officials which traveled to El Salvador to study EDUCO’s example; on the other 
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hand, representatives of the Salvadoran MINED traveled abroad to share the 
experience of EDUCO.  Importantly, both of these types of international events were, 
in the context of El Salvador, financed by the World Bank in order to spread 
knowledge of this new type of decentralization and to increase demand for its 
replication.  As the mechanism of international events demonstrates, financial 
resources themselves are crucial.  To that end, I will later suggest that financial 
resources should be understood as a separate mechanism.  
Conditionalities: This mechanism, which has received much attention over the 
years for its ability to act as a lever of imposition, also impinged on the case of 
EDUCO in El Salvador.  As explained in chapter seven, the World Bank drew on this 
mechanism for two reasons: First, in order to ensure that the MINED would increase 
its funding to education in the coming years and, second, in order ensure that an 
unambiguous legal footing existed upon which to base the program.  For other, less 
fundamental issues, the World Bank chose to activate different mechanisms (e.g., 
other loan-related actions, discussed below).  However, out of a recognition of the 
importance of constructing a solid foundation for this program, the Bank elected to 
rely on its most blunt mechanism for influencing the actions of national governmental 
actors. 
Loan-related actions: Loans documents from the World Bank often contain 
more than one type of mechanism.  This was true in the case of El Salvador.  In 
addition to conditionalities, there were a series of “agreements” and “assurances” 
recorded in the education loans.  These pertained to the implementation of a 
communications strategy and cost recovery mechanisms at the community level, not 
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to mention staff selection and the conduct of program evaluations.  Though these 
loan-related actions carry less weight than conditionalities, they do explicitly indicate 
to the borrowing government the expectations of the World Bank.  In addition, by 
entering into these agreements and by providing such assurances, the recipient 
MINED is placed – literally – in the debt of the World Bank, which ultimately 
decides if sufficient progress is being made on project implementation.  To that end, 
the final loan-related action of note was the regular supervisory trips performed by 
World Bank staff to monitor progress and address any shortcomings.  In this way, one 
sees how the mechanisms of loan-related actions and technical assistance worked 
together to enhance the influence of the World Bank.  
While the findings of the present dissertation revealed the operation of the five 
mechanisms explained above, they were not the only ones to affect EDUCO.   The 
above examples of transnational influence, rather, were those that accord with the 
mechanisms which have been identified previously by scholars – namely, Dale (1999) 
and Samoff (2009). In what follows, I discuss other mechanisms which emerged 
during analysis.  
8.1.3 Implications of EDUCO for Mechanisms of Transnational influence 
As Table 8.2, above, indicates, the other mechanisms present during the 
evolution of EDUCO were financial resources, transnational excitement, intermediary 
organization, policy entrepreneur transfer, and global reach. Below, I will explain 
what these mechanisms are and how they operated in relation to EDUCO. I will also 
suggest that these mechanisms should be considered for incorporation into future 
analytic frameworks for understanding transnational influence.  
 274 
 
Financial resources: The first mechanism I would like to highlight here may 
also be the most basic.  Indeed, it may come as a surprise that I would suggest the 
need to mention financial resources as a separate mechanism, particularly given the 
emphasis that researchers often place on the importance of loans in influencing 
education reform (especially in developing countries). That said, it stands out to me 
that the two primary scholars who have written on transnational influence (Dale, 
1999, and Samoff, 2009) do not discuss this mechanism in isolation, as they do in the 
case of loan conditionalities and other loan-related actions. 
In the case of EDUCO, while we see that loans, and the mechanisms 
associated with them, are important, this is not the same as suggesting that financing 
can operate as stand-alone mechanism.  On one hand, financing often does come in 
the form of loans, which are themselves associated with conditionalities, agreements, 
assurances, supervision, and a host of administrative requirements; on the other hand, 
it is not uncommon for financial resources to be provided in the form of grants, 
particularly in development contexts.  A prime example of this in the case of EDUCO 
would be the financing that UNICEF provided to fund the pilot program on which 
EDUCO would be based.  Similarly, USAID, among many other bilateral 
organizations, provided large sums to the MINED in the form of grants for education 
reform (MINED, 1999).  For these reasons, I suggest that provision of financial 
resources be considered its own mechanism in terms of the transnational influence.  
Transnational excitement:  The mechanism of transnational excitement 
repeatedly emerged in the data that I collected.  As mentioned in chapter seven, the 
passion, enthusiasm, commitment, persistence, and attention to detail that the staff of 
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the World Bank exhibited was infectious.  Cumulatively, this excitement affected the 
staff of the MINED and the seriousness with which they took the EDUCO program.  
It also led to jealousy and competition, for the staff within the MINED knew that 
those who worked with this program would be given preferential treatment; they 
would be first in line for a promotion.  It should be noted, though, that the World 
Bank was not the only actor to contribute to the mechanism of transnational 
excitement.  The fact that international delegations came from many countries to 
study EDUCO’s example reinforced the excitement.  
Though many projects are financed by international organizations, I would 
suggest that few have been the subject of the kind of intense and sustained attention 
that EDUCO experienced beginning in the early 1990s. Importantly, such excitement 
on the part of international actors can serve to build or sustain motivation and 
momentum at the national level.  This can be important – from the perspective of 
those who would wish to advance a particular kind of reform – especially when the 
reform context is not especially propitious.  With this in mind, I suggest here that it 
may be useful to be aware of the operation of this mechanism in future research.  
Intermediary organizations: Perhaps one of the most important mechanisms to 
affect education reform generally and the development of EDUCO specifically was 
the creation of intermediary organizations.  As I explained in chapter six, USAID 
took specific steps during the early-to-mid 1980s to facilitate the creation of both 
FUSADES and FEPADE.  Later, and in ways were discussed in chapter seven, both 
of these organizations were integral to the reform context.  To be sure, the creation of 
FUSADES and FEPADE was part of a wider strategy aimed at promoting a specific 
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strand of the Salvadoran elite.  This strand not only tended to be associated with the 
new business sector but was also pro-U.S. and favored the neoliberal policy reforms 
(in the economic and social sectors) that were being advocated by USAID, among 
other organizations, such as the World Bank and FUSADES.   
In the context of El Salvador during the mid-1980s, the importance of these 
organizations is better understood if we recall that the presidency at the time was 
occupied by Duarte’s social democratic party.  USAID thus facilitated the founding 
of FUSADES and FEPADE in order to create spaces in which both Salvadoran and 
international policy entrepreneurs (see subsequent discussion) could operate.  By 
fostering and coordinating with FUSADES, USAID was able to contribute to 
ensuring that its preferred candidate – Alfredo Cristiani – would assume the 
presidency in 1989.   
Even after the presidential elections, however, FUSADES and FEPADE 
remained active and influential.  FUSADES continued to act a key node in the circuit 
that connected El Salvador with international reform trends.  For its part, FEPADE 
remained at the forefront of education reform and education projects that benefitted 
the business sector.  Moreover, as mentioned in chapter seven, the Salvadoran 
Minister of Education during 1990-1998 first worked as an education specialist with 
FEPADE. 
Based on the integral and instrumental role that these organizations played, it 
seems that it would be useful to consider their creation and operation as a key 
mechanism of transnational influence. With regard to future research, it may also be 
productive to look for the presence of this mechanism in other reform contexts.   
 277 
 
Policy entrepreneur transfer: This mechanism is similar to one which has been 
previously identified by Samoff (2009) – namely, national actor recruitment and 
socialization. In the latter case, however, international organizations recruit actors 
from various countries – developed and developing – to work with the organization 
and help it advance its agenda.  In the case of policy entrepreneur transfer, however, it 
is the international organization that supplies a particular actor to another 
organization for the purpose of advancing an agenda or policy that is favored by the 
former.   
There are three examples of this which stand out in the present research.  In 
two cases actors transferred from the World Bank to positions in El Salvador.  In the 
first instance, an economist from the World Bank took a sabbatical in order to assume 
a position with FUSADES, which, as mentioned above, was significant because this 
organization worked closely with the government to establish the direction of policy 
reform.  In the second instance, an economist from the World Bank left this 
institution and assumed the important role of Minister of Finance (Hacienda).  The 
importance of this latter actor was clear during my interviews with key MINED staff 
from the early 1990s.  As they indicated to me, the Minister of Finance was a strong 
supporter of EDUCO who had no problem approving funding increases to this 
program, which he saw as an example of positive governmental reform.  The third 
case of policy entrepreneur transferred occurred when the UNESCO consultant 
became the coordinator of the EDUCO project office, a key position which she 
maintained for long enough (2.5 years) to create a solid foundation for the program. 
Thus, while scholars have pointed out previously how international organizations 
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absorb and leverage national actors to their advantage (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006; 
Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & Johnson, 2006), I suggest that a mechanism of which we 
should also be aware is policy entrepreneur transfer, through which international 
actors are deployed to other (typically national) organizations to enable certain 
reforms.  
Global reach: This is the final mechanism that I wish to discuss in relation to 
the period 1988-1995.  With this mechanism, I would like to draw attention to the fact 
that exercising one’s global reach – or global presence – can act as a form of 
influence.  For organizations, global reach allows them to stay plugged into political 
changes and reform opportunities as they arise in various countries.  It may be said, 
then, that the mechanism of global reach is one which organizations such as the 
World Bank engage consistently in order to seek out and remain aware the emergence 
of policy windows or favorable reform contexts.   
At the national level, the influence of the global reach mechanism occurs as a 
result of the presence and/or involvement of international actors in those processes 
and actions which may (at least initially) pre-date the execution of reform.  In these 
situations, the global reach of particular actors may induce actors from the local and 
national levels to react to their presence or participation. The primary function of this 
mechanism, however, is to ensure that international actors continue to remain abreast 
of important opportunities at the national level and across the globe.   
The words of a long-time World Bank education specialist speak to this 
mechanism in relation to the EDUCO program. He said:  
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EDUCO – the Bank did not invent EDUCO. The Bank saw it, and had a 
person in the right place at the right time – look at it, brought it to the Bank, 
the Bank study it, analyze it, learn what it was, and once we were comfortable 
with it, push it. It’s not the way you think. It’s not that we have the “semilla 
germinal” (original idea) – no, because we are, like the holy spirit, almost 
everywhere. Many times, we have the right people in the right place at the 
right time, and we take advantage of it (INTACT35, interview 2). 
Aside from indicating the value of the mechanism of global reach, what these words 
also indicate is that, in practice, this mechanism works in tandem with others which 
assist the World Bank in “pushing” a particular reform idea.  
8.2 Multiple Mechanisms of Influence, the Agency of Local and National Actors, and 
the Climate of Reception 
 To this point, I have primarily focused on individual mechanisms of influence. 
What I have not yet done, however, is consider these mechanisms together.  Nor have 
I incorporated an assessment of the importance of local and national actor agency.  I 
attempt to address both of these issues here, in addition to examining issues around 
the initial development of the overall climate of reception in El Salvador.  
8.2.1 Multiple Mechanisms of Influence  
In the preceding two sections, I discussed a total of 10 mechanisms of 
transnational influence. To summarize, these were dissemination, technical 
assistance, international events, conditionalities, loan-related actions, financial 
resources, transnational excitement, intermediary organizations, policy entrepreneur 
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transfer, and global reach. While it is useful for our knowledge of EDUCO’s 
development to discuss the specific mechanisms of transnational influence, it is also 
necessary to place the net effect of the combination of these mechanisms into 
perspective, noting that some influences are stronger than others and not all are 
pushing in the same direction.  
 To that end, we can be sure that EDUCO would not have developed in the 
way that it did were it not for the operation of multiple mechanisms, and in a 
particular order. First, USAID facilitated the creation of FUSADES and FEPADE. 
Second, these intermediary organizations then served not only as spaces for the 
dissemination and circulation of reports by international actors, but also as spaces 
through which to promote a Salvadoran elite which would move into government and 
which concurred with the preferences of the dominant international organizations 
operating in El Salvador at the time.  This local elite, either as staff of FUSADES and 
FEPADE or as officials within the government, then served as a counterpart to the 
technical assistance provided by the World Bank, the Kast Foundation, and 
UNESCO.  Via the mechanism of global reach, the World Bank was able to remain 
aware of early developments within El Salvador, specifically the important change in 
direction committed by the Minister of Education when she decided to orient away 
from municipalization and towards community level management.  
To continue, through the technical assistance provided by international 
organizations, specialists advocated for specific reform strategies, strategies which 
then served as the basis for grant money from UNICEF and education loans from the 
World Bank.  World Bank loans were then accompanied by further mechanisms, such 
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as conditionalities other loan-related actions, not to mention additional technical 
assistance to ensure that EDUCO’s implementation would be as successful as 
possible.  During this time, both the World Bank and UNESCO also transferred 
policy entrepreneurs to El Salvador, where they would work in key governmental and 
NGO positions, positions that were integral to the success of the reforms under way.  
Once the program’s implementation began, another set of mechanisms 
became relevant.  Across El Salvador, a communication campaign was carried out 
with financing from the World Bank and technical expertise provided by the 
UNESCO consultant, who had begun to work in the MINED as the coordinator of the 
EDUCO program. The idea was to disseminate a particular message about the 
EDUCO program through community meetings, workshops, TV, radio, and 
newspapers, not to mention direct meetings between the World Bank and the 
oppositional groups (e.g., the FMLN and teachers’ organizations). 
The final two mechanisms during 1988-1995 were a series of international 
events and transnational excitement. These international events were delegations of 
MINED staff from foreign countries, as well as travel by Salvadoran MINED staff to 
other countries. These events were complemented in El Salvador by the persistent 
excitement, conviction, and dedication exhibited by World Bank staff as the EDUCO 
program grew.  Ultimately, as previously explained, both of these mechanisms 
reinforced the commitment of key actors within the MINED. 
 In these ways, then, transnational influence encompassed the entire 
development of the EDUCO program.  Indeed, while EDUCO was the primary 
outcome of this period of education reform in El Salvador, it is clear that any reform 
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that would have emerged from during the early 1990s in El Salvador would have been 
unavoidably impacted by transnational influence in a number of ways.  To that end, 
by the time the EDUCO program began, not only the education sector but the country 
as a whole had been engulfed in a context that had been thoroughly penetrated by 
transnational influence for more than a decade.  Initially, this influence came in the 
form of U.S. military, economic, and social aid. Only later, towards the end of the 
1980s, did the influence begin to appear in the form of mechanisms with relevance 
for education reform. 
8.2.2 National and Local Actor Agency 
 However, despite all that has been said above about the predominance of 
transnational influence, it is important to recognize the agency of local and national 
actors.  With regard to the former, the issue of agency cannot be overemphasized.  
That is to say, while the rebels themselves also received some assistance from 
international actors (e.g., transnational civil society, Cuba, the revolutionary 
government of Nicaragua, United Nations organizations), the locus of control (in the 
revolutionary effort) remained with the FMLN.  In other words, the FMLN refused to 
capitulate, despite the fact that they were fighting against a government and military 
forces which were backed by training and significant amounts of resources from the 
United States, as detailed in chapter six.  Importantly, both the will of the FMLN and, 
realtedly, the will of the popular teachers to carry on with their cause in the face of 
such obstacles constituted a key constraint in the Salvadoran context throughout the 
1980s and into the early 1990s.  Indeed, as explained in chapter seven, the Minister of 
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Education saw the FMLN controlled areas generally and the popular education 
schools specifically as primary challenges to the reform of the education system. 
 Similarly, national actors’ agency was integral to the evolution of education 
reform.  We have seen, for example, how the Minister of Education decided, first, to 
approve the pilot program in early 1991 and, second, to bet on the EDUCO model as 
the central reform to finance through World Bank loans.  I have also explained how 
the staff within the MINED participated in the implementation of the EDUCO 
program, and eventually came to promote it themselves. Each of these instances 
figure as key contributors to the overall trajectory of EDUCO. 
 Yet, none of the actions taken by national level actors should be surprising. 
This is because the theoretical framework elaborated in chapter four recognizes that 
structurally constrained actors will select the most strategic path to follow.  With 
regard to the Minister of Education, this meant betting on the EDUCO program once 
she perceived that muncipalization would fail due to the dual constraints imposed by 
teachers’ unions and mayors’ lack of capacity.  The later decision by certain national 
actors to act as a champion of the EDUCO program is likewise understandable.  
Salvadoran education specialists working with the EDUCO program perceived that 
their association with the program would have positive consequences for their 
professional careers, particularly if they were able to elevate and advance the cause of 
the EDUCO program.   
Time has shown that these decisions were well calculated, in both cases. The 
structural circumstances in the early 1990s were favorable to a program such as 
EDUCO, given not only that it aligned with the reform agenda of the Cristiani 
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administration but also that it had the support of the World Bank.  This type of 
informed decision-making has been labeled by Dale (1999) as paradigmatic learning 
because it reflects the structural and ideological exigencies of the moment.  At the 
time, the exigencies centered around  notions of “modernization” and “innovation” – 
both of which implied the pursuit of reform in a way that would (in theory) reduce 
central government bureaucracy, introduce market mechanisms, and move the system 
toward decentralization. This is not to say that the Minister did not also consider the 
needs of the Salvadoran education system (e.g., around access), only that one of the 
primary constrains which had to be taken into account when selecting a reform 
strategy was the preferences of the organizations which constituted structural 
constraints (and provided structural enablers). 
Due to the various mechanisms that have been discussed in this chapter, the 
structural conditions were even more propitious a few years later, in 1993-1994.  By 
that time, the profile and promise of the EDUCO program had already been “proven.”  
Informal competition thus arose among Salvadoran staff within the MINED – both to 
work with the EDUCO office as well as to become the next director of it.  Just as the 
Minister of Education had done in 1990-1991, key Salvadoran education specialists 
analyzed their structural environment and assessed the various possibilities for 
advancing their careers.  These actors then followed these calculations by repeatedly 




8.2.3 The Climate of Reception 
 Although I have highlighted the importance of agency on the part of local and 
national actors, it is necessary to take the discussion one step further.  That is to say, 
rather than concluding my discussion of EDUCO’s origins by focusing on the 
centrality of individual actors within El Salvador, I would like to shift the attention to 
the climate of reception (Dale, 2013).  Put differently: I see it as necessary to move 
the issue of national context itself to the forefront of my analysis.  The reason for this 
has to do with the extent to which shifts in the national context subsequently affect 
the effectiveness of the mechanisms of transnational influence. 
 As explained in chapter six, the U.S. government and USAID dedicated an 
enormous amount of resources – financial, institutional, political – to El Salvador 
during the 1980s.  These resources were dedicated, on the one hand, to ensuring that 
the FMLN would not be victorious in its battle against the Salvadoran government.  
On the other hand, these resources were directed at engendering fundamental changes 
in terms of El Salvador’s political and economic structures.  Over the course of this 
decade, USAID identified and sponsored a new business elite and their associations 
(Robinson, 2003). The purpose of these actions was to stimulate and strengthen a 
class of entrepreneurs who would be receptive to the neoliberal macroeconomic 
reforms that had been promoted strongly by the United States and England since 
1980.   
This strategy was successful and, over time, the Salvadoran elite who emerged 
were not only receptive but eager to implement such reforms.  They recognized the 
mis-alignment between the preferences of the dominant force of the United States 
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government and those of landed oligarchy that had for many years controlled 
Salvadoran political and economic life.  In response, the new business elite took 
advantage of the supports available to them through USAID (which helped Cristiani’s 
presidential campaign), FUSADES (which brought in the Chicago Boys to establish 
economic and social reform strategies), and the World Bank (which clarified those 
actions it would be necessary to take in order to qualify for structural adjustment 
loans).  By tapping into these supports, combined with the failure of the Duarte 
presidential administration, Cristiani followed the path toward success that had been 
mapped out by key international actors.   
Once the new business elite was on the same page as USAID and the World 
Bank, fundamental changes to the economic and political power structure within El 
Salvador accelerated.  Thus, by 1990, the climate of reception for all sectors had been 
modified – and any reform program that would make more than a minor impact had 
to accord with these fundamental changes.  Though numerous international 
organizations operated in El Salvador in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the two 
largest and most influential were USAID and the World Bank. This meant that 
successful reform programs, in addition to responding to local constraints, had to 
integrate with the neoliberal agenda for state and sector reform.  High priorities in this 
agenda were, for example, the reduction of the state generally, the incorporation of 
market mechanisms in the provision of services, and the implementation of various 
kinds of decentralization.  
 It should be clear, then, that the changes that took place in terms of El 
Salvador’s political and economic structure had serious implications for the climate 
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of reception in 1990, when international actors such as the Kast Foundation, the 
World Bank, and UNESCO began to make suggestions regarding education reform 
strategies.  Indeed, those structural alterations had the effect of creating a political 
space in which many of the mechanisms of transnational influence could operate with 
a greater likelihood of success than they would have otherwise.  Importantly, 
mechanisms which stand out in this regard are those that operated at the outset, when 
the process through which EDUCO developed first began. These mechanisms 
include, for example, dissemination of international exemplars and technical 
assistance from the World Bank and UNESCO.   
Put into broader perspective, we see that USAID created conditions for the 
success of the Cristiani administration, while later the World Bank created conditions 
for the “success” of EDUCO.  In the interim, the UNESCO consultant pointed to a 
strategy that fit with the exigencies of the local and global context at the time.  
Ultimately, however, it was the World Bank rather than UNESCO that served as a 
primary constraint on the Salvadoran context.  For this reason, while the basic outline 
of the strategy suggested by UNESCO’s consultant was retained, its purpose and 
features were different than they would have been otherwise.  This is further evidence 
of the climate of reception at the time: Notions of community empowerment, adult 
education, and the rights of the child were sanitized in favor of teacher accountability 
and cost recovery. 
Thus, in accordance with Dale (2013), I would like to suggest that the climate 
of reception be an element which is kept in mind when analyzing the development of 
education policies.  That is to say, beyond individual mechanisms, we must 
 288 
 
understand the nature of the national context in which they operate.  This is 
particularly important when considering how policies first develop.  That said, I 
would now like to turn to a further discussion of the implications of the full trajectory 




Chapter 9: Implications for Global Education Policy 
 
 While the primary focus of this dissertation has been the development of the 
EDUCO program during 1988-1995, it is important to emphasize that mechanisms of 
transnational influence continued to operate in the post-1995 period.  This was made 
obvious in the literature review chapter (chapter three), when I detailed the ways in 
which EDUCO was promoted globally.  At this point, I suggest that further 
consideration of the information presented previously about that global promotion is 
necessary.  In particular, this is so because we can gain additional insights into the 
significance of EDUCO from a long-term perspective (i.e., in the post-WWII 
context).  Finally, with the entire process in mind through which EDUCO emerged 
and has evolved, I can offer a set of implications for the development of global 
education policy. 
Thus, I begin in the present chapter by engaging in a re-assessment of what is 
known about EDUCO’s post-1995 trajectory.  That is to say, in the first section, I 
analyze the mechanisms that were at play in EDUCO’s global promotion from the 
mid-1990s onward, with grounding in the information which was presented in chapter 
three.  In the second section, I briefly reflect on EDUCO’s full trajectory, from 1988 
onward. In the third section, I locate our more comprehensive understanding of the 
EDUCO program in the post-WWII context. In so doing, I consider the significance 
of the EDUCO program in relation to the other periods of decentralization that we 
have witnessed. In the fourth and final section, I then present a series of implications 
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for the development of global education policies which follows from the experience 
of EDUCO.  
9.1 EDUCO’s Post-1995 Trajectory and Mechanisms of Transnational Influence 
 In chapter three of this dissertation, I discussed a number of issues related to 
EDUCO’s trajectory in the post-1995 period. To be specific, in section 3.4, I detailed 
the program’s global promotion during 1996-2005/6; then, in section 3.5, I reviewed 
the ways in which EDUCO has continued to be a feature of the global education 
literature.  Also as part of chapter three, I engaged in an extended discussion of the 
numerous studies produced during this time.  Going forward, I would like to take into 
consideration what that information – when considered collectively – reveals about 
the mechanisms of transnational influence that facilitated EDUCO’s continued rise.   
While I engage in that task in this section, it should be remembered that the 
post-1995 period was not the primary period of analysis for this dissertation. As such, 
there may have been additional mechanisms at play which I do not discuss here.  
Future research should further investigate the insights that I offer below.  
There were five mechanisms of transnational influence which merit our 
attention.  In the language of the analytic framework presented in chapter four, the 
mechanisms at play in the post-1995 period were international events, research, 
certification, dissemination, and national actor recruitment and socialization. Table 
9.1, below, summarizes key examples of these mechanisms, each of which I discuss 




Table 9.1: Mechanisms of Transnational Influence 
 in the Promotion of EDUCO,  Post-1995 
No. Mechanism of 
Transnational Influence  
Examples (and Year) of Mechanism Manifestation 
1 International Events EDUCO is featured at a regional seminar held in 
Central America by World Bank (1996); the IDB 
features EDUCO at the 1998 meeting of its board of 
governors; A workshop in Peru financed by the World 
Bank emphasizes EDUCO (2001); EDUCO is a 
featured program at a World Bank conference in 
Shanghai, China (2004) 
2 Research Studies performed by World Bank staff, including 
Umanzor et al. (1997), Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 
2003), Lindo (1999), Parandekar (2002), Sawada 
(2000), and Sawada and Ragatz (2005) 
3 Certification World Bank confers the President’s Award for 
Excellence on the EDUCO program (1997) and also 
labels it as a flagship program (1997); the IDB’s 
Strategy paper for primary and secondary education 
highlights EDUCO as an exemplar (2000); EDUCO is 
spotlighted in the World Development Report 2004 as a 
model for the reform of education sectors  
4 Dissemination A special issue of the World Bank Economic Review 
features the study by Jimenez and Sawada (1999); the 
journal En Breve, of the World Bank, presents on the 
experience of EDUCO (2004, 2006); a World Bank 
book on service delivery singles out EDUCO (2005); 
articles and reports by World Bank education 
specialists underscore EDUCO (Barrera et al., 2009; 
Bruns et al., 2011; Di Gropello 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Umansky &Vegas, 2007) 
5 National Actors Recruitment 
and Socialization 
Salvadoran education specialists who worked with 
EDUCO were recruited for multiple events, including: 
a Central America regional seminar (1997), a meeting 
of the board of governors of the IDB (1998), an 
international workshop in Peru (2001), and an 
international conference in China (2004).  In addition, 
Salvadoran education specialists were invited to 
contribute academic publications to journals and books 
produced by the World Bank and the IDB (Jacir de 
Lovo, 2000; Meza, 1997; Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 
2004b). 
Note: This list of mechanisms is meant to be indicative but not exhaustive, as it is based on 
the literature review contained in chapter three.  Additional research may reveal additional 




International Events: As mentioned previously, El Salvador received 
international delegations and also sent staff from the MINED abroad to share the 
EDUCO experience.  In the post-1995 period, a number of other international events 
also took place. These began, for example, with a regional seminar being organized in 
1996 by the World Bank in Central America. Subsequent events at which EDUCO 
was also featured included the 1998 meeting of the board of governors of the IDB in 
Colombia, a World Bank workshop in Peru in 2001, and, later, a World Bank 
conference during 2004 in Shanghai, China.  From a long-term perspective, then, we 
see that international events began by bring foreign delegations to El Salvador early 
on (as early as September 1992) and then continued with not only sending MINED 
staff abroad, but also by incorporating EDUCO into a number of international 
functions.  Notably, though not surprisingly, the institutions that utilized this 
mechanism of influence were those – the World Bank and the IDB – that financed the 
program within El Salvador and had a stake in its success.  
Research: From a chronological perspective, research was the next mechanism 
to be activated.  A few years after the international events had begun, research began 
to emerge which offered “favorable findings,” as noted extensively in chapter three. 
Seven studies financed by the World Bank came out in all: 1997 was the year of the 
first study, while the year of the final one was 2005.68  Two features of these studies 
lent credibility to the EDUCO program and raised its profile.  The first feature is the 
                                                 
68 As discussed in chapter three, there were more than seven studies of EDUCO 
produced in all.  Here, I refer exclusively to those produced by the World Bank.  This 
is because the present discussion is focused on mechanisms of transnational influence 
in relation to the program’s ascendance.  The non-World Bank studies were not 
favorable to the program and, as such, would not function as a mechanism of 
transnational influence which served to promote the program.  
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fact that the studies were performed by staff of (and published by) the World Bank – 
an institution which not only produces more research than any other on issues around 
development, but which, importantly, is perhaps the most-well respected by many 
development specialists (Squire, 2000, in Broad 2006, p. 395).  The second important 
feature of these studies in terms of transnational influence was the fact that the 
majority of them (or at least those which were subsequently promoted) either showed 
positive outcomes or offered positive interpretations of their results.  In ways that will 
be discussed, the mechanism of dissemination has gone hand-in-hand with the 
research studies of the World Bank.  
Certification: Shortly after the research studies began to emerge, the 
mechanism of certification was operationalized.  At least four separate instances of 
certification can be identified, two of which occurred in 1997. In that year, EDUCO 
was conferred the President’s Award for Excellence by the World Bank, beating out 
other “innovative” projects from around the world.  Also in that year, EDUCO was 
labeled a flagship program by the Bank.  Three years later, in 2000, EDUCO was 
cited by the IDB in its Primary and Secondary Education Strategy as an exemplary 
program; and then, in 2004, the most notable example of certification came to pass 
when EDUCO was spotlighted in the World Bank’s leading publication – its World 
Development Report, or WDR – as the primary example for reform for education 
systems in developing countries.  The magnitude of this latter example should not be 
underemphasized, as this edition of the WDR, which was titled “Making Services 
Work for Poor People,” has been seen by many (though certainly not all) international 
development institutions and practitioners as a key point of reference for the reform 
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of public services (World Bank, 2003).  The fact that the IDB strategy mentioned 
above and the WDR 2004 are also publications leads me to the next mechanism: 
Dissemination.   
Dissemination: It is common for international actors to promote a particular 
reform through the production and distribution of publications and reports.  This was 
certainly the case with regard to the EDUCO program. In the beginning, studies were 
created specifically to highlight the EDUCO program – such as those studies 
discussed above in relation to the research mechanism.  There were also articles in the 
World Bank’s En Breve journal which briefly summarized the EDUCO experience 
and the benefits that, from the perspective of the Bank, accompanied it (Meza, 
Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004b; World Bank, 2006b). 
However, the study that was perhaps most influential – that by Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999)69 – was featured in a special issue of the World Bank Economic 
Review which was dedicated to educational programs. Thus, in addition to being seen 
as a study with a credible methodology, and in addition to presenting findings that 
EDUCO produced comparatively higher student achievement on language tests, not 
to mention lower student absenteeism, this study’s dissemination was being greatly 
amplified by its inclusion in “the most widely read scholarly economic journal in the 
world.” 70 
                                                 
69 As Gershberg, Meade, and Andersson (2009) note: “Jimenez and Sawada (1999) 
was influential in convincing World Bank staff that EDUCO was a successful model” 
(p. 198). In that Alec Ian Gershberg was a senior education economist working the 
Bank at the time that the Jimenez and Sawada (1999) studied emerged, this 





In the 2000s, studies of the program continued, as Table 9.1 indicates. Also in 
the 2000s, EDUCO’s inclusion in other, thematic publications, which were not geared 
to the program exclusively, also became more common.  Prime examples include a 
World Bank book on the delivery of public services (Fiszbein, 2005), as well as 
numerous articles, book chapters, and reports by World Bank education specialists 
(Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009; Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 
2011; Di Gropello, 2005, 2006, 2007; Umansky &Vegas, 2007).  As a final comment 
in this regard, and as a result of the research base created by the World Bank, 
knowledge of the EDUCO program continued to be disseminated in that it was 
included in reports by a number of other organizations, including the United Nations, 
UNICEF, UNESCO, the Brooking Center, and the Global Partnership for Education. 
(See section 3.5 of this dissertation for more information on these reports.)  
National Actor Recruitment and Socialization: In addition to featuring 
EDUCO at international events, the World Bank also repeatedly recruited Salvadoran 
nationals on whom it could rely to produce and/or present favorable results for the 
EDUCO program.  As discussed under the “international events” mechanism above, 
these national actors were sent, for example, to Peru, Colombia, and China.  These 
same actors were relied upon to contribute academic publications to journals and 
books produced by the World Bank and the IDB (Jacir de Lovo, 2000; Meza, 1997; 
Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004b).  Such interactions were mutually beneficial, for 
while the World Bank gave these national actors more credibility, the World Bank 





was, in turn, also able to borrow from the credibility of certain actors who were 
integral in implementing EDUCO in the Salvadoran context.  
Thus, based on the above discussion, not only do we see that numerous 
mechanisms operated in the post-1995 period, but we also see that the mechanisms 
reinforced one another.  For example, while international events often relied on 
national actors that had been recruited by the World Bank, research studies with 
sanguine findings enhanced the program’s desirability and increased the clout of 
those national actors who would share their experience with the program. In this way, 
the simultaneous and complementary operation of multiple mechanisms served to 
increase the global reach of the program.   
At the same time, however, the post-1995 mechanisms should not be assessed 
in isolation.  I suggest that they should be considered in view of the foundation that 
was created in El Salvador during 1988-1995.  Only then can we appreciate the full 
trajectory of the EDUCO program and reflect on its implications for the development 
of global education policies.  
9.2 Consideration of EDUCO’s Full Trajectory 
 Despite the strategic nature of the post-1995 mechanisms of transnational 
influence, they cannot be considered separately from the developments of the prior 
period.  That is, while the combination of the post-1995 mechanisms was 
instrumental in raising the profile of EDUCO and in ensuring that this program would 
become widely known and emulated, the in-depth understanding of EDUCO that I 
present in this dissertation suggests that such mechanisms would not have been 
possible – or, at least, as successful – had it not been for the foundation that had been 
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established during 1988-1995.  In other words, the post-1995 mechanisms of the 
World Bank and the IDB (the two primary institutions to promote EDUCO) would 
not have been nearly as successful, if at all operable, were it not for the breadth of its 
implementation and the extent to which it was entrenched in the Salvadoran context.   
Indeed, the World Bank built on and reinforced the extent to which the 
Salvadoran MINED took on EDUCO as a program that it (i.e., the MINED) sought to 
implement as fully as possible, as explained in chapter seven. Furthermore, because 
of the buy-in from Salvadoran MINED actors, it was easier for the World Bank to 
enact a number of key mechanisms, including: Study trips for foreign delegations, the 
participation of Salvadoran actors at international events, and the conduct of research 
studies.  Subsequently, and as mentioned previously, these mechanisms fed into and 
strengthened the other mechanisms of dissemination and certification.  Ultimately, 
then, as we have seen, the EDUCO program went from being a pilot program in six 
schools in 1991 to being featured in the World Bank Economic Review, the WDR 
2004, and, more recently, many other reports by international organizations that 
operate on a global scale.  
9.3 EDUCO’s Trajectory in Long-Term Perspective 
As noted in chapter two, there have been multiple periods in the post-WWII 
context.  Across these periods, the dominant thinking around development and 
decentralization varied.  In the first period (mid-1950s – mid-1970s), educational 
decentralization was mentioned in relation to the creation of national school systems.  
This happened as many developing countries were gaining independence and 
incorporating citizens into newly created systems of political representation.  
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In the second period (1970s – early 1980s), educational decentralization was 
associated with the expansion and rationalization of the state’s administrative 
bureaucracy.  This often occurred as many countries were preoccupied with 
expanding and improving the operation of multiple levels of government as well as 
the number of services offered to citizens, but especially the poor.  
In the third and most recent period (early 1980s – present) the focus of 
development changed.  As explained previously, the state was seen as the problem. 
Ministries and systems of service provision were viewed by many development 
practitioners (but particularly mainstream development economists) as inefficient, 
cost-ineffective, cumbersome, and overly-centralized. In response, a primary concern 
of development was to reduce the size of the state, in addition to making the 
management of the state’s components more efficient, cost-effective, and 
accountable.   
Education was an area of central concern.  Indeed, in that this sector often 
consumes a significant portion of state budgets, neoliberal reformers from the 1980s 
onwards have tended to focus on reforms that would, from their perspective, improve 
the operation and management of this sector.  Likewise, to the extent that teachers’ 
unions have constituted obstacles to reform, policy entrepreneurs looked for ways to 
weaken them (Compton & Weiner, 2008). Thus, in the third post-WWII period, 
where education policies could help to minimize the size of the central government, 
could introduce market mechanisms to the provision of education, and/or could serve 
to the detriment of teachers’ unions, the more popular they would be with the 
dominant reform-minded interests of the time, such as World Bank and USAID. 
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This was a primary reason why EDUCO was received – internationally – with 
such excitement in the 1990s, once news of its “success” started to emerge from El 
Salvador. This is not to suggest that EDUCO was the first innovation to align with 
neoliberal reform preferences, for the example of vouchers in Chile emerged many 
years prior, itself serving initially as inspiration for education reform in El Salvador, 
as explained in chapter seven.  The difference was that EDUCO represented the first 
innovation wherein the dominant preferences of the time were enacted through a 
model of community-level education decentralization.   
However, beyond simply transferring to parents the responsibility for hiring 
and firing teachers, much of the attention that the program received stemmed from its 
implications for teachers’ unions. Indeed, those teachers who were hired by EDUCO 
schools could not also belong to the unions, as explained in chapter three.  Thus, by 
serving as a blow to the unions, the program was all the more popular with those 
actors within and outside El Salvador who sought to implement or spread reforms that 
would have similar effects.   
Overall, one key implication of this discussion is that, in part, EDUCO’s 
popularity resulted not from the mechanisms on which I have elaborated in this 
dissertation but rather from the extent to which it matched the pre-existing 
preferences of policy entrepreneurs.  In general, since the early 1980s, neoliberal 
reformers had been interested to reform the nature of the state; then, beginning in the 
second half of the 1980s, World Bank education specialists also began to take interest 
in applying the idea of decentralization to the education sector. The point here is that, 
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by the time the experience of EDUCO began to emerge, these actors were primed for 
a successful example of reform that could do what EDUCO was claimed to do. 
Importantly, it was never necessary to advertise, publicly, this aspect of the 
EDUCO program. That is to say, in addition to being politically unpopular (at least 
with teachers’ unions), advocates of EDUCO were able to highlight other aspects of 
the program’s success, aspects which were likely to engender less resistance. 
Examples included enhanced community participation and the supposed efficencies 
which resulted.  Most importantly, however, advocates were able, after a few years, to 
point to the World Bank studies which began to emerge and which showed positive 
results on student achievement and student attendance, for example.  With these 
studies in hand, neoliberal advocates could point to the theory and results of the 
program, rather than the more contentious issue of how the program affected 
teachers’ unions.  Ultimately, EDUCO’s example met both those official and 
unofficial priorities shared by actors in policy-relevant positions – thereby enhancing 
its attractiveness as a reform option and increasing its status as a global education 
policy. 
9.4 EDUCO and Global Education Policy 
To that end, it is necessary to step back and consider the implications of 
EDUCO for the phenomenon of global education policy.  In accordance with the 
critical realist ontological tradition on which this dissertation is based, these 
implications (or generalizations) could also be stated as hypotheses about the nature 
of the world.  In delineating these implications, I will take both mechanisms and 
issues of structure into account.   
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These implications should be understood as an attempt to explain how the 
phenomenon of global education policy works.  That said, the points offered below 
should also be understood as directed toward similar situations, situations which 
themselves should be further investigated through future research in order to more 
completely understand and perhaps problematize global education policies that have 
emerged in a manner similar to that of the EDUCO program. Possible examples 
include vouchers in Chile and outcomes-based education in South Africa. In both of 
these cases, contexts of conflict and crisis preceded the development of policies 
which subsequently achieved the status of global education policy. 
In terms of EDUCO and what we know about its trajectory, a number of 
variables, arranged in a particular sequence, and based on a particular context, would 
seem to be necessary for a policy to originate which would later become a global 
education policy.  This is not to suggest that there is only one way for a policy to 
develop and then go global; the suggestion, rather, is that the EDUCO program 
provides insights into one particular way in which that can happen.  With that in 
mind, I now present and discuss a series of implications.  
Based on the findings in this dissertation around the development, evolution, 
and diffusion of EDUCO, I suggest that the case indicates the following with regard 
to the phenomenon of global education policy. Each suggestion is accompanied by 
brief commentary. 
1. Particular contexts lend themselves to serving as the foundation for global 
education policies.  These are contexts in which the climate of receptivity is high, or 
in which the ability to resist external influence is low.  From an international political 
 302 
 
economic perspective, investigating the development of the national context and the 
ways in which international actors have contributed to changes in its nature can 
reveal, on one hand, important structural developments that increase or decrease the 
climate of receptivity and, on the other, why national actors may or may not be likely 
(or able) to resist transnational influence.  In more specific terms, there is need in 
future research to be critical of the nature and development of the national context 
itself, as well as the role of international institutions (or their intermediary 
organizations) in that regard.   
Relatedly, one issue to investigate further is whether other global education 
policies have emerged from contexts of conflict, crisis, or vulnerability.  Indeed, these 
contexts may lend themselves to the development of a favorable climate of 
receptivity. While change in government and periods of political transition are 
commonly associated with education reform (Ginsburg, 1991), the question here 
pertains to whether contexts of particularly high need and uncertainty, such as 
conflicted-affected contexts, have served elsewhere as jumping off points for policy 
experiments which later became global education policies. 
  2. A particular sequence of mechanisms facilitates a policy of interest being 
pursued, implemented, and scaled up at the national level.  That sequence would 
entail technical assistance, followed by financial resources, conditionalities, loan-
related actions, international events (e.g., foreign delegations), and research.  While 
technical assistance precedes the other mechanisms, it also continues throughout.  
Additionally, this series of mechanisms is likely to be more successful if it is 
introduced in a highly receptive national context. 
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In terms of theory, a further point can be made here, particularly with regard 
to Jakobi’s (2009) concept of global policy field (see section 4.3.2 of this dissertation 
for more).  To be specific, the sequence of events specified here would pertain to the 
vertical dimension. Through the combination of technical assistance, financial 
resources, conditionalities, and loan-related actions, international organizations 
influence, in a vertical sense, the development of education policies and programs at 
the national level. As discussed below, the horizontal transmission of influence is 
more relevant subsequently.  
3. Once a solid foundation has been established at the country level, a 
separate (though related) set of mechanisms encourages the evolution of the policy 
internationally. The point here is that international promotion is made possible by 
leveraging the foundation created at the national level. The mechanisms involved are 
international events (e.g., foreign delegations, international workshops, Salvadoran 
MINED staff abroad), research, certification, dissemination, and national actor 
recruitment.  Among these mechanisms, the production of credible research is a 
crucial in that it not only adds legitimacy to the other mechanisms but also endures 
longer than the others, as discussed in chapter three of this dissertation (see section 
3.5). 
Theoretically, these mechanisms would correspond with the horizontal 
dimension of Jakobi’s (2009) global policy field. This is because these mechanisms 
are not geared towards developing the education policy in question in a particular 
national context but rather serve to disseminate the policy example across countries. 
At the same time, it should be noted that policy traveling along the horizontal 
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dimension does not occur in the absence of the vertical dimension.  Put differently, 
horizontal transmission is frequently facilitated by mechanisms which are activated, 
in a vertical sense, by international organizations. Indeed, during this stage, the 
vertical and horizontal work in tandem to the extent that dispersion among countries 
(horizontal dispersion) of an idea or policy is made possible by international 
organizations who leverage the experience of a particular country by activating 
mechanisms such as international events, research, certification, dissemination, and 
national actor recruitment. 
4. It matters which organization predominates in a particular country. In El 
Salvador, the most influential organizations were USAID and the World Bank.  This 
is significant because these organizations, like all organizations, have preferences 
regarding the nature of education reform. In addition to being among the most 
powerful international actors working in the field of development, they also dedicate 
significant resources to education, often more so than other involved institutions, and 
in ways that carry greater influence. 
In the context of El Salvador, the significance of the above comments 
becomes more clear when we recall that USAID and the World Bank were not the 
only involved international organizations.  As explained in chapter seven, the 
consultant from UNESCO was also integral. This consultant successfully persuaded 
the Minister of Education to take a risk on the community-level pilot program. 
Moreover, this consultant saw it as her personal mission to try to disrupt the 
education reforms that were being advanced by the World Bank and the consultants 
from Chile who were brought in by USAID.  In the end, while this consultant was 
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able to place an alternative reform concept on the agenda (community 
decentralization rather than vouchers/muncipalization), its ethos and form were 
altered in the process by the World Bank and the MINED.  As explained previously, 
because the World Bank held the most clout and sway in the early 1990s in El 
Salvador, the staff of this institution were able to ensure that the community-based 
model of education decentralization aligned with their preferences for reform.   
To that end, were EDUCO to have been driven by the interests of UNESCO, 
rather than being subsumed by the World Bank, it is likely that a number of features 
would have been different. For example, it is probable (a) that the adult education 
component of EDUCO’s initial design would have been maintained; (b) that a focus 
on literacy and quality rather than efficiency and accountability would have been 
central; (c) that support from the MINED for the local level would have remained 
strong, rather than dissipating once the UNESCO consultant left her post as program 
coordinator; (d) that community empowerment would have been pursued for reasons 
of its intrinsic, rather than instrumental, value; (e) that community participation 
would have gone beyond a few parents managing the teacher; and (f) that education 
reform would have been seen from a perspective that values human rights and 
involvement in political processes, rather than education reform for system efficiency, 
the debilitation of teachers’ unions, and the creation of human capital. With regard to 
the case of El Salvador, it is for these reasons why the issue of which organization 
predominates is of great importance. That said, the issue of organizational dominance 
is closely linked with geopolitical context. 
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Before proceeding to the next implication, however, the irony of EDUCO’s 
development should not be lost.  I refer to the fact that a program which started as a 
progressive grassroots initiative was eventually co-opted by the World Bank (with the 
consent of the Salvadoran Ministry of Education) and transformed into a model for 
neoliberal education reform.  While the FLMN and many of the sympathetic 
communities which supported them had worked for social justice and a more 
egalitarian society, the EDUCO program subverted their efforts and brought them 
into a system where community involvement meant the accountability of teachers to 
parents and the weakening of the FMLN’s support base.  Not only were popular 
education teachers not eligible to work in EDUCO schools (due to insufficient 
training and inadequate credentials), but EDUCO teachers could not belong to the 
teachers’ unions.  Thus, FMLN communities had to hire outside teachers, and the 
unions experienced a setback.  Community struggle for structural transformation and 
the benefit of all became a group of parents managing a few teachers (in each 
community).  
5. The dominant geopolitical context matters. Geopolitics influence 
international organizations, which often serve as mechanisms for the furtherance of a 
given country’s foreign policy. Prime examples are USAID and the World Bank, 
which have for decades advanced notions of free-market capitalism and IN the case 
of USAID) representative democracy, often in ways that protect or extend U.S 
economic and political interests (Robinson, 1996). The point here is not that these 
two international organizations are the only relevant ones, but rather that these have 
been among the two most influential because they act in strategic ways and are 
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controlled by the United States, which has since 1991 been the world’s sole 
superpower.71   
Furthermore, as agents of U.S. government interests, these institutions help to 
establish the dominant discourse around development, as discussed in chapter two.  
The implication is that these organizations promote a particular discourse around 
development while also working at the country level to develop and implement 
policies which align with the principles and examples embedded in that global 
discourse.  EDUCO is an example of how a policy developed at the national level can 
feed back into and reinforce global level rhetoric that corresponds with dominant 
interests.  
Going forward, it will be interesting to see how changes to the geopolitical 
landscape affect the global architecture of aid for education.  In particular, it will be 
important to study the ways in which such countries as Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China gain more autonomy and create and strengthen their own development 
agencies.  At the same time, it will be important to focus on how the recent 
withdrawal (again) of U.S. funds from UNESCO affects the ability of this institution 
to advance its priorities.  
6.   It may be necessary to modify how we understand the role of the World 
Bank in relation to the origin of global education policies. As this dissertation has 
shown, it was not the World Bank which originally proposed the idea of community-
                                                 
71 Until recently (2010), the United States held a sufficient number of votes in the 
World Bank to veto any policy change with which it did not agree. For this reason, 
the United States has unilaterally appointed each of the Bank’s presidents. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, effectively, the United States continues to 
possess a sufficient number of shares to control World Bank policy, in that it has 
15.85% of the 16% of votes required to veto policy changes.  
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level decentralization. Rather, it was an innovation born of necessity during the 
Salvadoran civil war, which the consultant from UNESCO later propounded. Only 
once the World Bank recognized the utility of this model for its own purposes did this 
institution actively begin to support (an altered version of) it. 
The implication is that the World Bank, first, relies on its global reach to scan 
for policies (or policy contexts) that concur with its reform preferences and, upon 
locating one, then provides the necessary inputs to ensure its success, assuming the 
national climate is receptive (either voluntarily or otherwise). Prior research has 
suggested that the World Bank has pursued this strategy in other locations.  Examples 
include conditional cash transfers in Brazil and Mexico (Bonal, Tarabini, & Rambla, 
2012), Escuela Nueva in Colombia (McEwan & Beneviste, 2001), and vouchers in 
Chile (Gauri, 1988; Schiefelbein & Schiefelbein, 2000).  This is perhaps a different 
conception of Bank behavior than is typically suggested, given that the World Bank is 
often seen as an organization that imposes its will and requires that its policy 
preferences be implemented. While this may be true to some extent, the point here is 
that, with regard to policy innovation, the World Bank may more frequently borrow 
(or usurp and reshape) the ideas of others, at least in the field of education. 
9.4 Conclusion 
 With the present chapter, I have attempted to do two things.  On the one hand, 
I engaged in an assessment of the mechanisms at play in the second half of the 
EDUCO experience – i.e., the portion of EDUCO’s trajectory that developed after 
1995.  On the other hand, I sought to reflect on what we know about EDUCO’s full 
trajectory.  To that end, I considered EDUCO’s significance in the post-WWII 
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context, and then elaborated on the implications of this program for the development 
of global education policies more generally.  Many of these implications, which were 
elaborated in last section of this chapter, serve both as tentative findings around the 
nature of global education policy as well as the basis for future research.  At this 
point, now that I have discussed the meaning of this dissertation’s findings, I now 
turn to the final chapter, in which I will offer a few concluding remarks and briefly 





Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 
In this short concluding chapter, I offer a number of comments. First, I reflect 
on the contributions of the dissertation overall. Second, I point out issues of concern 
which emerge from the findings I have presented. Third, I elaborate on avenues for 
future research. Fourth and finally, I delineate a number of suggestions for future 
action.   
10.1 Contributions of the Dissertation 
 I have attempted to accomplish a number of tasks with this dissertation. Most 
centrally, I sought to unpack the origins of an education policy – EDUCO – which 
went on to become well-known and popular around the world. In order to do this, I 
relied on the concept of IPEPF (i.e., international process of education policy 
formation).  The value of this concept was that it helped to delimit, from an analytic 
standpoint, the space that was under investigation.  Moreover, the concept of IPEPF 
was useful because it drew my attention to the processual aspect of how education 
policies are developed.  This was precisely the aspect of the phenomenon of global 
education policies which I aimed to unpack. I felt that there was a need to better 
understand and problematize the dynamics of how, exactly, from an international 
political economic perspective, education policies first develop and then go global.  It 
is my hope that by investigating the case of the EDUCO program, I have contributed 
in a meaningful way to these ends. 
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Theoretically, I have also attempted to contribute something to the way that 
we understand transnational influence. To summarize, I began in chapter four by 
presenting an analytic framework of mechanisms of transnational influence.  This 
framework was based on the work of Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009) – two scholars 
who have been instrumental in shaping our thinking around the ways in which 
globalization and foreign aid influence education policy at the national level.   Then, 
in chapters eight and nine, I drew on this framework in order to explain how 
transnational influence affected EDUCO’s trajectory; in addition, however, I also 
used the case of EDUCO to suggest additional mechanisms, mechanisms which are 
distinct from and complementary to those previously identified by Dale (1999) and 
Samoff (2009).  In this sense, my use of existing theory was not confining but rather 
dialogic.  The mechanisms which I have identified and suggested that we further 
consider for their incorporation into the framework of mechanisms of transnational 
influence are: Financial resources, transnational excitement, intermediary 
organization, policy entrepreneur transfer, and global reach. 
Finally, though this dissertation did not focus primarily on the implementation 
of EDUCO in practice, this dissertation has made a contribution in that regard, 
particularly through chapter three. In a way, this chapter serves as a response to the 
overwhelmingly positive attention that EDUCO has been given since its inception.  
To summarize, the following characteristics of the EDUCO experience should prompt 
us to temper sanguine interpretation of its merits: (a) It required socioeconomically 
disadvantaged families to take on additional managerial responsibilities without 
compensation; (b) it extracted unpaid time and labor from rural communities 
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members in order to construct or maintain local schools (particularly during the early 
years of the program); (c) it deprived teachers of job security by precluding them 
from joining teachers’ unions;72 and (d) it limited the notion of participation to 
parents acting as an accountability mechanism through which to punish teachers.   
Beyond these features – and beyond their important negative implications for 
equity – we also saw in this dissertation that, in practice, EDUCO was not a cheaper 
alternative to traditional rural public schools73 and that, based on the critical review of 
the World Bank’s studies, the desired outcomes of the program were not achieved. 
More than that, however, Parandekar (2002) reported that school directors were 
younger and had fewer years of experience, that teachers received no professional 
development (in the year prior to his study), and that EDUCO schools had higher 
rates of student repetition and teacher absenteeism.  As pointed out in chapter three, 
the points discussed above run counter to both the theory and rhetoric around 
EDUCO. Ultimately, though some parents and communities may have valued the 
opportunity to be involved in their local school’s management, the program’s larger 
implications should not be ignored.  It is in that regard that this dissertation has made 
a contribution.  
 
                                                 
72 A recent report on the experience of EDUCO teachers has, furthermore, shed light 
on the fact that (a) female EDUCO teachers were at times subject to sexual 
harassment by the parents on the ACE, (b) ACE members would in some cases 
misappropriate part of the teacher’s income, and (c) that ACE members would at 
times sell teaching positions in their community (SIMEDUCO, 2011).  
73 Particularly not after 1995, when EDUCO teachers received salary increases that 
put their earnings 7 percent above that of teachers in traditional public schools.  
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10.2 Issues of Concern 
 It is my hope that the readers of this dissertation perceive the findings to be 
concerning. Indeed, it stands out to me that there are a number of disconcerting issues 
around how the experience of the EDUCO program developed. In what follows, I 
briefly specify and comment on a few of these issues.  
1. The fact that the World Bank and the MINED decided on EDUCO before 
the Peace Accords. Six months before the Peace Accords were signed, the MINED 
and the World Bank concluded negotiations on the SSRP, the education loan through 
which EDUCO was initially scaled up.  Given the timing of these negotiations, the 
implication is that the country had not even ended the conflict, let alone formally 
begun discussion around policy reform.  The MINED and the World Bank thus set 
the trajectory for reform of education governance while out of view of the public. In 
that education is a public good, reform processes can and should be more open, 
transparent, and democratic.  
2. The conditions under which the MINED made its decision.  I do not wish to 
suggest that there is, inherently, an issue with transnational mechanisms of influence. 
The provision of technical assistance, for example, can certainly be advantageous, 
and is not necessarily harmful. Rather, the issue to which I refer here is the fact that 
the exigencies driving the Salvadoran MINED were, in large part, external. It is true 
that the Minster of Education also experienced local level constraints, such as the 
FMLN and popular education teachers, but the force driving the reform process came 
largely from the World Bank. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government was 
hurriedly taking the steps necessary to qualify for structural adjustment loans.  
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Similarly, the Minister of Education was searching for a reform that would align with 
the preferences of the World Bank. Moreover, it had to do so according to the World 
Bank’s internal timeline for negotiating and approving the education loan.  In contrast 
with the above, interaction between national and international actors should be 
collaborative rather than coercive, and it should respond to the needs of those who are 
most in need within the country, rather than the requirements and preferences of the 
Bank or any similar institution.  
3. The way in which the World Bank used its research. Based on my critical 
literature review of World Bank EDUCO studies in chapter three, there is evidence to 
suggest that researchers in this institution were primarily interested in proving that 
EDUCO worked.  Both the sample and the methods on which these studies relied 
were problematic, as I attempted to explain.  I also attempted to demonstrate that 
alternative interpretations were possible. The World Bank, however, continued to 
offer findings which were overly rosy. Alternative forms of research and alternative 
explanations were not pursued.  
4. The fact that, during this historical period, many policies which tend to spread 
globally also tend to be neoliberal in nature. EDUCO is one example of a global 
education policy. I have mentioned others at various times in this dissertation (e.g., 
vouchers, merit-based teacher pay, charter schools, public-private partnerships). The 
issue that I wish to point out here is that many of these policies tend to be neoliberal 
in nature. This is concerning because, as forms of privatization, such policies tend to 
have negative implications for equity, diversity, inclusion, public school quality, and 
the functioning of a healthy democracy.   
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10.3 Future Research  
 This dissertation has highlighted areas for future research. These areas depart 
from the study’s limitations (as noted previously in section 5.5.4). Seven areas for 
future research which stand out in particular.  
1. Local level operation: The primary focus of my research has been the 
interaction of the international and national levels. While I have addressed the local 
level, my commentary in that regard has tended to center around the fact that the local 
level – i.e., communities sympathetic with the FLMN and popular teachers – 
constituted a constraint on the national context. Going forward, research should 
attempt to unpack how the program operated at the community level.  The only other 
qualitative study at that level is the one conducted by Lindo (1998), which I discussed 
in chapter three.   
Even though El Salvador’s President – Mario Funes – began to undo EDUCO 
beginning in 2011, I was able to collect retrospective data from parents and teachers 
at the community level in two separate communities. I was able to complement this 
with data from EDUCO specialists and MINED representatives at the departmental. 
Together, once analyzed this information may provide additional insights into the 
benefits and limitations of EDUCO in practice.  
2. Resistance: As noted in this dissertation, prior research on EDUCO tended 
to focus on whether or not the program worked – statistically speaking and with 
regard to certain outcomes, such as student achievement and student and teacher 
attendance.  Thus, a major gap in the literature relates to the experience of those 
communities where popular education operated during and after the civil war.  A 
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number of these communities strove, with varying degrees of success, to maintain 
their approach to education, rather than joining the EDUCO program.  There is 
extremely limited information on this resistance, however. 
Research should go beyond the initial resistance, though.  I also suggest that 
any study conducted also investigate the ways that these communities (a) adapted to 
the EDUCO program, once they had (for reasons of financial necessity) to join it, and 
(b) used the program to their own benefit, by hiring, where possible, their own 
popular teachers.  At present, I am in the process of finalizing a study on one 
community which has been particularly successful not only at resisting the initial 
adoption of EDUCO, but also at using the program for their own ends once they 
became a part of it.  This same community has also been adept at applying pressure to 
the government in order to procure additional resources for their school, resources 
which they would not have received otherwise through the EDUCO program.  
3. Actor perspectives: Future research may illuminate to a greater extent the 
perspectives of certain groups of actors (e.g., MINED staff, teachers, community 
members, the FMLN) in relation to EDUCO and the process through which it 
developed.  The primary focus of this dissertation was not to examine or present the 
perspectives of involved actors, per se, but was rather to explain the origins and 
evolution of the EDUCO program.  Further presenting and comparing perspectives 
across actor groups could provide interesting insights – for example, it could add 
additional nuance (a) to how we understand the experience of being involved in the 
process of developing and implementing global education policy, (b) how we 
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interpret their meaning, and, by extension, (c) how actors may attempt (or wish) to 
respond to them.  
4. Organizational dynamics: In particular, I refer to the internal dynamics of 
the World Bank. This area is important to research because it will help us get a better 
understanding of how this institution works, particularly with regard to the adoption 
and promotion of policy innovations. Such research may help us understand how 
EDUCO went from being a policy to which World Bank staff were initially averse to 
one which World Bank staff widely held up and promoted, for example, through the 
WDR 2004. At present, I have data that can shed light on these issues – data that I 
collected by interviewing numerous World Bank representatives at multiple levels 
within the organization.  In the future, I plan to interrogate the information that I have 
to see what insights it yields.  
5. Post-1995 trajectory: In chapters three and nine, I analyzed the trajectory of 
EDUCO in the post-1995 period.  This was done by conducting – and drawing 
inferences from – an extensive literature review. While this analysis produced a 
number of valuable insights into how the EDUCO program was used and promoted 
after 1995, further research could provide additional findings regarding how the 
World Bank and others contributed to its trajectory.  For example, it is likely that the 
World Bank’s policies for country-level staff relocation after 3-7 years contributed to 
the geographic dispersion of the program’s influence.  If so, this would be an 
additional mechanism of transnational influence of which we should be aware. Such 
research would complement the study suggested in number three, above.  
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6. EDUCO’s undoing in El Salvador:  As mentioned above, Mario Funes, the 
president of El Salvador who was elected in 2009, recently began to transform the 
EDUCO program.  Notably, Funes’ election represented the first time that a candidate 
from the FMLN reached the presidency.  The ARENA party had controlled this office 
since 1989, when Cristiani was elected.  The point here, however, is that research 
does not yet exist which examines this recent period of education reform – either 
generally or with regard to how and why it is that EDUCO, specifically, has been 
transformed.  That said, we do know that Funes has provided EDUCO teachers with 
job security. He did this by moving all EDUCO teachers to the regular governmental 
teacher system (they can now join the unions), and by removing from parents the 
ability to hire and fire teachers.  
 7. Other global education policies: EDUCO is, of course, only one among a 
number of policies that have become globally popular. Others include vouchers, 
outcomes-based education, merit-based teacher pay, conditional cash transfers, 
charter schools, public-private partnerships, etc. Additional case studies should be 
conducted which investigate the development of these policies over time, from their 
inception to their elevation as global education policies. Such research could, where 
appropriate, help to critique such policies individually, as well as to draw attention to 
the potentially problematic manner in which such policies have evolved and been 
spread around the globe.  
10.4 Recommendations 
 In this final section, I offer a few brief recommendations for future action 
which depart from some of the issues that were brought to the fore in this dissertation.  
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1. Development practitioners and national-level actors should be more critical of 
the origins of global education policies, as well as the claims and research 
base which accompany them. 
2. Efforts should be made to support transnational civil society (TNCS) – and in 
ways that help TNCS to participate, monitor, and apply pressure at multiple 
levels of the policymaking, policy implementation, and policy evaluation 
process. Work has begun in this area since the emergence of the EDUCO 
program (e.g., Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Verger & Novelli, 2012). A good 
example at the moment is the Global Campaign for Education.74  
3.  Steps should be taken to build alternative sources of research on education 
policy, sources which are not guided exclusively by the principles of 
efficiency, accountability, cost-effectiveness, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship at the expense of equity, social cohesion, and the creation of 
an egalitarian society.  A current example is the Privatisation in Education 
Research Initiative, which sponsors research that applies a social justice lens 
to its interpretation of the effects of education reform.75   
4. Quantitative methodologies should not be prioritized to the exclusion of 
alternatives.  Ethnographic evaluation (Whitehead, 2002), discourse analysis 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002), geo-spatial approaches (Lubienski, Gulosino, & 
Weitzel, 2009), vertical case studies (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2009), narrative 
methods (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998; Moen, 2006), and 
                                                 
74 For more, see: http://www.campaignforeducation.org/en/  
75 For more, see: http://www.periglobal.org/  
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matrix-based strategies (Miles & Huberman, 1994), among others, can 
provide valuable insights, and they should not be ignored. 
5. Alternative funding channels for education should be developed and/or 
strengthened.  The channels to which I refer are unrelated to the World Bank 
and other development institutions which advance neoliberal policies and 
principles, often through coercive means.  As part of these efforts, the national 
level is not necessarily the only or the best counterpart with whom to work.  
Working directly at the local level to develop or strengthen promising 
education programs is an option which should likewise be pursued. Interesting 
work on one example – the Bolivarian Alternative for the peoples of our 
America (ALBA) – has been done (Muhr, 2008, 2011).  
6. Efforts by the MINED and international actors (e.g., international NGOs, bi- 
and multi-lateral agencies, and TNCS) should be directed at developing the 
technical capacity of national-level education specialists. In my experience in 
El Salvador, the staff of the MINED, education specialists who worked with 
education NGOs, and professors of education at the best universities in El 
Salvador all lacked (or felt they lacked) sufficient abilities with regard to 
research methodologies. This contributed to their dependence on external 
evaluators and their recommendations. 
From a critical perspective, moving toward some of these suggestions may have 
positive implications for how policies are developed, implemented, disseminated, and 
received, as well as for their effects in practice. Both this dissertation and these 
suggestions have been aimed at problematizing the current nature of the dominant 
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approach to development, as well as at encouraging future efforts which can not only 
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